

Dealing with Aftermath of Attacks: Lessons from Mumbai and elsewhere on what to do and what not to do

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The Mumbai November 26 attacks were marked by several new features though less in casualties than earlier incidents.¹ For the first time heavily armed terrorists *invaded* India through a sea route and engaged in active combat for almost 68 hours.² All earlier attacks on Mumbai were explosions through timed devices. It was also the first time that many foreigners were killed, mostly in 5 star hotels. Although casualties were less, the psychological damage and panic it created on civil population resulted in severe public anger resulting in the resignation of several senior politicians including the State Chief Minister and Union Home Minister.

The attacks unveiled a number of innovations in terrorist methodology. The most important was the handlers' ability to direct action from a foreign country.³ Next was their ability in utilizing target country's free electronic media as guide for further killing. Competitive visual media covering the attack beamed minute to minute details which were relayed back to killer teams by handlers through cell phones. Simultaneous attacks on all the five targets totally confused an unprepared Mumbai Police and public much like the September 11 attacks did to the Americans. The elaborate subterfuge which the handlers organized in their communications with terrorists was yet another innovation.

Unlike many other earlier attacks in India, during this incident real time operational co-operation between foreign and Indian agencies in tracking down communications between terrorists and handlers took place. This helped immediate tactical planning for counter measures. Foreign cooperation also helped to secure scientific evidence in tracking down the source of procurement of equipment used for the attack. Thus this incident provided a highly illustrative case for examining international cooperation in counter-terrorism.⁴

The Mumbai attacks

In January 2008 India nationals Fahim Ansari and Sabuddin Shaikh handed over rough target maps to the "Lashkar-e-Taiba" (LeT) leadership. This was fed into five Garmin Rino GPS sets procured by the LeT. Fake Indian (Hindu) identity cards were prepared for ten terrorists (in five "buddy pairs") who were taught the Hindi spoken in Mumbai. To hide their communication, the LeT booked an account in October 2008 with

Callphonex, a New Jersey (USA) VOIP service provider and obtained different cell numbers in an Indian fictitious name as a VOIP re-seller. Separate numbers were obtained for two way communications (handler to terrorists and terrorists to handler). Payments were made from different locations including Pakistan and Italy. Fictitious e-mail ID created by them was traced subsequently to ten IP addresses in Lahore, Chicago, Kuwait, Koroliyov (Russia) and Rawalpindi. This was used for communication with Callphonex and also with an Indian TV channel claiming themselves as "Deccan Mujahideen".⁵ One IP address - that of Sajid Iftikar - was traced to "Special Communication Organization", Rawalpindi, which was suspected to be a government organization. An inflatable rubber dinghy was procured with a Yamaha outboard engine by "Business and Engineering Trends", Lahore. Five cell phone handsets used by terrorists and abandoned in Mumbai were found procured from Nokia, in Dongguan, China by different addresses in Pakistan. Live hand grenades recovered from dead terrorists had "Arges" mark traced to the "Wah Nobel Company" located near Islamabad.⁶

The fully trained terrorists left Pakistani waters on November 23 in a Pakistani vessel "al-Husaini". Each was armed with a AK-47 rifle with 240 bullets, 10 grenades, one 7.62 pistol with 14 rounds, a Nokia cell phone, a RDX laden IED (Improvised explosive device) and dry fruits. The group had a satellite phone. On entering Indian waters off Saurashtra coast they hijacked an Indian vessel *M.V.Kuber* with five crew members. Four of them were led away in al-Husaini and reportedly killed. One was taken to Mumbai coast as a guide, until the last four nautical miles, and then killed. They then inflated the rubber boat with a foot pump, transferred all equipment and abandoned the *Kuber* with the dead sailor, and reached the Mumbai shoreline around 8:30pm on November 26. On landing in the thickly populated Machimar Nagar (Fishermen's Colony) opposite Badhwar Railway Officers' quarters, they split themselves into five groups and went towards target areas. Some hired taxis while one team walked up to the Chabad House⁷ through narrow bye-lanes. All were guided by GPS instruments.⁸ Targets were: Leopold Café, Taj Palace Hotel, Chabad House, Railway Terminal and Oberon/Trident Hotel. The Chabad House terrorists were the last to fall at about 4:00 pm on November 29 while the two terrorists in the Oberoi-Trident lasted until that morning. The two terrorists who attacked the railway terminal tried to escape through a narrow lane into Cama Hospital where they killed seven and hijacked a senior police officer's vehicle after killing nine, including three senior police officers, around midnight of November 26 and 27. However soon thereafter they were finally intercepted by a police road block on "Marine Drive". One terrorist was killed while the other was taken alive. He was Ajmal Kasab, the lone Pakistani terrorist who was caught alive, faced trial and was sentenced to death on May 6, 2010.

