Dr Eugene Rogan

It is hard to remember today how central the Lebanese civil war was to international and Middle Eastern affairs through the 1970s and 1980s. The Lebanese Civil War certainly shaped my own world view dramatically. I was a high school student in Beirut when, on 13 April 1975 Christian militiamen massacred 28 Palestinians in Ain Rumaneh, setting off the conflict, and endured much of the first year of the war before my family moved definitively to Cairo in February 1976. But over the intervening decades Lebanon has been over-shadowed by Iraq as the chief 'regional problem', forgotten in the Middle East peace process, and even lost its primacy among sectarian and communal struggles to the horrors of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia.

To some extent this complacency reflects the greater urgency of other world problems and the sense that the Taif Accords 'solved' the Lebanon problem. A semblance of normalcy has returned to the politics and economy of Lebanon, reconstruction and a return to business as usual. The Lebanese government has actively promoted this image in the hope of luring investors back to Lebanon - expats and foreign funders alike. There has been an active policy of putting the past behind in the hope of turning swords into stock shares. Former war lords have been drawn into cabinet posts. Thus, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who candidly acknowledged his role in 'sectarian cleansing' [he drew the distinction with 'ethnic cleansing' then current in Bosnia by saying the Lebanese were the of the same ethnic stock and that sectarian differences were the operative principle in Lebanon] was appointed Minister of Displaced Persons! Those who refused to play by the new rules, such as Maronite warlord Samir Geagea, were tried and imprisoned.

These were pragmatic decisions, to make Taif work and to give former combatants an interest in the new political order. The mistake lies in the assumption that the Lebanese 'problem' has now been 'solved'. War broke out in Lebanon because of specific political, social and economic problems in the Lebanese body politic. It is no good putting the past behind you if you leave those problems unresolved. The post-Taif Lebanese state has not been so successful in political and economic reconstruction as to guarantee adherence. And failure of the root causes of the conflict risks renewed conflict.

Root causes

Demography: Lebanon has been a flawed democracy from the outset by the principle of sectarianism. Political posts and seats in parliament were allotted by religion in an unwritten document [nice oxymoron] known as the National Pact of 1943, based on the last full census of the country taken in 1932 which showed a narrow Christian majority and Maronite plurality. On this basis the President and head of the army were to be Maronites, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Parliament a Shii Muslim, the Foreign Minister an Orthodox Christian, and the distribution of Christians to Muslims/Druze in parliament was set at 6:5.

In the early 1970s pressure was growing to conduct a new census. The political ramifications were immense. No one doubted that natural growth had favoured Muslims since 1932, and that the Shiites enjoyed a plurality. The political formula would have to be redressed to reflect demographic realities. Maronite pre-eminence would not be tenable. And the Palestinian presence was seen by the Maronites as the key threat, shifting the demographic balance in favour of the Sunnis. The Maronite-Palestinian animosity sparked the war and was one of its defining features, responsible for the tacit alliance between Maronites and Israel, for the Sabra and Shatila massacres in 1982, and the current Lebanese government position that no peace with Israel can be concluded that leaves the Palestinian refugees (est. 350,000) in Lebanon.

Taif did not seek to resolve the Maronite-Palestinian issue. It did attempt to redress the political distribution set out in the 1943 National Pact. Parity between Christian and Muslim/Druze deputies was agreed. Though the document foresaw a day when a new electoral law would transcend the confessional system, that day was put well over the horizon. [In the event, the Taif Accords called for the creation of an upper house based on confessional representation.] The existing distribution of government offices set out in the National Pact was retained, though their powers were modified. The president would remain a Maronite, but the post was reduced to ceremonial powers as 'head of state and symbol of unity.' The Sunni Prime Minister's powers were expanded to head of the executive, chairing cabinet meetings and responsible for implementation of the policies of the Council of Ministers, in which executive authority was vested. He could only be dismissed by Parliament. Similarly, the Shi`i speaker of parliament's powers were expanded, the term of office extended from one year to the full parliament and a kingmaker role in the selection of both the Prime Minister and the President.

To some extent these changes reflected demographic changes, taking powers previously enjoyed by the Maronite President and transferring them to the Sunni PM and Shii speaker. However, the Shii plurality is not reflected in the Taif system. One wonders how long Hizbullah, the heroes of the resistance to Israel and arguably seen by voters as the most legitimate political voice in Lebanon, will abide by this distribution power before challenging it.

Inequality: Since the second world war the inequalities in Lebanese society had become pronounced. In 1960 some 4 percent of the population disposed of 32 percent of GNP. The Lebanese state never used taxation as a means to redress inequality. Reliance on indirect taxes on articles of common consumption (tobacco, fuel), and a freeze on direct taxes at a low 10 percent which was inefficiently collected and widely evaded, meant that the poor were proportionately overtaxed and the rich hardly taxed at all.

It was impossible to hide the disparities, as the countryside migrated to Beirut in the 1960s and 1970s. This reflected the government's over-investment in Beirut and neglect of the rural sector. Investment in industrial plant was low, promised infrastructure to promote agriculture never materialized, and access to such primary social services as education and health care was very limited for people in the countryside - prompting them to move to the capital. By 1973, Beirut accounted for half the Lebanese national population. Most Beirutis lived in slums that ringed the city where they had little access to public utilities such as water, electricity or sewerage. Yet they lived in view of the luxurious modern apartment blocks that housed the rich.

The reconstruction plans for Lebanon fall outside the scope of the Taif agreements. They have been led by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, whose conflicts of interests as the largest contractor in Lebanon never seem to detract from his claims to act out of patriotism in rebuilding his country. A son of the South from the coastal city of Sidon, Hariri has nonetheless focused nearly all of his reconstruction efforts on Beirut. New tunnels and highways pass shell-pocked buildings and converge on the largest project of all - the Central Business District. With the blessing of the World Bank, the Lebanese have used deficit financing to fund reconstruction in the hope that an economic takeoff will follow. Yet the expected flows of investment have not materialized. Lebanese government debt has now reached the equivalent of its annual GDP and debt servicing consumes some 2/3 of the annual budget. The nation as a whole is mired in debt. Yet the poor remain poor, and the disparities of wealth more pronounced.

Prospects

Lebanon has not been solved. This does not mean it is on the brink of renewed war. The external circumstances have changed with the end of the Cold War. Yet the Lebanese Civil War was not the product of outside forces alone. Whoever funded the conflict, it was fought by the Lebanese themselves. Their willingness to bring down the edifice of their state and society was a reflection of their lack of a stake in both. The Taif Accords provided a framework to return to political life. Yet Lebanon's politicians need to learn from the past and address the issues that underlay their civil war. In Lebanon, at least, the issues haven't been forgotten and they won't go away.