

**Muslims in Europe, post 9/11:**  
**Understanding and Responding to the Islamic World**

St Antony's College and Princeton University  
25-26 April, 2003

Conference report  
Richard Bartrop

## Introduction

The Oxford-Princeton Conference, 'Muslims in Europe post 9/11', was the first major international conference to assess the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) against Washington and New York on Muslims in Europe.

The conference was the second in a series jointly organized by the universities of Princeton and Oxford. The first conference, 'Understanding and Responding to the Islamic World after 9/11,' was held in Princeton on 27-28 September 2002 and assembled a distinguished group of intellectuals from across the Muslim world.

For the second conference, held at St Antony's College in the University of Oxford on 25-26 April 2003, the organisers focused on Muslims in the West, and in Europe in particular. Participants were drawn from academia, civil society organisations, the law and the media from across Western Europe. A distinguished audience generated animated discussion after each panel.

The presentations and discussions were transcribed to allow the debates to reach the widest possible audience. Here a summary report of proceedings is presented, following the order of the conference sessions. The ideas and arguments contained in the presentations, responses and discussions have been summarised as accurately as possible and without additional comment.

The organisers wish to acknowledge the support of an anonymous benefactor whose generosity has made both these conferences possible.

**Oxford-Princeton Conference Muslims in Europe post 9/11**  
(Understanding and Responding to the Islamic World)  
St Antony's College, Oxford  
25-26 April 2003

**Programme**

**Friday 25 April**

8.30-9.15 am: **Registration & coffee**

9.30-11.00 am: Session 1

**Multiculturalism in Europe**

Chair: Dr Eugene Rogan (St Antony's College)

Speakers: H.E. Mona Sahlin (Swedish Ministry of Justice)

Professor Stefano Allievi (University of Padova)

Respondents: Professor Mario Nordio (Universita Ca' Foscari Venezia)

Dr Sami Zubaida (Birkbeck College, University of London)

11.00-11.30 am: Coffee

11.30 am-1.00 pm: Session 2

**Immigration and Asylum**

Chair: Dr Ahmed Al-Shahi (St Antony's College)

Speakers: Mr Mahmud Al-Rashid (Association of Muslim Lawyers, UK)

Dr Murad Wilfried Hofmann (Central Council of Muslims in Germany)

Respondents: Professor Stephen Castles (Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford)

Dr Nadim Shehadi (Centre for Lebanese Studies, University of Oxford)

1.15-2.30 pm: Lunch

2.30-4.00 pm Session 3

**Citizenship and Political Participation**

Chair: Professor John Esposito (Georgetown University)

Speakers: Professor Jorgen S. Nielsen (University of Birmingham)

Respondents: Dr Theodoros Koutroubas (Catholic University of Louvain)

Dr Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University)

4.00-4.30 pm: Tea

4.30-6.00 pm Session 4

**Attitudes and the Media**

Chair: Dr Walter Armbrust (St Antony's College)

Speakers: Mr Khaled Hroub (Writer & Broadcaster, Al-Jazeera)

Mr Roger Hardy (BBC World Service)

Respondent: Mr Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (University of Copenhagen)

6.45-7.15 pm: Reception, followed by dinner.

**Saturday, 26 April**

9.30-11.00 am: Session 5

**Discrimination and Legislation**

Chair: Lord Bhatia (The Forbes Trust)

Speakers: Ms Maleiha Malik (King's College, London)

Dr Valerie Amiraux (CNRS/CURAPP)  
Respondents: Mr Cem Ozdemir (German Marshall Fund of the United States)  
Dr Anya Rudiger (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia)

11.00-11.30 Coffee

11.30 am-1.00 pm: Session 6

**Terrorist Networks in Europe**

Chair: Dr Eugene Rogan (St Antony's College)

Speakers: Dr Farhad Khosrokhavar (L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales)  
Dr Jeroen Gunning (University of Aberystwyth)

Respondents: Dr Lindsay Clutterbuck (Metropolitan Police Service)

1.15-2.30 pm: Lunch

2.30-4.00 pm: Session 7

**The Foreign Policy Impact in European Countries**

Chair: Professor Shireen Hunter (Centre for Strategic & International Studies)

Speakers: Dr Gilles Kepel (Sciences Po)

Professor Peter Mandaville (George Mason University)

Respondents: Professor Jorgen S. Nielsen (University of Birmingham)

4.00-4.30 pm: Tea

4.30-6.00 pm: Session 8

**Concluding Remarks**

Sir Marrack Goulding (Warden, St Antony's College)

Lord Nazir Ahmed (House of Lords)

Mr Timothy Garton Ash (Director, European Studies Centre, St Antony's College)

Biographies of the Speakers

List of Delegates

## Conference proceedings

### 1. Multiculturalism in Europe

Chair: Dr Eugene Rogan (Director, Middle East Centre, St Antony's College)

Eugene Rogan opened the conference's first session by introducing the participants and giving the apologies of the session's first scheduled speaker, the Swedish minister for democracy and integration issues, Mona Sahlin, who was unable to attend. In her absence, Dr Rogan gave a synopsis of the draft speech Ms Sahlin had prepared, which had been circulated to the panel. The speech, entitled 'A Europe of Diversity', explored the ways in which the concept of multiculturalism is used and interpreted both in Sweden and in the European Union. The concept can, for example, be used purely descriptively, to describe a society in which people from many countries live; or it can be used normatively, to describe a desired model of the relationship between the state and individuals with an ethnic or cultural background different from the dominant or traditional ethnicity or culture of the country. Multiculturalism also has different connotations, in particular the contrasting approaches of assimilation and integration, around which debate on multiculturalism has centred.

Debate on these issues is not new, but awareness has grown that achieving equal treatment and equal opportunities for all people, irrespective of their backgrounds, is vital to the future of Europe. As a result, the policies of EU member states already show a number of similarities, and further convergence is likely now that issues of diversity and integration are being increasingly discussed within the EU. Nonetheless, important problems and questions remain. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown raised some of these questions in her book *After Multiculturalism* (2001 – Foreign Policy Centre), in which she particularly criticised policies that are based on a broad interpretation of multiculturalism and lead to the division of society into static, incompatible ethnic groups which hinder rather than help people's development. By stressing the factors that separate people rather than those in common, ethnic conflicts can be stirred up. Better instead that respect for difference apply not only to groups but to individuals, and that integration policies therefore be based on the rights of individuals. In short, respect for human rights should be equal, regardless of ethnic or cultural group or religion.

Ms Sahlin's speech concluded by noting that in the past, Sweden's own immigration policy and its administration had tended to contribute to feelings of alienation among many immigrants and their children in Sweden. For this reason, in 1997 Sweden replaced its immigration policy with integration policy, meaning by this that the needs of immigrants, like those of everyone else, must be taken into account within general policies. The late Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, had argued that economic and social justice are necessary to prevent racism gaining a foothold in society. But, Ms Sahlin's speech suggested, for racism to be fully rooted out and for multiculturalism to succeed, a further step is needed. This step is the embracing of 'otherness' and the affirmation of values such as democracy, human rights, solidarity and openness, rather than ethnicity or colour, as the values that unite a nation.

#### **Professor Stefano Allievi (University of Padova)**

In his presentation, Stefano Allievi discussed how multiculturalism may be considered to entail the construction of a new form of society, different from that implied by conventional conceptions of the nation state. The presence of immigrant populations is neither culturally nor religiously neutral, for immigrants do not arrive naked. Rather, they bring traditions, values, beliefs and images, and they change the countries to which they come. They entail too the modification of society, making homogeneity (if it ever existed) no longer a criterion of the definition of society.

Use of the term multiculturalism even in its descriptive sense still leaves ambiguities about the idea of identity implicit in the term. Collective religious or political identities are very different from individual identities. Scholars in different fields use differing concepts of identity. And the subjects or concepts to which the notion of identity is applied are not static. Culture, religion and community change over time, and to take account of the temporal dimension we therefore need a socio-historical approach to understanding immigration, rather than just a sociological approach. Individuals change over time; social and cultural contexts change. So too do religious contexts and religion, including Islam.

Muslims who have immigrated to Europe constitute groups, associations and communities. However these categories are socially constructed, for within them it is still individuals who act. We can say that

the European Muslim world is rapidly changing, and certainly it will be important to see how the structuring of Muslim communities in Europe continues. But at the same time we should be aware that the notion of Muslim 'community' can obscure the importance of the 'individual'. Properly, community and individual are concomitant. Debate on multiculturalism or Muslims in Europe should therefore not be formulated as being about communitarianism *or* individual integration, but about communitarianism *and* individual integration.

The advantages of such an approach to multiculturalism are many. The evolution of the cultural situation in Europe is important not only for the Muslim populations in Europe but also for Europe and, for different reasons, for Islam itself. Social networks lead to interactions between Europe and Muslim immigrants' countries of origin. Islam in Europe also has an influence on Islam 'there', in those countries of origin. Moreover as a result of the internal diversity among Muslims in Europe, the Muslim *umma* is in many ways more visible in Europe than in the countries of origin. For these and other reasons, it will henceforth not be possible to understand the modern history and social evolution of Europe without taking into account its Muslim component. Similarly it will not be possible to understand the history and social evolution of Islam without taking into account its European component.