As far as can be ascertained this was the first time terrorist handlers actively guided attacks from Pakistan through cell phones with numbers appearing from European countries. Also almost certainly for the first time, the terrorist handlers were

helped by a visual media broadcasting minute to minute details on attacks at different spots, casualties, persons who were trapped, public panic and all other operational details.⁹ Policemen who saw visuals of their top leaders dying in ambush including an Inspector General in charge of the State anti-terrorist squad conveyed to the Enquiry Team that it seriously demoralized the entire force which was engaged in combat operations for 68 hours. Further and significant public panic also resulted from several bombs going off in different parts of the city. The terrorists had planted bombs in unsuspecting taxis which took them to target spots which later blew up in different parts of the city. Bombs planted in the Taj hotel, the Oberoi-Trident and Chabad House, exploded causing great damage. Rumours that started to spread claimed 60 terrorists had invaded the city.¹⁰

Strategic failures of government machinery

Even though central agencies received a series of intelligence alerts from 2006 that the LeT was training teams for sea borne commando attacks on multiple targets including luxury hotels in Mumbai they did not lead to capacity building by the local police in Maharashtra state. No efforts were made to strengthen sea patrolling.¹¹ In the Indian system, the State Police were responsible for guarding 12 nautical miles from shore line, the Defence Ministry's Coast Guards from 12 to 200 nautical miles and the rest is the responsibility of the Navy. Owing to several reasons the state of Maharashtra, which has 720 kilometers of coast line, could not set up satisfactory coastal security. The Central Government also failed to order the Coast Guards to keep vigilance despite generating terror alerts since 2006. Special anti-terrorist squads created in Maharashtra to confront terrorists in the wake of earlier bomb attacks also proved inadequate. The terrorists used "area clearing weapons" like grenades against which the local police had no suitable equipment to counter.

Prior to the attacks the central and state governments neglected "open source intelligence" on such attacks. They failed to verify press reports that a suspected LeT vessel with terrorists was intercepted in March 2007 off the Mumbai coast by the Coast Guards. Similarly the Mumbai police failed to analyze capacity building by the terrorist groups concerned and their implications for Mumbai's own security following the Kabul Serena Hotel attack (January 2008) or Islamabad Marriot attack (September 2008).

The government's response was also let down by the time it took (almost 11 hours) for the National Security Guards (NSG), the specially trained commando force to counter terrorist attacks, to arrive at the scene since they had to be flown from a location near New Delhi. By the time they arrived most of the killings and arson had already taken place. The Army and Navy contingents who were deployed in the interim to help the local police proved ineffective in resisting the heavily armed and well trained terrorists. Even the NSG only managed to clear the last of the terrorists in the afternoon of November 29. The local police, although poorly equipped and took heavy casualties

in the process, contributed most to containing the damage by avoiding the violence from spilling beyond the target spots. Its officers even ventured inside the narrow labyrinths of luxury hotels to keep terrorists at bay although they could not match the terrorists' skill.

A constitutional provision of division of power between the Union and the states is partly responsible for the poor preparedness of State Police forces. The primary responsibility for internal security affecting the 1.3 billion Indian people is with the civil police numbering about 1 million working under 28 state governments and seven Union territories.¹² The Seventh Schedule of Indian Constitution provides for distribution of powers wherein "police" and "public order" is the state's responsibility. States have been reluctant to dilute this.¹³ The deployment of police is a prerogative of state governments and the Union government, as such, has no authority to order the deployment of police. Unlike other countries India has no law on "federal crime". Consequently terrorism even emanating from outside international borders is considered as crimes to be investigated only by state police.¹⁴ Training and deployment of state police are left to individual states. The quality of police training and preparedness thus differ from state to state. The Mumbai incident confirms long standing experience that this is a key weakness in India's anti-terrorist capacity.

