Dr Steve Tsang

• No regime change: legitimacy of regime not to be weakened

• Credibility of regime badly damaged, esp. by the GPCR: need to carry the general public with it for a new policy direction (Deng Xiaoping�s reform)

Essential for the post-Mao leadership to continue to monopolize the "truth": Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC (6^th Plenum, 11^th CC, 1981)

• Sought to pacify the general public by admitting some serious mistakes were made, not least by Mao in his later years, but Mao defined as 70% right, only 30% wrong over all.

• Biggest blame to be attributed to small groups of evil characters who misled Chairman Mao and seized power, and thus made major mistakes, esp. in the GPCR. G of 4 + Lin Biao were mostly responsible. The fact that the G of 4 was really G of 5 was ignored.

• GLF: blamed partly on Mao�s (& others�) mistake in judgement, in impatience for quick result, and in estimating the potential of human endeavour � cannot be avoided as Mao was completely identified with GLF. But also blamed on natural disaster (in fact there was none), and on withdrawal of Soviet aids (in reality a result of Maoist policy). Completely avoid any reference to the scale of the man-made disaster.

• Built up on the super great quality of Zhou Enlai, the only top leader who never fell from power since 1949: essential to project the idea that the CCP did have a most capable, dedicated, honest, kind � leader who worked himself until he dropped thinking of nothing but the welfare of the people.

• In short, the history presented was a deliberately selective one to ensure that the general public and members of the CCP could accept the general importance of CCP rule, while the Party admitted it made some mistakes and all should now rally around the current leadership which had restored the CCP�s historically correct line, a line that gave rise to the "golden age" of the 1950s prior to the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957.

NB CCP also allowed, indeed, encouraged the "wounded" literature for victims to share their horrific experiences and thus release steam. "Wounded" literature had parameters set: within framework as defined in 1981 document.

• The reality was too awful to be accepted as it was: 20-40 million died of hunger as a result of GLF; over 100 million were victims of political prosecution out of a total population of 800 million in c.1980.

• Most Chinese adults were involved in some of the murderous campaigns of the previous 30 years:
• land reform associated campaigns involved 2 million executions, usually after kangaroo courts with mass participation;
• set quota execution of counter-revolutionaries in 1950s, for which Mao had to set a upper limit of the quota 0.05 to 0.1% (out of a population of 600m - 600k approx).
• Anti-Rightist campaign 1957: 550k out of 4 million "intellectuals" were treated as rightists & struggled against. These were before GLF & GPCR.

• Sheer scale of the horror: cannibalism in Guizhou; struggle against dearest in GPCR.

• Residue fear of a revival of totalitarianism: nearest to Orwellian "1984 world": small mercy came to be highly treasured.
• No illusion that CCP would not give up monopoly of power and "the truth".

• Desire to move on.

In mutual pragmatic interest to heal the open wounds of the GPCR and suppress the rest of the horror of CCP rule. GLF victims were dead. Only GPCR victims needed clearing of their names, which the CCP was doing systematically.