**Dr Sami Zubaida (Birkbeck College, University of London)**

Sami Zubaida began by expressing his agreement with the problematisation of the issues set out by the two speakers. It is, he described, evident that at one level the societies of Europe are multicultural. On the other hand, the very use of the term multiculturalism implies the existence of a multiplicity of units, when it is not clear how these units should be defined or whether they exist. Examples can be taken from numerous levels. It is, for example, problematic to speak of Islamic culture as a unity, when more accurately there are multiple and different Islamic cultures. It is equally problematic to speak of Bangladeshis in Britain or other minorities as unities. In truth, then, there is a great diversity of things that can be called Muslim, some of which have little in common with each other.

The identification of cultural units can be further complicated by a number of other factors. Immigrants to Europe may maintain links with their countries of origin, with consequences for their own behaviour. Thus the politics of Islamic groups in Turkey or elsewhere, for example, may be reproduced in Europe. Moreover units and behaviour change, and one of the most important elements that drives such change is the generations. Differences between immigrants, their children and their grandchildren drive de-ethnicisation and, above all, secularisation. At the same time, it is also true that some children of Muslim immigrants turn to Islamic universalism rather than become more secular. Many more, though, turn towards a moderate or unconservative form of Islam, towards what might be called a European Islam.

**Professor Mario Nordio (Universita Ca' Foscari Venezia)**

In his response Mario Nordio focused on the role of time and intensity in shaping cultural perceptions. The long history of relations and exchanges between Europe and the Arab world, and with Muslim populations, has left marks which are integrated into Europe, in architecture, place names, language and otherwise. On the other hand wars and crises can redraw mental borders and perceptions of acceptability, both individual and societal. This occurred in Europe after the Second World War, when countries and peoples reconsidered their attitudes to each other. To some degree it has occurred since 9/11, putting in question the cultural and political frameworks established between the EU and the Arab countries of the Mediterranean, such as the Barcelona process.

However it is not clear that we can meaningfully talk just of a pre- and a post-9/11. It is at least necessary to consider too the role of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in shaping perceptions in Europe and the Muslim world. Arguably, the short elapse of time since 9/11 has not shown a new variant of an old anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe, but a new turning of attention from cultural and religious factors to political ones, with a focus on Islam. And while apocalyptic views exist about how relations will develop, there are also positive signs. European public reaction, for example, to calls by some radical organisations for a generalised *jihad* was not anti-Islamic. And scholars in Europe and in Muslim countries are seeking to update *fiqh*, to respond to the new conditions of Muslims' lives.

Professor Nordio concluded by noting that political correctness in Europe has, by and large, not provided for assimilation, but has encouraged a multiculturalism of separate units. However ultimately

multiculturalism is not a political option but a cultural process, and in this respect time and intensity of perception will greatly influence what sort of multiculturalism emerges in Europe.

### **Discussion**

The subsequent discussion between delegates and the speakers focused on some of the assumptions commonly made in debates about multiculturalism and Muslims in Europe, and on issues of the role played by *fiqh*. Jocelyne Cesari noted that multiculturalism can be applied as an ideological or a doctrinal term. But in discussions about Muslims and multiculturalism it is commonly assumed that there is a particularity about Islam and that it must be broken down to be dealt with, or in short, must be treated differently. John Esposito remarked that statements about the number of Muslims in the US tend to provoke alarm because it is assumed that all Muslims are practising Muslims. Similarly, it is assumed that questions about attitudes to pluralism need only be asked of Muslim groups, and not of Christian groups. Moreover, as Nancy Lindisfarne suggested, a tendency now exists for discussion about multiculturalism in Europe to slide automatically into discussion about Muslims, without challenging the assumptions involved in doing so. These considerations lead back to the danger of treating people as minorities and majorities, rather than as individuals. Many in the audience therefore agreed with the emphasis of Mona Sahlin's speech on the need for respect for difference to apply to individuals, and for human rights to be equal, regardless of ethnic or cultural group or religion.

Opinions differed on the need for and use of new *fiqh*. Maleiha Malik commented that multiculturalism does require action by people from minority groups: a one-sided accommodation of needs allows groups to become more static. However Dr Zubaida rejected the view that this meant that more minority *fiqh* was needed. On the contrary, he considered there to be plenty of European *fiqh*. The problem was rather about how to use this *fiqh*: so far it had been used mostly in politics.

Other issues were raised in the discussion. Opinions differed about the political views and actions of the controversial Dutch politician, Pim Fortuyn, assassinated in May 2002. It was suggested that reactions to Muslims in Europe show a number of analogies to reactions in the twentieth century and before to Jews in Europe. Discussion also touched on how the state can be perceived at two levels by Muslims – at the local level as a friend providing services, and at the national level sometimes as an enemy pursuing foreign policies which Muslims disagree with.

## 2. Immigration and asylum

Chair: Dr Ahmed al-Shahi (St Antony's College)

### **Mahmud al-Rashid (Association of Muslim Lawyers, UK)**

In his presentation, Mahmud al-Rashid began by discussing the concepts of asylum and immigration in Islam, drawing on the example of the prophet Mohammed's own experience as a beneficiary of asylum. From this Mr al-Rashid went on to discuss features of current British asylum policy and how public debate about it has been politicised. Plainly, as a result, the underlying aims of asylum policy have been obscured by misrepresentations or exaggerations. Some media coverage has contributed to exaggerated fears of Britain being flooded by asylum-seekers. This has fed hostility to asylum-seekers and, by extension, to Muslims, who after 9/11 have sometimes been treated as an especially threatening category of asylum seeker. In the process of this debate, legitimate concerns about the economic and social costs of asylum have been supplanted by civil and political criteria.

Misleading statistics and myths about asylum-seekers have further complicated debate about asylum policy. It is, first of all, appropriate to remember that the numbers seeking asylum in Britain and the rest of Europe are small. Worldwide there are some 12 million refugees. One third of these are from African countries; Pakistan hosts some 2.5 million refugees, more than any other country. Moreover, it is a myth, said Mr al-Rashid, that most asylum seekers are economic migrants.

What then, Mr al-Rashid asked, do British Muslims feel about the asylum system? Broadly they have balanced or reasoned views. While some Muslims feel that the system is being abused, most believe that Britain has a role to play in offering asylum. This view at least is shared with many non-Muslims, and has been expressed by the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. However for some Muslims, Britain's role in offering asylum is, or should be, tied to historical responsibilities to countries which were formerly British colonies or mandates. For other Muslims, selfish motives encourage arguing against increasing asylum and immigration. But in general there is also increasing understanding among British Muslims about the full implications of staying in Britain and the responsibilities this entails along with the rights and opportunities.

Important questions therefore remain but need to be treated sensibly. In Britain the government has declared that British Muslims have contributed valuably to the country, but many British Muslims still feel that they have to justify their presence. Legislation does not protect Muslims against discrimination on grounds of religion, and yet Muslims feel that they are most affected by religious discrimination. Ultimately, is Britain heading towards greater inclusiveness or are narrow-mindedness and parochialism going to prevail?

### **Dr Murad Wilfried Hofmann (Central Council of Muslims in Germany)**

The approach of treating asylum as a variation of immigration was taken by Murad Wilfried Hofmann. In his presentation, Dr Hofmann discussed six factors which, in his view, contribute strongly to whether immigration succeeds or fails: (i) cultural affinity, (ii) level of education, (iii) distance from home country, (iv) degree of secularism and pluralism, (v) collective memory, and (vi) readiness to integrate. Dr Hofmann focused on the role of these factors in Germany, but they are relevant across Europe, though with a number of informative contrasts.

In the past two centuries Germany has absorbed immigrants from many of its neighbours and elsewhere in Europe. Muslim immigrants, mostly from Turkey but also from Albania, Bosnia and North Africa, now number more than three million. However they remain less integrated than other immigrant populations partly because of cultural and religious distinctiveness, but also because their degree of 'foreignness' in native German eyes is high. Inferior educational standards and language skills compared with Muslim immigrants to Britain and France have furthermore hindered upward social mobility, with the result that Muslim representation in German political and public institutions is poorer than that in Britain, for example. Paradoxically, in general the proximity of the country of origin (for most, Turkey) has led immigrants to Germany to maintain stronger links than do most Muslim immigrants to Britain, while many Algerians and Tunisians in France maintain weaker links because they are asylum-seekers. In short, the easier it is for immigrants not to break the bridges behind them, the longer the process of integration tends to take.

Germany also differs from Britain and France, and even more from the US, in being less secular and pluralist. Until recently German citizenship was not transferred by residence (*ius soli*) but by blood (*ius sanguinis*), and Germany therefore treated its large Muslim population as temporary. Since the law was changed two years ago some 700,000 Turks have been 'nationalised'. Nonetheless religious discrimination remains common, despite the possibility for strongly believing Muslims and Christians to co-operate in an increasingly atheistic and agnostic society. To some degree, such discrimination derives from the collective memory of Germany's encounters in history with Islam.