Inexperience of local authorities also contributed to their failure in handling an attack on the scale of the Mumbai assaults.¹⁵ Ambulance services failed while fire engines ran out of water. Police vehicles had to be used to ferry the injured to hospitals and also as escorts for fire engines trying to replenish their water. Instead of having one centralized Operations Room, different sets of supervisory officials met in different "Control Rooms". The experience underlined the need to have an overall "Operational Incident Manager" to take charge of the situation.

Present features of Jehadi terrorism in South Asia and inter-state links

Educated Indian Jehadi recruits continue to have links with others including like minded extremists abroad as revealed by the terrorists arrested in September 2010 for the February 13, 2010 Pune (Maharashtra) "German Bakery" IED attack which killed 17 and injured 56. Footprints of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the LeT were clearly visible proving James Kitfield's premonition in 2006.¹⁶ The attack architecture was prepared in a remote town, Udgir, 590 kilometers from Mumbai in a small "Cyber Café"¹⁷ owned by Mirza Himayat Baig. The 3 kilogram RDX bomb assembled here was carried all the way from Udgir to Pune (380Km) on a public bus! They also wanted to attack a major Indian Army camp in Deolali (Nashik District adjoining Pune District) to avenge the Malegaon Bomb attack on September 28, 2008 by a Hindu extremist group.¹⁸ The main terrorists were trained by the LeT in Pakistan and had used Bangladesh and Nepal for clandestine cross border journeys. Mirza Himayat Baig revealed that he received training in Colombo, a hitherto unknown training center, in "Daura-e-aam"

(Basic combat course) and “Daura-e-Khaas” (3 months advanced combat course). Colombo was preferred since Pakistan-Nepal or Pakistan-Bangladesh routes have been kept under close surveillance since November 26. He also said that terrorists preferred operating in small modules to prevent detection. Another terrorist Sheikh Hussain Fareed alias “Bilal” who lived as a Hindu in Nashik District said that he was indoctrinated in Qatar in 2007 while working as a mechanic. Bilal was then sent to Dubai and Iran to meet with LeT leadership. He said that Gulf countries continued to be key recruiting areas for Indian youths. ¹⁹

Some fringe organizations representing “marginalized sections” of Indian society with avowed political agenda were found instigating extremist activities clandestinely. Abdul Nasser Madani of Kerala State, leader of the Islamic Sevak Sangh (Islamic Service Society-ISS) and later of Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) when ISS was banned in 1992 was accused in the 1998 Coimbatore serial bomb blasts killing 60. After his acquittal in 2007 he was wooed by Kerala State political parties to garner Muslim votes. However he was again arrested in 2010 for inciting LeT terrorists responsible for several bomb blasts including the 2008 Bangalore serial bombing cases. Similarly some activists of the Popular Front of India (PFI) were accused of chopping off the right hand of Mr. Joseph, a Kerala College professor on July 4 2010, for alleged blasphemy in preparing a College question paper. ²⁰

“Mega Cities”: A big problem in developing Countries

South Asian cities are “Endless Cities” ²¹ with nightmarish logistical problems for law and order even in normal times. India’s Central Urban Development Ministry’s “Expert Committee” has said that the projected slum population in or around major Indian cities would go up from the present 75.26 million to 93.06 million in 2011.²² Lop sided urban development in most major cities has created honey comb residential structures on narrow streets causing traffic snarls, water scarcity and a host of other problems. Mumbai, which had a population of 7 million in 1975, has 14 million now. Including its satellite cities it is 19 million. The entire population is confined to a land area of 604 square kilometers, with 54% living in slums occupying only 6% of the land area.²³ Seven million travel daily by suburban trains while the volume of daily traffic by bus is four million.²⁴ Flash riots take place if daily transit trains are delayed. Even in ordinary times emergency vehicles have grave difficulties in reaching trouble spots promptly. ²⁵