Reaching over all these factors is the question of whether immigrants and the countries which receive them envisage assimilation or integration. Muslims, as long as they remain Muslims, will reject assimilation. But while governments in Britain, France and Germany alike do not publicly demand assimilation, they are often seen to act as if assimilation was their preferred outcome. Integration, however, is a viable option, and is favoured by the majority of Muslims. Its success however depends on efforts by both sides: European states must ensure that their constitutions and bills of rights allow Muslims to adhere to the core commands of their religion; and Muslims must be willing to learn local languages and, in the case of immigrant leaders, to teach the compatibility of Islam with democracy and human rights.

**Professor Stephen Castles (Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford)**

In his response Stephen Castles argued that the dynamics of exclusion and racism in Europe have more to do with the needs or attitudes of local populations than with the identity of immigrants. This can be seen in how the targets of racism have switched: thirty years ago colour and nationality determined who was a target of racism. Today the most common targets are firstly asylum-seekers and secondly Muslims, two targets which are often intertwined. Moreover in Britain the idea of an immigration crisis has taken root, as evidenced every day by articles and reports in British newspapers. In general, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, this immigration 'crisis' tends to be seen as the South impinging on the North. Little effort is made to see that immigration flows are a reflection of populations which have been detached by globalisation.

To understand where the idea of a crisis has come from we need to look at British society and the feelings of insecurity that underlie racism. Those feelings are certainly linked with changes brought about by globalisation. But they are also linked with the recent phenomenon of the securitisation of migration and asylum, which has entrenched the idea that migration and asylum are threats to the security of recipient countries. 9/11 has superficially legitimised these ideas and feelings of insecurity – superficially and wrongly, since in fact none of the 19 hijackers were asylum-seekers or immigrants. A better approach to the issues of immigration and asylum should instead begin with an examination of Europe's immigration needs. Such an approach should furthermore look at the reasons why European societies stigmatise certain types of immigration, and how European societies discriminate between migrants 'we want', and migrants 'we don't'.

**Dr Nadim Shehadi (Centre for Lebanese Studies, University of Oxford)**

Regarding the idea that there is a crisis in immigration or asylum numbers, Nadim Shehadi drew attention to data from the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which indicate that the total number of asylum-seekers in Europe is now less than ten years ago. The contradiction between such data and the increased controversy about asylum and immigration highlights the need to look to political factors and events to understand what has occurred. In his view, such factors have naturally included 9/11 and its repercussions, and now the Iraq War. However the politicisation of immigration from specific regions such as North Africa had already begun before 9/11, with Europe seeking to deal with it through the Barcelona process.

Dr Shehadi also briefly treated the question of motivations for emigrating and/or seeking asylum. These, he said, have changed. Greater political freedom in the past in Middle Eastern countries meant that those who wanted to be politically active could remain and do so. In contrast, Dr Shehadi suggested, people now emigrate from some countries in order to take advantage of greater political freedom abroad.

**Discussion**

In the discussion, a number of delegates in the audience expressed their agreement with the view that differentiation between asylum-seekers and economic migrants was unhelpful. Dr Anne Deighton raised the questions of what is meant by Europe in this context – the EU or Europe in its wider sense.

Certainly for some immigrants the EU is the intended destination. But it is difficult to generalise about whether immigrants see themselves as coming to Europe, the EU or specifically to countries of their choice. Many immigrants try to go to a specific country on the understanding that it is safe or because of reasons of family, history, language or simply feasibility.

In response to some of these issues Professor Castles remarked that the EU is trying to address the 'root causes' of migration. So far, however, its policies have tended to be shaped by an old agenda of keeping immigrants out and punishing states that send immigrants. Clearly a policy of 'open borders' is not politically viable, but it is unlikely that it would lead to the best outcome. Better instead would be a more open and honest (or fair) system for immigration.

Philip Lewis raised a question about local Muslim authority and what can or should be done to facilitate its development. He remarked that in France and Germany a local imamate has yet to emerge. This can have problematic consequences. Dr Hofmann explained that the absence of local Turkish Muslim authorities in Germany has allowed the authorities in Turkey to resist the call by the Central Council of Muslims in Germany for Islamic instruction in schools to be in German. In Britain local imams are being trained. However in the view of Mr al-Rashid, it may be another twenty years before the local imamate is fully developed.

### **3. Citizenship and political participation**

Chair: Professor John Esposito (Georgetown University)

#### **Professor Jorgen S. Nielsen (University of Birmingham)**

In his presentation Jorgen Nielsen discussed the variation that exists in the European environments in which Muslims find themselves. Variation exists both between and within countries, such that the environment in Birmingham differs from that in Bradford. Evidently environments change over time as well. Access to citizenship is a good example of this variation. In Britain it is comparatively easy for an immigrant to obtain citizenship, although the idea of citizenship in Britain is new (dating from the 1981 Nationality Act) and is still influenced by the concept of being a subject. For this reason it has been relatively easy in the past to absorb people from the Commonwealth, because they too were subjects and, if resident in Britain, were entitled to vote. In contrast, access to citizenship in countries such as Germany and especially Switzerland is very difficult.

The definition of terms such as citizenship is not without problems. Different understandings of the term exist. Citizenship in Britain, for example, has very few implications for active political and social participation. It is because of this that the British home secretary, David Blunkett, has felt it necessary to talk of 'active citizenship', in order to approach the French and German ideas of citizenship. The concept of nation also varies across Europe. In Germany, for example, the narrow prevailing concept of nation meant that until recently it was very difficult for a Turk living in the country to gain full political participation rights. In contrast it was far easier for a German descendant living in another country to 'return' to Germany and gain full national rights without going through an elaborate process. In Denmark the concept of nation remains notably monolithic. In contrast, Britain has a pluralist concept of national identity at the centre of its identity (even if this is not without its problems).

Understandings of citizenship are further complicated by a widespread and underlying idea that there is a degree of contradiction in dual or multiple identities. The perceived contradiction is reflected in questions about hyphenated identities – such as, 'Are you Muslim-French or French-Muslim?' or 'Are you British-Pakistani or Pakistani-British?' Indeed, to some extent an assumption that identities are static dominates public discourse. At the same time, at least in the case of Britain, an ethnicisation of Muslims and Islam has occurred, caused in part by the Race Relations Act. As a result, in Britain the predominant image of Muslims is of Indian and Pakistani Muslims, although they make up only around half of the total Muslim population in the country.

Cutting across all of these issues is the role of the media in shaping perceptions. Professor Nielsen remarked that, on the whole, the local media in Britain take a much more accepting view of local pluralism. This is partly because of local media's greater dependence on local readers and advertisers, whereas some national media appear to be able to afford to alienate minorities. Media reactions to reports about changes in the ethnic make-up of the population have reflected this difference: national media have tended to dramatise such reports as controversial, while local media in the towns or cities to which the reports most apply have tended to accept the reports as uncontroversial.

#### **Dr Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University)**

In her response, Jocelyne Cesari focused on what is understood by political participation. At the most basic level, participation is taken to mean voting in local and national elections, but it also includes election and appointment to public positions, and political lobbying. Information on voting habits is generally sketchy, but ideas about which parties Muslims vote for have been current in politics for some time, and in the case of France, for example, since the 1980s. The generally low level of support for creating separate Muslim political institutions also means that local and national elections remain the principal avenues for political participation. This is true in Britain, where the Muslim Parliament lost much of its early momentum after the death of its leader, Dr Kalim Siddique.

In general the number of Muslims elected or appointed to public positions is increasing but remains below what is representative for Muslims' shares of the population. Moreover representation at the national level is usually weaker than at the local level. It appears, too, that religious identity is not an important factor in determining the election or appointment of Muslims, be it as councillors, mayors or members of parliament.

It is noticeable that Muslims in Europe are less active in lobbying than Muslims in the US, who lobby on issues of labour rights, Islamophobia and discrimination in general. Lobbying by Muslim groups and organisations in Europe is increasing, but it is not yet as articulated as in the US.

### **Theodoros Koutroubas (Catholic University of Louvain)**

Theodoros Koutroubas cautioned against use of terms such as ‘Muslim citizen’ and ‘Muslim vote’. While it is true that citizenship may be ‘lived differently’ in different countries, in any European country, a citizen is someone who is entitled to change religion. The term ‘Muslim citizen’ is therefore perhaps no more helpful than ‘Christian citizen’. Similarly, it is not clear that it can be helpful to try to explain voting behaviour by religion rather than by other factors.

In Mr Koutroubas’s view, terms such as ‘Muslim citizen’ and ‘Muslim vote’ are symptomatic of a tendency to treat ‘Muslim citizens’ as citizens with special cultural needs. Better instead to treat them just as citizens, leaving the matter of their religious identity and practice as a private matter. This approach is supported by the example of the large proportion of Muslims elected to or standing for public office who do not make religion part of their political platform or agenda.

Despite these points, distinctions between ‘Muslim citizens’ evidently can be and are made. Professor Esposito remarked that in the US, African-American Muslims, who are in effect indigenous Muslims, sometimes resent immigrant Muslims for having different views or political allegiances. Up till now, when immigrant Muslims have had a political platform they have tended to use it to campaign on foreign issues, whereas indigenous Muslims tend to use the opportunities they have to campaign on domestic issues such as employment and the economy. This difference was visible in the US presidential election in 2000, when African-American Muslims voted overwhelmingly for Al Gore, while immigrant Muslims voted predominantly for George Bush.