Inter-state Counter-Terrorist cooperation in South Asia

Terrorism was noticed as a new phenomenon in India only since the mid-1980s after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination by her police guards on October 31, 1984. India then created new Central anti-terrorist forces to help the state police in meeting terrorism which had raged in Punjab after Indian forces stormed the Sikh

religious shrine in June 1984 to flush out militants. From 1989 onwards Kashmir related terrorism gave a new dimension to the problem while the Babri Masjid demolition by Hindu zealots on December 6, 1992 extended it to the rest of India. Communal strife gave way to Jehadi terrorism. However Indian Police did not evolve a holistic strategy to tackle terrorism since information on terrorist activities was scattered in different wings of the Security machinery. The March 12, 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai, which killed 257 in 13 “serial” explosions, were considered as the first manifestation of externally sponsored terrorism in the “rest of India”. It was not so. Indian security forces forgot that an earlier externally sponsored attempt to spread strife to South India with similar *modus operandi* by bombing various targets including the Madras Stock Exchange. This series of attacks failed due to the chance arrest of the Toronto based Lal Singh on July 16, 1992.²⁶ The Central Bureau of Investigation which took over investigation from the local police in August 1992, failed to inform others of this methodology of serial bomb blasts - much like the failures of US authorities prior to September 11 where interrogation reports were not shared. Consequently the then Bombay Police Commissioner told the media that he suspected LTTE’s hand immediately after the March 1993 blasts in which the Bombay Stock Exchange was also bombed.²⁷

The lack of a holistic understanding of the inter links between terrorists adversely affects not only the internal counter-terrorist operations within a country but also the countering of global terrorism. I first underlined the importance of understanding how terrorists operated trans-nationally during a lecture at the Seminar on Terrorism organized by the National Advisory Council on South Asian Affairs, Washington DC on June 19, 2003. It was the chance arrest of Noor Sikander by Mumbai Police in May 2003, who was responsible for the March 2003 serial Mulund blasts, that revealed Aftab Ansari – deported from Dubai to India in February 2002 – was involved in the January 2002 shooting of the Kolkata American Center in Calcutta, and as the mastermind of the kidnapping for ransom of Partha Burman (Kadim shoes, Kolkata) in July 2001. The ransom (reportedly US\$ 600,000 or \$830,000) was sent through “Hawala” channels in Hyderabad or Dubai to Saeed Omar Sheikh of Jaish-e-Mohammad (the killer of Daniel Pearl) who forwarded it to Mahammed Atta before September 11. In other words the Kolkata ransom wholly or partially funded September 11 attacks. We came to know about this only in 2003. No state police with inherent handicaps would have learnt about this in advance since criminal activities spanned several states/countries.²⁸

Counter-terrorist cooperation between different countries usually depends on bilateral political relations. If bilateral relations warm up there is some movement in cooperation as we see with India and Bangladesh. The present Bangladesh Government has handed over several fugitives of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a regional terrorist group hiding in Bangladesh. ²⁹ However by and large there has been no satisfactory cooperation among South Asian countries due to

historical factors. Despite reaching the “SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Co-Operation] Regional Convention on Suppression on Terrorism” since 1987 no concrete steps have been taken by the signatories to establish intelligence sharing or arrest of fugitive terrorists. Sometimes even when political relations are normal such exchanges do not result in prompt action. Early in October 1994 Indian intelligence came to know LTTE preparations to assassinate Gamini Dissanayaka, one of Sri Lanka’s brightest politicians. Sri Lankan authorities were immediately alerted through diplomatic channel. However this was lost in the bureaucratic chain and Gamini Dissanayaka was killed in a suicide bomb attack near Colombo on October 24, 1994 much like former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who was killed on May 21, 1991.³⁰

Studies of the Indo-Pakistani relations indicate that temporary groundswell of good dialogue is not translated into policy correction. The “Hawana Declaration” (September 16, 2006) between President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on intelligence exchange was a non-starter. The bonhomie witnessed during SAARC Interior Ministers’ Conference (Islamabad, June 2010) and the warm sound bites between Indian and Pakistan Interior ministers during bilateral parleys, which also saw the first ever meeting between both countries’ Chiefs of Intelligence Bureaus, did not in fact result in any forward movement to implement “SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters”. Indeed, the verbal pyrotechnics witnessed later between both countries on Kashmir stone throwing and police action have almost wiped out the possibility of any movement by Pakistan pursuing the case against November 26 conspirators which were purely as a result of external pressure.³¹

What is the way out?