### **Discussion**

Discussion between the audience and the panel focused on questions about the content of citizenship and its variation across Europe. Some delegates cited examples of how specifically Muslim political institutions can contribute positively to building knowledge or attitudes that are supportive of citizenship. Christian Hoffmann, for example, pointed out that in Germany a *fatwa* had been issued on the compatibility of Islam with democracy. The Central Council of Muslims in Germany has also issued a charter setting out clear positions on subjects such as democracy, and it considers the charter to have been useful. However few delegates felt that there was a strong future for Muslim parliaments or similar political institutions. In Jocelyne Cesari’s opinion, such institutions contribute to an idea of the legitimacy of Muslims as political actors. But religio-political institutions or leaders are not necessarily representative. As Theodoros Koutroubas remarked, in Belgium, for example, it is unlikely that all Catholics feel adequately represented by the Catholic archbishop.

The variety of concepts of citizenship and its application suggest that it will continue to be a subject of public interest and debate. One area of difference touched on in the discussion was the association between citizenship and allegiance to the state. In Britain, for example, registration as a citizen requires no statement of allegiance, while naturalisation requires swearing of allegiance to the queen. In Belgium, however, citizenship requires allegiance only to the state, not to the king or any other figure. With such differences, it is unsurprising that European countries should have had widely differing approaches to teaching citizenship.

In addition to these points, Eugene Rogan raised the question of whether 9/11 had been a turning point in Europe, as it is widely perceived to have been in the US. Despite the title of the conference – ‘Muslims in Europe post 9/11’ – in the first three sessions, 9/11 had been mentioned little. The opinions expressed by the panellists and the audience suggested that broadly 9/11 was not seen as a turning point in Europe – a view that would be contested in later panels. Jorgen Nielsen commented that in Denmark 9/11 was a turning point, in so far as it had coincided with an election. But in his view in Britain it was not. Stefano Allievi suggested that if there was a turning point in Italy, it was not 9/11 but September 2000, when the Northern League started an anti-mosque campaign and an Italian cardinal made an anti-Muslim statement. The picture appears to have been similar for France, where many of the issues raised by 9/11 were already present, though in some respect were then exacerbated. Theodoros Koutroubas suggested that likewise in Belgium, Islamophobia had been present before 9/11 and had change little since, because the government had sought to prevent an increase in Islamophobia by stressing that Belgian identity was not based on religion or ethnicity.

## 4. Attitudes and the media

Chair: Dr Walter Armbrust (St Antony's College)

### **Khaled Hroub (Writer and broadcaster, Al-Jazeera)**

Khaled Hroub began his presentation with an anecdote to show how Western media shape attitudes in the US and Europe to Muslims, Arabs and the Middle East. 9/11, he argued, had had a strong impact on Western media, reducing it to the standards of 'Third World media' broadcasting government views in an uncritical manner. This poses a problem for media in the Arab and Muslim worlds: if the Western media model is seen to have deteriorated and not to be delivering accurate information, local authorities in undemocratic Arab and Muslim countries will use this as an excuse not to liberalise their media.

The contrast between the performance of Western and Arab media is ironic. Arab media are generally of poor quality, because they are subject to strict state controls and ownership. Western media, on the other hand, usually function in a much freer environment but – Mr Hroub argued – relative to these conditions they have been performing proportionally worse than Arab media. Specifically they have been less scrupulous and less scrutinising since 9/11, and in one form or another the rhetoric of good and evil slipped into their discourse. In short, the media have made little attempt to understand the reasons and factors behind extreme behaviour or terrorism. This has led to a decontextualisation of 9/11. An example of this has been the personalisation of terror, as with Mohammed Atta, the hijacker on whom Western media have most focused. The media have presented and represented him largely stripped of any political and economic context, leaving only cultural and religious definitions. As a result, the public has tended to understand his behaviour in those terms.

A further consequence of how Western media have covered 9/11 and events since is that many Muslims have felt they do not see themselves fairly represented. They have therefore looked towards Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi television to see themselves. This raises the possibility that Muslims in Europe will increasingly diverge from the mainstream public discourse, in a form of ghettoisation.

### **Roger Hardy (BBC World Service)**

Roger Hardy expressed the view that, at least from a media perspective, 9/11 had been a turning point for Muslims in Europe. It had increased the polarisation of views, and it had reinforced an idea that Islam was no longer just a foreign policy issue, but was also a domestic policy issue.

As a result, since 9/11 mainstream public discourse in Europe has appeared to be carrying two messages to Muslims. These messages are drawn from very different agendas – one the social worker's agenda, the other the policeman's agenda. The first message is an encouragement to be 'good Muslims', who integrate and are helped to do so by a welcoming, multicultural society. The second message is a warning not to go to radical mosques or to read radical texts, the subtext being that Muslims are not so welcome after all, and that the state feels the need to single Muslims out for special monitoring.

Mr Hardy suggested that rather than focus on the problems in Western media coverage of Muslims and the Middle East, more time should be spent considering why Islamophobia exists in the media. The term Islamophobia is not without its problems, and for this reason Fred Halliday has suggested anti-Muslimism as an alternative. However it can serve as a convenient label for a range of problems, the causes of which need to be looked at. In doing so, two points may need to be borne in mind. Firstly it is perhaps unrealistic to expect commercially-driven Western media to do what they do not want to do, and in particular to go out of their way to represent the ordinary, unsensational face of Muslims and Islam. At the same time, the scale or extent of Islamophobia in the media should not be exaggerated, and it should not be assumed that there is no solution. As Islam becomes a more common feature of European societies – as it becomes more *banalisé* – Muslims will cease to be seen as a source of problems and will instead be seen as human beings and individuals.

### **Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (University of Copenhagen)**

In his response, Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen began by remarking that in Denmark media representation of and interest in Muslims has been much as elsewhere in Europe. Headlines are often, for example, about political parties campaigning against *shari'a* law or about alleged terrorist cells. Although the latter issue has some legitimacy in security concerns, such reports and media coverage collectively

places an onus on Muslims to prove themselves good citizens. Furthermore, in Mr Skovgaard-Petersen's view it is not enough just to say that it is up to commercial forces or the market to change the prevailing pattern of coverage. Western media have editorial input, besides which they are subject to some regulation. In addition to this, Mr Skovgaard-Petersen suggested that the coverage or representation of Muslims in Europe by Arab channels such as Al-Jazeera has tended to play down Muslims' level of political participation in Europe.

For these and other reasons, Mr Skovgaard-Petersen felt that 9/11 had had an impact on the media image of Muslims. It has, moreover, contributed to a tendency to politicise knowledge about Islam, whether held by Muslims or non-Muslims. This trend (which some might call Islamicist-phobia) has been seen in the US, where it is more pronounced and has been characterised by the discrediting of academic specialists on Islam and the Middle East. For Muslim leaders or religious authorities it has been characterised by an expectation that they must not remain silent.

The notion of 'anti-Muslimism' may therefore be more appropriate and useful than the terms Islamophobia or anti-Islamism. Western hostility is not directed against Islamic theology, since the idea of Islamic civilisation has been widely if not fully accepted in Western countries. Instead, the hostility – as seen in media coverage and attitudes – is largely directed against Muslim individuals and believers.

#### **Dr Walter Armbrust (St Antony's College)**

In his response Walter Armbrust argued that the key issue in understanding media is to appreciate their capacity both to form and to transcend boundaries. Plurality is inherent in media, as it is to the different capacities and scales of media. It is therefore wrong to approach media as a flat, non-plural discourse. However this is commonly done, partly as a result of the term discourse being reified much as culture has been. Discussion about media discourse has tended implicitly to assume that a single discourse works through groups of media, turning them into single entities. In turn, this discourse has often been associated with biases of varying degrees. Evidently patterns of bias do exist: it would be dishonest to deny the existence of a pattern of pro-Israeli, anti-Muslim bias in most US media output, and a pattern of crossing the line into anti-Semitism in, for example, Egyptian film. But this is not the same as a single discourse, for evidently there is US and European media output which is not reflexively anti-Muslim and pro-Israeli, and there are Egyptian films which avoid the traps of anti-Semitism.

The importance of these points can be seen in relation to the vilification of Al-Jazeera since 9/11. The vilification has been strongest in the US, but has also occurred in Europe. The accusations of anti-Americanism or of pandering to Islamism levelled against Al-Jazeera have been an example of the tendency to flatten media into single, non-plural discourses. The accusations mark a purported transformation of the channel, from mouthpiece of democracy to mouthpiece of Osama bin Laden. At the same time the assumption that there is a single, non-plural discourse to Al-Jazeera (or other Arab media) makes it more difficult to challenge the accusations and to argue that the truth might be more complex. A discourse is almost immovable and resistance is ultimately largely futile. In contrast a pattern changes: its roots can be discerned and exceptions to the pattern more easily explained because understanding the pattern calls for engagement with history and details.

Clearly the media has played an important role for Arabs, Europeans and Americans since 9/11, though as suggested by the earlier speakers, the key patterns in the media existed before 9/11. It is ironic, too, that contrary to what the critics of Al-Jazeera might suggest, in many ways the Middle East has had access to broader media variety than the US or, to some extent, Europe. The simple reason is that many Arabs are better at languages and have access to Arab, European and US media, especially through satellite television. However it would be a mistake to assume that the power and importance of the media mean that they have been solely responsible for creating attitudes – such as attitudes about Muslims and Europeans, or of Muslims and Europeans. Policy, as many would point out, is fundamental.

#### **Discussion**

In the discussion that followed, the issue of attitudes and the role of the media was discussed with reference to attitudes both to Muslims in Europe and to Muslims more generally. No-one appeared to doubt that 9/11 had made the issue only more important and vexed. In both Europe and the US, Muslim identity has been heavily mediated since 9/11 and, as Jonathan Birt put it, dominated by the most dissident Muslim views. Moreover 9/11 seems to have created the contradiction between the messages

being sent to Muslims in Europe, which in principle could otherwise be a single message, 'Be law-abiding and you will be welcomed.' The effect of the dual message from European governments, and which is carried by many European media, is to make Muslims seem, if not feel, guilty until proved innocent.

A number of delegates took issue with the notion that European or Western media could or should be left to resolve by themselves the question of how they represent Muslims. Stefano Allievi suggested that it was too optimistic to consider that media are only driven by commercial factors and that these will help 'banalise' Muslims as a media subject. 'Banalisation', in the way that Roger Hardy seemed to mean, is also no guarantee that a problem has gone away, as can be seen from the example of racism. Plainly the fact that it is now ordinary or unremarkable for black actors or presenters to appear on television, or that race relations are no longer a frequent feature of discussion in US newspapers, does not mean that racism has disappeared.

Moreover, as Peter Mandaville remarked, the media dislike the ordinary and banal, and as a result what is most banal in the case of Muslims, namely the large majority, does not get represented. This begs the question of to what extent there is a civic imperative to respond to this problem. Several delegates suggested that the media can be asked to exercise more prudence. Editorial mechanisms exist to control the quality of output generally, and these could potentially be used more actively to increase accuracy in representing Muslims. Acknowledging this, Roger Hardy made the point that it should be remembered that the ethos in public sector broadcasters is now private-sector, meaning that commercial factors weigh heavily in decisions about output. However this need not, and does not, stop people asking the media to change.

## **5. Discrimination and legislation**

Chair: Lord Bhatia (The Forbes Trust)

### **Maleiha Malik (King's College, London)**

Maleiha Malik began her presentation by citing some of the aspects of social exclusion of Muslims in Britain that are caused by discrimination. On average Muslims are more likely than non-Muslim Britons to be victims of crime, to have incomes below the national average, to live in deprived areas and to have bad health. Social exclusion is severest among Muslims of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin, although in some circumstances an element of isolation is also at work.

A common starting point for judging how the state deals with discrimination is criteria of justice. Generally, justice in this context is taken to mean justice for individuals in terms of human rights and civil or political liberties. However, drawing on the work of Iris Marion Young, Ms Malik explored the ways in which a model of group justice could be established and implemented. Although definition or identification of groups is not without problems, for the purposes of policy and legislation or legal action it is often practical and necessary to use the idea of groups. Furthermore, groups can be identified that share the common experience of cultural alienation, where the dominant meanings in society are not meanings with which they identify, and the feelings or perspectives of their groups are either stereotyped, distorted or rendered invisible.

An environment of discrimination existed before 9/11, but since then has been exacerbated by the merging of discussion about extremism and terrorism with discussion about Muslims, which has increased prejudice against Muslims as individuals and as groups or communities. Nonetheless, in Ms Malik's view, in order that freedom of speech is maintained, state intervention against the manifestation of prejudice in public speech should remain very narrow. This should be done by deregulating the existing blasphemy law (which only pertains to Christianity) and introducing legislation against incitement to violence. In general, non-legal interventions should be used to build up the capacity of Muslims to defend their views and religion in public. However other areas of weakness in legislation remain. In Britain, the lack of legislation against religious discrimination has meant that in cases of religious discrimination Muslims have had to seek protection under the race relations legislation. The introduction of a new EU directive covering religious discrimination in employment and training will partly resolve this problem. But legal protections will still be lacking for Muslims who feel that they are discriminated against in areas such as education, housing and public services.

The outlook, however, is not all bleak. Solutions are available, through policy and legislation, at both the local and EU levels. The recognition that multiculturalism is a two-way process, involving responsibilities for Muslims too, is also important. Moreover, values of human rights and justice have not been displaced by 9/11.

### **Dr Valerie Amiraux (CNRS / CURAPP)**

In her presentation Valerie Amiraux developed the argument that 9/11 had highlighted the diversity and relevance of national contexts for how Europe has responded to Muslims. Taking the example of France, she described a number of contrasts and similarities in discrimination, compared with Britain and other European countries. Public debate in France about the wearing of headscarves or veils, for example, has still not reached a conclusion after some ten years, while in Britain it has largely been absent. Most notably, France was the only country in Europe where attacks on Muslims did not increase after 9/11. One explanation for this is that it reflected an ability in France to distinguish between Muslims in France and Muslims outside.

Plainly, however, the absence of explicit reaction did not mean the absence of racism and religious discrimination. Moreover there is no legislation that covers religious discrimination. French anti-discrimination legislation has been developed incrementally, with new areas being added over the years. Since 2001 there has even been a telephone hotline which the public can call to report incidents of perceived discrimination. However the criteria for assessing incidents reported on the hotline do not cover religion.

The establishment in April 2003 of a national Islamic council, elected by delegates from nearly 1,000 mosques, may mark a step forward in dealing with religious discrimination. But this will not be without problems. After the election, the French Minister of the Interior indicated that the existence of the

council would not mean that Muslims would have specific rights that were different from the rest of the population, taking as an example the wearing of veils in identity card photos. On the other hand, how representative the council is may also need to be considered. This suggests that domestically a consensus may still not be reached soon on how to deal with religious discrimination. If so, organisations like the Islamic council may have to wait for new EU provisions against discrimination to see religion brought within the sphere of discrimination legislation.

**Dr Anya Rudiger (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia)**

Anya Rudiger began by discussing the work of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Originally set up to monitor racism and all forms of racial discrimination, the centre has found clear evidence that a religious factor is involved in discrimination against Muslims in Europe, and that in most instances Muslims face greater discrimination than other minority groups. This is consistent with the findings of the commission set up by the Runnymede Trust in 1998, which concluded that Islamophobia is about real discrimination faced by European Muslims in their daily lives. Such discrimination predates 9/11 and is therefore likely to continue even if international and domestic political factors change and media representation of Muslims improves.

The difficulty of distinguishing between racial and religious discrimination raises the possibility that, in its work, the European Monitoring Centre might inadvertently contribute to the ethnicisation of Muslims. However it is worth asking to what extent religious discrimination is simply a cultural or religious form of racial discrimination. Since 9/11, religion appears to have surpassed race as a focus of conflict. This change has been made easier by the decreasing acceptability of using skin colour to distinguish between people. In its place religion and culture have gained currency as markers of difference, and as a result European Muslims, who used to be seen as ethnic or national minorities, are now increasingly identified by their faith.

Given this, what is specific to religious discrimination, and what are the implications for legislation? Discrimination can be against religious groups or against specific needs and practices. This implies that the application of legislation ensuring equal rights rather than legislation protecting specific religious needs should be adequate, especially given that the dynamic of discrimination and exclusion since 9/11 has encompassed other minorities such as Jews and Sikhs, Arabs and Middle Easterners regardless of their religion, and especially asylum-seekers. As discussed already, most national legislation in Europe is some way yet from doing this. However some developments at the EU level should help advance protection against discrimination. As well as the EU directive against religious discrimination in the workplace, an EU framework decision on racism and xenophobia is currently being drafted which includes religion among the grounds of incitement which it aims to prohibit. Nonetheless, this leaves important issue areas, such as immigration and anti-terrorism measures, still outside the anti-discrimination agenda

**Cem Özdemir (German Marshall Fund, US)**

Cem Özdemir gave a number of examples of the ways in which discrimination manifests itself in Germany and made some remarks about the condition of anti-discrimination legislation. In Germany attitudes towards multiculturalism can be said to have improved over the past generation, but the space for multiculturalism remains small. In particular, Turkish and Muslim immigrants continue to be viewed as a problem or as a distinct population, rather than treated as part of everyday life.

A manifestation of this is the habit of even Germany's better media to see German Turks as Turks rather than German citizens. When, for example, 42 businessmen and other individuals joined the Green Party, for which Mr Özdemir was a member of parliament, *Der Spiegel* reported it as 'Özdemir brought his 42 Turks'. This occurred too in the case of a teacher, around whom a controversy arose because of her wish to wear a headscarf in school. Although she had been a German citizen for many years, the media represented her as a teacher from Afghanistan. Moreover, although there were no complaints from fellow teachers or pupils or their parents that she had misused her position as a teacher, in the end she was banned from teaching in public schools.

Willingness to tackle discrimination has so far been weak. The absence of anti-discrimination legislation in Germany has meant that until now, people with discrimination claims have had to revert to the Constitutional Court. The national educational authorities have also sought to argue that the absence of national Muslim partners makes it impossible for them to revise the national religious instruction requirements, which are at present derived from the Constitution and therefore serve only

the two main Christian denominations. For these and other reasons, campaigners for the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation are therefore seeking for it to include religion.