It will be futile to imagine that relationship between some South Asian countries would improve in the near future to enable active counter-terrorist cooperation to European standards. However, experience reveals that activities of scattered extremist modules in different countries pose threats not only to home countries but also to the rest of the world. Experience during the last thirty years has revealed that terrorism is not a conventional foreign intelligence problem. Yet most nations still entrust their foreign intelligence agencies with collection of intelligence on terrorism and liaison merely because terrorists usually live outside their national boundaries. Most intelligence agencies are organized on the basis of lessons learnt from World War II to support their foreign offices. They share the same professional culture and outlook, and often undertake intrusive and at times coercive operations under cover of diplomacy. Because of this they suffer from mutual distrust. In contrast, terrorism based on transnational religious extremism is a new phenomenon that uses organized crime’s tradecraft. It is more of a policing problem than a foreign intelligence service problem. In this context it is useful to remember the main recommendation of the “John Major Enquiry Report” on the 1985 Air India Kanishka aircraft bombing. He advised the CSIS

to upgrade their intelligence collection to the level of MI5 or ASIO in producing intelligence that can be used as evidence.³²

It is a generally accepted fact that police organizations enjoy better credibility even between less friendly nations since their activities are governed by national criminal laws supervised by courts. That is not the case with intelligence agencies, which are often suspected to be working against other countries or whose work are not subject to be tested in a court of law. It is for this reason why national crime investigating agencies like FBI or Australian National Police have foreign relations posts. Even New York Police and Los Angeles Police Departments have foreign liaison posts in view of the complex problems of terrorism originating from abroad. To make South Asia more effective in countering transnational terrorism, "Police Attaches" should be appointed to liaise with local police authorities where they are needed.³³

¹ The 1993 serial bomb attacks killed 257 while the timed bomb attacks on transit railway system in 2006 resulted in 209 deaths. The Mumbai attacks saw 170 deaths including 25 foreign nationals, 18 security personnel and 5 sailors on the high sea.

² They were met initially by poorly equipped civil police who took heavy casualties and later by well trained Central anti-terrorist commandos.

³ New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said, "The ability of terrorist handlers to direct operations from outside the attack zone using cell phones" was a "formidable capacity to adjust tactics while attacks are underway". The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on "Mumbai Terrorist Attacks" on January 08, 2009.

⁴ Remarks prepared for delivery by Robert S. Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the Council on Foreign Relations Washington, D.C. on Feb 23, 2009: "Through these partnerships, we had unprecedented access to evidence and intelligence. We examined the scenes of several attacks. Agents and analysts conducted more than 60 interviews, including that of the lone surviving attacker. Our forensic specialists pulled fingerprints from improvised explosive devices. They recovered data from damaged cell phones, in one case by literally wiring a smashed phone back together. At the same time, we collected, analyzed, and disseminated intelligence to our partners at home and abroad - not only to determine how these attacks were planned, and by whom, but to ensure that if a second wave of attacks was in the offing, we possessed the intelligence to stop it."

⁵ The "Indian Mujahideen" (IM) was noticed from 2008 in several terror attacks in India. This is widely seen as a breakaway group of "Students' Islamic Movement of India" (SIMI). The Mumbai terrorist handlers used "Deccan Mujahideen" to confuse the public that it was an indigenous outfit like IM.

⁶ Final Report (charge sheet) of the Mumbai Terror Attack cases November 26, 2008 submitted on February 25, 2009 in the Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai. Two Garmin Rino sets were traced from Taj hotel while one Garmin 12 Map was recovered from *MV Kuber*, an Indian vessel hijacked by terrorists on November 23, 2008.

⁷ "Chabad House", known locally as "Nariman House", was purchased by Chabad Lubavitch movement in 2006. Neither the local police nor the Foreigners' Intelligence Branch knew about the existence of a Jewish hostel here.

⁸ The first attack was made at Leopold Café (21:30-21:40) killing 11, the second at Taj Hotel (21:40 - 36 dead), the third at Chabad House (21:45 -9 dead), the fourth at Oberoi-Trident (21:50 -35 dead) and the fifth at the Railway Terminal (21:50- 22:15, killing 52). The Leopold team joined up with the Taj pair during the prolonged siege, until the morning of November 29.