### **Discussion**

In the short discussion that followed, delegates sought clarification on a number of points. Dr Anne Deighton asked about the evidence that religion is now surpassing race as the key focus of discrimination, citing the example of Britain, where the Metropolitan Police recently state that institutional racism remained the key problem for policing. In response, Ms Rudiger acknowledged that while it is clear that a shift has occurred, it does not necessarily mean that religious discrimination now exceeds racial discrimination. It seems clear that in specific areas such as stop-and-search and treatment in the criminal justice system, Afro-Caribbeans continue to face the most discrimination. A major obstacle to knowing the exact balance, Ms Malik observed, is that police statistics do not accurately identify religious discrimination. However in the future, we may be able to make more precise comparisons if data show, for example, that something is happening to Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in Britain that is not happening to Indians and Sri Lankans.

Ahmad Gunny reminded the audience that despite discrimination in Europe, Muslims still choose to come and stay in Europe because of certain basic benefits. While issues of day-to-day discrimination exist, ranging from obtaining prayer places to modifying butchery training requirements to allow for Muslims to practice as butchers, many of these can or should, Mario Nordio suggested, be resolvable by local authorities.

Several delegates asked about the constituency and funding of the Islamic Council in France. According to Ms Amiraux, it was possible that the council would charge a fee to all the mosques from which it drew representatives, or else ask for contributions which would, at least nominally, come directly from the representatives. However the Council was expected to decide the matter at its first meeting in May 2003 or subsequently.

## 6. Terrorist networks in Europe

Chair: Dr Eugene Rogan (Director, Middle East Centre, St Antony's College)

### **Dr Farhad Khosrokhavar (L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales)**

In his presentation Farhad Khosrokhavar discussed the causes of radicalisation, drawing on interviews he had carried out with 160 Muslims held in prison in France, 15 of whom had been charged with terrorist acts. It has often been argued that radicalisation is caused by extreme experiences of Islamophobia, social exclusion or even mental illness. However the evidence for this explanation of radicalisation is thin. On the contrary, as the interviews conducted by Mr Khosrokhavar showed, radicalisation tends rather to be tied to feelings of victimisation and humiliation, which an individual seeks to overcome through action. To understand this, it can help to bear in mind that while Islamophobia must be denounced, for the majority of Muslims in Europe the experience of Islamophobia is not so acute as to leave no space for social action against it.

The 15 men interviewed by Mr Khosrokhavar who were charged with terrorism did not conform to a picture of a terrorist as an excluded person who, for example, feels rejected by modern or Western societies. All spoke between three and six languages and were in some sense multicultural. However what was true was that they did not belong to clear, concrete communities. While being a member of a community may entail some cultural or attitudinal specificities or particularism, on the whole it can be considered to prevent radicalisation. But the profile of the sort of person who might fall outside communities that could prevent radicalisation is not limited to being from a lower class or excluded background: as was seen with the 9/11 hijackers, people from middle class or prosperous backgrounds and with higher education are radicalised. Some converts are also drawn to radicalisation, and the vilification of Islam in some quarters since 9/11 can act as an encouragement to some people to convert. Indeed, in many poor suburbs in Europe Islam has gained popularity because of perceptions of it as the religion of the oppressed and dominated.

However the major spur towards radicalisation appears to be a feeling of humiliation. This can be bodily, as for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank forced to pass through checkpoints. But for others it can be a constructed sense of humiliation, constructed, for example, out of seeing pictures of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus radicalisation can be expected to occur when feelings of victimisation are overcome by a logic of self-affirmation and self-assertion. In short, it is far from being the result of mental illness, paranoia or schizophrenia.

### **Dr Jeroen Gunning (University of Aberystwyth)**

Jeroen Gunning began by discussing briefly the question of the definition of terrorism, before going on to consider characteristics of suspected members of terrorist groups. While the acts of violence that are often described as terrorist are 'real', the way they are interpreted and linked remains highly subjective. At best, attempts at defining terrorism can be narrowed down to a number of general definitions which have certain elements in common. These include the idea that terrorism denotes a type of violence, or the threat thereof, that targets a sample of non-combatant, non-office-bearing individuals, so as to terrorise the remainder of the community or population with the aim of gaining political advantage. However such violence is not always as distinguishable from other types of violence as government spokesmen or terrorism experts would have people think. These considerations highlight the fact that to talk about terrorism, or more generally about a security threat, is a social construct or choice, involving "securitisation" of a perceived threat. A recent example in Britain has been the "securitisation" of ricin, linking it to weapons of mass destruction in the arrest of a number of alleged terrorists, despite the fact that ricin is very difficult to deploy as a weapon. The process of "securitisation" has also been at work in forming the perception of Muslims and asylum-seekers as security issues.

Drawing on what information has been publicly available about suspected members of al-Qaeda, a number of common characteristics are apparent. Suspects are usually presumed to be of Arab and North African origin; they are recent immigrants or asylum-seekers; typically they are well-educated; a significant number were radicalised in Europe; and they are not embedded in local communities that can support them. However in making these generalisations a number of qualifications need to be made, though some further insights can also be drawn. In the first place, it is inaccurate to represent al-Qaeda as a single entity, when it is closer to being a network of networks. As an example, some of the North Africans recently arrested in Britain on suspicion of being members of al-Qaeda may instead have been working for separate, though possibly affiliated, groups. On the other hand, the

preponderance of North African immigrants among those arrested may be the result of al-Qaeda building on networks of people coming from recent areas of conflict (such as Algeria). Such immigrants may be without families and communities, and therefore be more amenable to radicalisation, unlike established immigrant populations, to whom al-Qaeda's goals and methods are likely to appear unnecessarily radical and not relevant to their own situation. Similarly, exceptions exist to the generalisation that many al-Qaeda suspects come from relatively well-educated and prosperous backgrounds, one example being Richard Reid, the "shoe-bomber".

Despite the difficulty of making firm generalisations about the characteristics of members of al-Qaeda or related organisations, several factors make it generally unlikely that European Muslims would be drawn to al-Qaeda. Above all, al-Qaeda does not address the local concerns and grievances of European Muslims. Moreover, there are non-violent channels for action in Europe, as well as scope to develop a democratic Islamism. And lastly, some Muslims may see Europe as a much-needed ally against US designs. Nonetheless, for Europe it remains important to examine further why people are attracted to al-Qaeda, and to try to de-securitise accommodationist Muslims and Islamists in both Europe and the Middle East. Underpinning this, in the future the countries of the EU are likely to need to take domestic Muslim sentiment more into account in formulating foreign policy, in order to counter al-Qaeda's appeal.

#### **Dr Lindsay Clutterbuck (Metropolitan Police Service)**

In his response to the two presentations, Lindsay Clutterbuck gave some personal observations about counter-terrorist networks and notions of terrorism. In Mr Clutterbuck's view, contrary to ideas that emphasise the uniqueness or singularity of terrorism, the distinction between terrorism and crime is blurring. Terrorist groups are known to be active in acquisitive crime, and organised criminals have in cases been turning to terrorist tactics to pursue criminal ends. Furthermore, a similar transformation from hierarchical groups to network-form organisations can be observed to have been occurring in both terrorist and criminal groups. This has at least in part been mirrored by a gradual development and transformation of counter-terrorism organisations into national and international counter-terrorism networks.

At the international and European levels, the organisations drawn into counter-terrorism have largely been those involved in the investigation of crime, in particular Interpol and Europol. The remit of such organisations have therefore had to be expanded to allow for effective focusing on terrorism. For Europol, the expanded remit took effect only from 1999, though 9/11 subsequently gave added impetus to its counter-terrorist role. Collectively, these international and European organisations have sought to draw on national counter-terrorism organisations and networks, which in Europe have often been closely linked to the criminal justice system. In the case of Britain, for example, the experience of terrorism over the past thirty years has led to the development of a counter-terrorist system in which policy, strategy, operations and tactics have been rooted in the criminal justice system, while implementation mechanisms have encompassed a wide range of the organs of the state.

#### **Discussion**

In the discussion that followed, delegates discussed briefly the lack of an accepted definition of terrorism, but otherwise focused on the dynamics and appeal of radical groups. On the issue of the relationship between Wahhabism and al-Qaeda, Roger Hardy suggested that while there is no automatic link between the two, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia appears to have created a space or milieu in which a support-base for al-Qaeda has developed. However this does not entail that members of al-Qaeda subscribe to Wahhabi ideology or dogma. Farhad Khosrokhavar suggested instead that it is useful to distinguish between implicit and explicit ideologies. For the sort of person who joins al-Qaeda, the explicit ideology may be poorly constructed. Poor education may also play a role in an individual's decision to join, though it is not clear how important a factor this may be, given that many prominent members of al-Qaeda have received advanced education.

Steffano Allievi queried the notion that a common characteristic among people who joined al-Qaeda or similar organisations was that they lacked links to communities. Mosques, he pointed out, had played a role in directing people who went to fight as *mujahideen* in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya or elsewhere. However this is not the same as joining al-Qaeda to commit terrorist acts and therefore does not refute the notion that people who join terrorist organisations tend not to belong to strong communities or feel close belonging. This characteristic is likely to be common to many who become terrorists, regardless of their religion. Indeed, the profiles of Christian, Jewish, atheist and other

terrorists are very similar, Jeroen Gunning remarked. The most common pattern is of someone who has been socially upwardly mobile but who has then hit a ceiling.