⁹ They unintentionally helped the handlers in re-energizing terrorists by exhorting them that their attacks were effective. At one stage the Indian TV wrongly reported that a Central Minister was among those trapped in Taj Hotel. Immediately handlers were heard asking terrorists to trace and kill him.

¹⁰ These simultaneous incidents sparked off panic all over the city leading to 1365 calls to the city police control room between 21:30 and 02:00 hours on the night of November 26-27. The authorities had no means of knowing how many terrorists were involved since in all these cases police entered the scene well after the terrorists had carried out initial killing. No means were available with the authorities to counter these rumours. Whatever feeble attempts were made by disorganized government authorities were drowned in the live coverage.

¹¹ As against this the Mumbai attacks were considered serious by different police forces in the US who conducted simulated exercises in several US cities. Please see Kevin Johnson and Thomas Frank, "Mumbai Attacks refocus US cities", *USA Today*, Dec 5, 2008.

¹² The reason why the states and not the Centre came to manage "Internal Security" was because India adopted the ingredients of the colonial Government of India Act of 1935 while formulating constitutional provisions on distribution of subjects between the central government and the states. The 1935 Act had divided subjects into "federal", "provincial" and "concurrent". V.P. Menon, *The transfer of Power in India* (Orient Longman: 1993), 53.

¹³ This can lead to bizarre situations. It is commonly estimated that Jehadi terrorism outside the Kashmir valley started after the 16th Century "Babri Mosque" was demolished by Hindu mobs in December 1992. Although the Central Government had placed over 20,000 Central Para-military forces at the disposal of the pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party government of Uttar Pradesh State, they were not utilized and the mosque was demolished. M.D. Godbole, *Unfinished Innings* (Orient Longman: 1996), 363.

¹⁴ It was only after the Mumbai attacks was a law passed by the Parliament in December 2008 to create a "National Investigation Agency" (NIA) to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India, and friendly relations with foreign States, thereby including terrorism too.

¹⁵ United States Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told a Johns Hopkins University audience that the absence of an operational incident manager as was developed in the US after the 9/11 attacks -- clearly was a major problem during the Mumbai attacks, where there was a glaring lack of coordination between various departments and agencies. He quoted the *Wall Street Journal* about the lack of communication between the fire services responders and the emergency responders, the police and the military dealing in the hours and then days after that initial assault in Mumbai. Rediff.Com report Dec 12, 2008 (<http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/12mumterror-lack-of-coordination-during-attacks-glaring-says-top-official.htm>).

¹⁶ James Kitfield said in "al-Qaeda's pandemic" (*National Review* September 1, 2006) quoting Mario Mancuso, former Deputy Assistant Secretary, US Department of Defense: "Global insurgency reacts to

Osama bin Laden's radical ideology almost like distant and seemingly disconnected light particles respond in unison to an unseen wave". In my writings I had gone back into Indian history to trace how extremist feelings were nurtured at different times but ignored on political grounds. The sudden rise in extremist feelings after Babri Masjid demolition in 1992 could be attributed to such latent feelings which have been lying dormant. (Please see my paper "Indigenous support to cross border/Jehadi terrorism with special reference to Indian Mujahideen/SIMI and the likes" - Paper presented to SIES Seminar on "Countering terrorism in India: Challenges of the 21st Century" - Mumbai University, August 31-September 2, 2009.)

¹⁷ "Cyber Cafes" are commercial outlets enabling those who do not possess computers to surf internet.

¹⁸ A Hindu extremist module responsible for the Malegaon (a Muslim majority city) blast on September 29, 2008 killing 7 persons was unearthed by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad in 2008. This was led by a Hindu extremist lady "Sadhvi" Pragya Singh Thakur and a serving Army Colonel Purohit. The latter is alleged to have provided explosives. All are facing trial now. Following the Mumbai attacks in which the Chief of Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (Mr.Hemant Karkare) and other senior officers were ambushed and killed there were unfounded rumours that Hindu extremists might have been responsible for this ambush to kill Karkare, the Chief Investigator, as they took advantage of the general confusion in the city.