Discussion also touched on differences in how the EU and the US have treated and responded to terrorism. While organisational differences are undoubtedly important, the subjective elements involved in identifying terrorism and labelling certain actors or actions as terrorist also surely influence how different states respond to it. In particular, as Dr Anne Deighton asked, the US appears to differ from the EU in its tendency to define terrorism not so much in terms of crime but as war. Consequently it seeks to deal with terrorism much in this way. However terrorism as war is the wrong approach, Leslie Clutterbuck argued. A war on terror makes as little sense as a war on crime. Crime will always be with us, and has no start and end point, unlike a war. Similarly terrorism has a long history. It is therefore better to treat terrorism as a crime.

## 7. The foreign policy impact in European countries

Chair: Professor Shireen Hunter (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC)

### **Dr Gilles Kepel (Sciences Po)**

Gilles Kepel took as his subject the contrasts in the reactions of Europe's Muslims to the Gulf war in 1991 and to the US war on Iraq in 2003, as well as to conflicts in the intervening years. In 1991 European governments worried about the reaction of immigrant populations to their participation in the coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait. But in the end reaction was muted, not least because European Muslims did not have a common position, but also because of the rapidity of the war. Mosques in Europe were divided between those that condemned Saddam Hussein (often being encouraged to do so because they were Saudi-funded) and those that tried to represent him as a champion of Islam against the West. Twelve years later, in 2003, most Muslims opposed the Iraq war, and in doing so found themselves alongside the majority of non-Muslim Europeans. There was, therefore, little or no space for them to claim that this was a clash between Islamic identity and European values.

At the same time, as young Muslims grow up in Europe, increasingly many Muslims in Europe are faced with the question of whether their feelings or views on issues such as the Iraq war can take precedence over their interests as citizens of the countries they are living in. Despite the drawbacks, immigration to and life in Europe is extremely attractive to many who must otherwise live in countries ruled by corrupt dictators. This was illustrated when the French president Jacques Chirac visited Algeria in March, and crowds applauded him shouting 'Visa! Visa!'. Moreover President Chirac's opposition to the war played well both abroad, in countries like Algeria, and at home in France with both Muslims and non-Muslims.

However it would be wrong to assume that these phenomena constitute an irreversible trend. Clearly risks remain. *Jihadi* networks linked to al-Qaeda do exist and have found recruits in Europe, from Hamburg, where the cell responsible for 9/11 was organised, to London, or Londonistan, as the city has been labelled in France on account of its reputation for harbouring radical groups. Even if threats from such networks do not materialise, more ordinary risks remain. Among the responses of Muslims to 9/11 was an exaggerated effort and wish to prevent Islam being 'put on trial'. This reflects a tension that can still be exacerbated. Already, Salafi movements, which reject violence but are fundamentalist, have gained ground among some Muslims in Europe, sometimes heightening tensions where they live. The continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also been translating into attacks on Jews and acts of synagogue vandalism in working-class areas of some European cities. It is therefore quite conceivable that a severe deterioration in the situation in Iraq, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or elsewhere, such as Kashmir, could easily foster radicalisation among European Muslims, especially poor, city-dwelling Muslims.

This context, and the very proximity of Europe to the Middle East and the Muslim world, suggest that on foreign policy issues European governments may need to consider domestic constituencies more than the US government needs to do. This difference in priority provides one explanation for the positions France and Germany adopted on the Iraq War. Whether it will occur again for Europe in the future has yet to be seen.

### **Professor Peter Mandaville (George Mason University)**

In his presentation Peter Mandaville drew attention to the inadequacy of the dichotomist logic found in conventional foreign policy, of distinguishing between inside and outside, or domestic and external. Many of the sessions in the conference, although ostensibly about domestic issues, had already touched on foreign policy issues, thus illustrating the problem of trying to treat the domestic and the external as separate, unrelated spheres. Citizenship and notions of dual nationality, migration and its securitisation – these and other issues discussed in the conference clearly have external dimensions, which give foreign policy (though not in its conventional form) central importance. In Europe, or at least the EU, this broader conception of foreign policy has been given weight by the European project of integration, which entails moving beyond traditionally delineated forms of sovereignty. It may, by extension, have implicitly been involved in Europe's efforts to treat terrorism as crime, in contrast with the US which since 9/11 has tended to reinforce conventional distinctions between 'inside' and 'outside' and chosen to pursue a 'war on terrorism'.

Nonetheless, since 9/11 European and US foreign policies and foreign policy events have evidently had a significant impact on Muslims in Europe. To some degree they have caused a repolarisation not just of relations between Muslims and the West, but of European Muslim communities, at least temporarily undermining some of the progress that had been achieved during the 1990s. Muslims have been put on the defensive about their identity and views, most starkly in the US where the polarisation has encouraged an assumption that unless moderate Muslims are shown, immoderation must be the norm. At the same time, the prevailing foreign policy environment has provided a fertile context for radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Mahajiroun, only adding to public suspicions of Muslims. More generally, the foreign policy dynamic has exacerbated many domestic policy issues, such as asylum and immigration, and citizenship, discrimination and political participation. Furthermore, this problem has been made worse by the fact that the wrong issues have dominated foreign policy debate. Debate has focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir have in comparison been sidelined. As many have argued, as long as the US does not place these issues near the centre of its 'war on terror', it will be continuing to marginalise Muslims both in the US and in Europe, and will be failing to deal with the issues that to some extent drive support for extremism. However the rhetoric of the war and most foreign policy debate, particularly the notion of being 'with us or against us', limit the scope for Muslims to articulate their identities and their views on these issues.

Beyond the impact of foreign policy in the two years after 9/11, it will be important to see how the relationship between policy and Muslims evolves in the European context in the coming years. In so far as the European project entails multiple identities, that are less territorially fixed than single, national identities, it resonates to some extent with Muslim concepts of identity and polity that are not necessarily tied to territory. To some extent, the fate of Islam in Europe may therefore be tied to the fate of the European project. Given this, the steps being taken by some European Islamic groups to deal with issues at a trans-national level should be welcomed.

**Professor Jorgen S. Nielsen (University of Birmingham)**

In his response to the two presentations, Jorgen Nielsen focused initially on the role of generations in the indigenisation of Islam in Europe, and the impact this had on forming links between Muslims and foreign policy. The role of indigenisation is partly illustrated by the Rushdie affair in the late 1980s, which, in general terms, acted as a catalyst for a generation of young Muslims in Britain who had begun to encounter the frustration of discrimination in the workplace to protest. That generation was increasingly seeing itself in terms of a common Muslim identity, rather than the particular ethnic or national identity of its parents. The same change between generations can be seen in the contrast between the generally muted reaction of Muslims in Britain to the Sabra and Chatila massacres in 1982, and the mobilisation of young British Muslims over Bosnia in the early 1990s. Fears, though, that the war in Bosnia was evidence of Europe wanting to cleanse itself of Muslims were subsequently allayed by the resolution of the war in Yugoslavia and then by the British position on Kosovo in 1999. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1990s, a picture had emerged of greater linkage between domestic and foreign policy, under the banner of a Muslim agenda.

The linkage was exemplified after the election of a Labour government by the initiation of public meetings between the Prime Minister and senior government officials, and British Muslim representatives. However the precedent for such meetings dated back to informal consultations that the Foreign Office began to hold with select Muslim representatives after the 1991 Gulf war, ostensibly for the purpose of gaining input to foreign policy. By 2003, after the example of the Kosovo war when British foreign policy broadly matched what British Muslims leaders wanted, Muslim representatives' expectations of how much they would be consulted were perhaps too high. As a result many were disappointed and angry when the government did not do what they wanted over Iraq.

The extent and ways in which domestic lobbying affects foreign policy-making, both in Europe and in the US, therefore remains an open question. In Britain it appears that lobbying affects foreign policy-making less than elsewhere. In the US it appears to affect foreign policy more than elsewhere, to the extent that critics have argued that US foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. In France, foreign policy on the Iraq War was in harmony with the wishes of French Muslims. However, this may have largely been the result of coincidence rather than deliberate catering to Muslim wishes, and a subsequent foreign policy challenge in the Middle East or elsewhere may show that the French government, like the British government, is still ready to ignore domestic pressures.

## Discussion

The subsequent discussion further explored the relationship between Europe's Muslims and foreign policy-making, and the role of lobbying. The gap between the growing local representation of Muslims in Europe and the relatively poor national representation, raises questions about the implications for foreign policy. Of particular concern, as Basil Mustafa asked, is the question of what might happen when Muslims who have grown up in Europe, within its democratic institutions, see their countries' foreign policies as not representing their interests? It is important, Maleiha Malik remarked, that people have ownership of their countries' foreign policy. This entails a freedom to comment and lobby on foreign policy issues, contrary to the recommendation of the Runnymede Report on Islamophobia that Muslims refrain from commenting on Middle East issues. Moreover Muslims should not fear the consequences of doing so. Commentators in the British media who have tried to label British Muslims as a fifth column have generally received very little support for their views.