¹⁹ A report published in a Sunday newspaper on September 5, 2010 said that 2 Indian nationals were killed among 10 in an accidental explosion in Mogadishu on August 21, 2010. They were among the many youths originally from Southern Indian states like Karnataka who were recruited from Dubai by Al Shabaab to work in Yemen and Somalia. *The Sunday Guardian* (New Delhi) September 5, 2010 ("Indian Youth Joining Al Qaeda in Africa").

²⁰ This provoked the Communist Marxist Chief Minister of that State to say that PDF was "aiming to convert Kerala into a Muslim country in the next 20 years".

²¹ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/22/un-cities-mega-regions/print>.

²² *Times of India*, September 5, 2010.

²³ "Real Estate Intelligence Service by Jones, Lang, LaSalle & Meghraj has estimated that Mumbai building industry forms 40% of the US\$100 billion building projects in India. (*Times of India*, September 25, 2010).

²⁴ Latest statistics on bus traffic indicates that the daily passenger traffic has reached almost 5 million a day in Mumbai city.

²⁵ Religious festivals like "Ganpathi" (Elephant God) in August-September pose tremendous crowd control challenges. Huge mass of people partake in the processions in which the clay idols of God "Ganpathi" are immersed in water. The number of idol immersions increases year on year. In 2009 there were 180,000 processions for immersion; in 2010 it reached 200,000.

²⁶ The first judicially tested terror case on outside involvement was through an Indian Supreme Court judgment on January 9, 2001 [2001(1) Crimes 115(SC)] mentioning that C.A.M Basheer of Kerala, a post graduate diploma holder in aeronautical engineering, had organized the 1991 Students' Islamic Movement of India(SIMI) convention in Bombay where Khalistani/SIMI linkage was firmed up as desired by Pakistan's official agencies. Later Lal Singh, also known as Manjit Singh, resident of

Toronto and Pakistani national Mohammad Sharief, described in the judgment as a military intelligence official entered India under false identity in 1991(Lal Singh as Chowdhry Mohmad Iqbal Ahmad and Mohammad Sharief as Mansoor), set up many safe houses and contacts all over India, stored arms and ammunition and surveyed places for bomb blasts in South India including the Madras Stock Exchange. They were assisted by some Indian nationals. Lal Singh and Mohammad Sharief were sentenced to life term prison while others were sentenced to 10 years.

²⁷The *New York Times* (March 14, 1993) quoted the then Bombay Police Commissioner, the late Mr. A.S. Samra, saying that the Mumbai blasts in March 1993 (257 deaths) would have been the handiwork of LTTE. He was prompted to say that because Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE on May 21, 1991 using suicide bombers. Mr. Samra would not have suspected LTTE had he been privy to the CBI's investigation in Lal Singh's case since August 1992. I had quoted several such instances of lack of coordination between different State Police forces on terrorism investigation. See my article "Internal Security Administration in India: The Reform Process" (Page 297-317 of "India's National Security-Annual Review-2009" -Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group-2010).

²⁸ This is examined in details in my lecture " Better Intelligence Management of terrorism - A blue Print for National Commission Investigating 9/11", delivered at the Cosmos Club, Washington DC on June 19, 2003 during the Conference organized by "National Advisory Council on South Asian Affairs". "Orbis" of Foreign Policy Institute, Philadelphia-Spring 2005 also published this story.

²⁹ *Times of India*, September 25, 2010 ("19 ULFA leaders brought to India").

³⁰ I mentioned this case in my lecture on June 19, 2003 at the Cosmos Club. A senior Sri Lankan diplomat who was present was astounded by this information I revealed on June 19, 2003.

³¹ Former Indian National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan admitted that the progress Pakistan made so far in investigating Mumbai case was due to American pressure. *The Hindu*, August 31, 2009.

³² Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182.

³³ I had recommended that the newly formed Indian National Investigating Agency (NIA) could take over all liaison work with foreign agencies including FBI on terrorism which is presently done by others in Indian Embassies. Vappala Balachandran, "Internal Security Administration in India: The Reform Process" in Satish Kumar (ed.), *India's National Security-Annual Review-2009* (Routledge: 2010), 297-317.