Jonathan Birt pointed out that London has a long history of offering refuge to dissidents, not just to religious radicals or conservatives, but also to people who use it as a base for a purely political agenda. Regarding this point, Gilles Kepel drew attention to a difference in the attitudes of the British and French authorities to the risk of politicisation of the Muslim suburbs or *banlieux*. In general, the British authorities could allow the development of a 'Londonistan' of principally Arab groups, thinking that it would not make a connection with the predominantly Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslim suburbs in Britain. In contrast, in the 1990s the French authorities wanted to prevent the civil war in Algeria spilling over into France and mobilising the large Algerian population in the *banlieux*.

Lastly, the discussion returned to the question of the terms being used, and their appropriateness for the issues being debated. Noting that the terms Islam and Muslims had sometimes been used interchangeably in the conference, Dr Kepel argued that the prism of Muslim-ness was not an ideal prism for looking at the issues. Identity in Europe can be constructed in many ways, and the majority of Muslims, he suggested, would not consider their Muslim identity or Muslim-ness as what was most representative of them. Peter Mandaville similarly noted that generalising across Muslims in Europe is problematic, because it obscures important variations in affiliation and foreign policy interests. For some Muslims in Europe the main interest is Turkey, for others it is Kashmir or Iraq; for many it is Palestine. Moreover, if the non-Muslim environment in Europe focuses only on an extremist segment of Muslim activism and opinion, it risks failing to recognise the great amount of thinking being done in Islamic intellectual circles.

## 8. Concluding remarks

Chair: Sir Marrack Goulding (Warden, St Antony's College)

In the final session of the conference two contrasting presentations were heard, from Timothy Garton Ash and Lord Nazir Ahmed. These were followed by a prolonged session for questions and concluding remarks.

### **Timothy Garton Ash (Director, European Studies Centre, St Antony's College)**

Timothy Garton Ash presented four points of central importance for the future of the European project and of Europe more broadly. In his view, it is first of all apparent that since the end of the Cold War, Europe has experienced a certain nostalgia for an enemy. Underlying much recent debate about Europe's external relations there has therefore been what might be called a search for a new 'other'. In response to this search two main candidates have been found: Europe's traditional other or rival, the US, and Europe's old 'other', the Muslim world. Reassuringly, efforts to revive an Islamic 'other' in political and public discourse have had little success. Attempts by Silvio Berlusconi after 9/11 to redefine Europe as Christendom and by Giscard d'Estaing to define Europe as a Christian club have both been rejected. Meanwhile divisions between Europe and the US in 2002-3 have gone far towards making the US Europe's new other. On the European side, this trend has built on a well-established rhetoric of moral difference and superiority between Europe and the US. But, as Mr Garton Ash argued, this leads to the second point of importance for the future of Europe, which is that Europe has been and continues to be less successful than the US in making immigrants feel at home. Symptomatic of this is that the label 'Muslim European' is not used yet, unlike the label 'Muslim American', and even the term 'European Muslim' is only rarely used. And yet if Europe is to cope with the economic and social challenges posed by an aging population in the next 20 years, it will need to become far better at making immigrants and in particular Muslim immigrants feel at home.

Mr Garton Ash's third point related to this challenge. The enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 members, and the questions of Turkey and the euro, will result in major socio-economic strains in the coming decade. It is therefore legitimate to fear that European politics, partly in response to the socio-economic strains, may increasingly become a politics of scapegoating of immigrants. Such scapegoating has already been seen in the rise of the parties of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Jorg Haider in Austria and Pim Fortyn in the Netherlands, whose main feature in common has been resistance to immigration. How Europe prevents it is part of the challenge of EU enlargement and absorption of new immigrants, and in particular Muslims. This in turn raises the question of how Europe responds to that part of the Muslim world which is on its doorstep, the Middle East.

Mr Garton Ash's fourth point therefore related to the Middle East and how at present it is the policy issue that most divides Europe and the US. Where in the Cold War it was the old 'East' of the Soviet bloc that united Europe and the US, it is now the Middle East that most divides them. Most conspicuously the division has been over the US neo-conservative vision of a project of democratisation for the Middle East. However the long term development, modernisation and democratisation of the Middle East is more directly in Europe's interests than it is in the direct interest of the US, for the simple reason that Europe is the neighbour of the Middle East. For this reason, in Mr Garton Ash's view, Europe should not reject out of hand the neo-conservative proposal for democratisation. Instead it should say that it agrees with the ultimate objectives but disagrees with the means by which the US proposes to achieve it. Democratisation and development should be done not *to* the peoples of the Middle East, but *for* and *with* the Middle East.

### **Lord Nazir Ahmed (House of Lords)**

In contrast, Nazir Ahmed focused on the feelings of Muslims after 9/11 and on the ways in which Britain in particular has responded to Muslims' concerns. Since 9/11, he claimed, all Muslims have had their loyalties questioned and have found themselves under the spotlight and subject to demonisation. Naturally the experience has provoked bitterness, as Muslims have felt that both they themselves and their religion have been demonised. Many have, for example, also felt it unfair that as Muslims they have been under pressure to prove their moderacy and to condemn terrorist acts committed by a very small minority, whereas Christians in Europe were not subject to the same expectations to show their views when Muslims were being killed in Bosnia.

In Lord Ahmed's view, the process of demonisation had been fuelled by the conduct of some media and politicians, especially by the common use of terms such as 'Islamic terrorists', 'Islamic jihad' and

'Islamic militants'. The religious category label, he observed, is invariably omitted for terrorist acts committed by non-Muslim groups, such as the Basque separatist organisation ETA and the IRA. However public debate about 9/11, al-Qaeda and terrorism has tended to look to Islam and the Qu'ran for answers, rather than political, social or economic issues. Suicide bombing has been treated as a new phenomenon, ignoring past examples such as by the Tamil Tigers and Japanese kamikaze pilots in the Second World War. And the public have been encouraged to see Islamic connections to potential al-Qaeda attacks, exemplified recently by warnings that al-Qaeda might time attacks to coincide with the Muslim festival of the sacrifice, *'Id al-Adha*.

Lord Ahmed agreed with Mr Garton Ash's fear that the situation could be exploited by political parties, with anti-immigration or anti-Muslim agendas. While far right parties have gained most ground in Austria, France and the Netherlands, they have gained ground in Britain too. Sadly, the British National Party has even been able to co-operate with certain Hindu and Sikh groups. However he noted that there are positive signs too, many of which had been touched on in the conference – from the growing representation of Muslims in public office and politics, to the social mobility represented by immigrant Muslims who had prospered in business, and the growing consciousness that discrimination against Muslims must be tackled. Lord Ahmed therefore concluded that with the right economic, political and social measures there was no reason why the situation of Muslims in Britain and Europe should not improve.

### **Discussion**

The subsequent discussion focused principally on the question of democratisation in the Middle East and European policy towards this. Anis Haggag remarked that the notion of democratisation was being used as if it were a sort of sterilisation. This aspect was picked up by Jeroen Gunning too, who noted that discussion in the session had tended to treat democratisation as a security issue. He suggested, however, that democratisation was likely to fail as long as Islamist participation remained taboo. After the example of Turkey in the past decade, Iraq will provide an important test case in the coming months and years.

The role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was raised by Khaled Hroub, who commented that until a just solution to the conflict is reached, Arabs will continue to treat the wishes of Europe and the US with suspicion. Avi Shlaim agreed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a central problem. However resolution of the conflict will not by itself lead to democratisation, as there are many reasons for the lack of democracy in the Arab world. In his view the Arab world must take responsibility for the lack of democratisation, and Britain and the US should recognise that they have done nothing to promote democracy in the past century. However it is also true that military strongmen and dictators have been able to exploit the conflict to help legitimise their clinging to power. Therefore a solution to the conflict would ease the road to democracy.

In response Mr Garton Ash agreed, saying that a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a *sine qua non*, and that in effect Europe had always maintained this. However in his view it was necessary to move beyond what has become a dialogue of the deaf between a neo-conservative administration in the US which has been calling for a grand Middle East project, and a Europe calling only for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Europe has 'soft' power which it can use to promote and facilitate democratisation in the Middle East. But it has not yet formed a coherent strategy for using this power.

Many delegates spoke on the subject of European policy towards democratisation and the Middle East, and Europe's response to the apparent neo-conservative approach in the US. Julian Simmonds remarked that it is already difficult for the EU to speak on foreign policy issues with one voice, and that it is likely to become only more difficult as the EU expands. However Roger Hardy observed that while it may be correct that there is no overarching European policy on the Middle East, there are clear areas of commonality and consensus. Moreover Europe, he felt, could be more confident about these: it wants a Palestinian state, and believes in the 'road map' for peace; it has a policy on Iran and Syria, which is to favour dialogue. Nonetheless, it seems true that the EU and its members are still treating their policies on specific Middle Eastern countries – from Iraq to Morocco to Turkey – in separation from each other. As a whole, said Mr Garton Ash, Europe does not seem to be asking itself what sort of societies it would like the countries of the Middle East to be in 20 years time.

Finding a common approach to promoting democracy in the Middle East would therefore seem to be important, both for the Middle East itself and for Europe. As Avi Shlaim commented, trying to impose

democracy at the point of the bayonet surely will not work. However it is not clear how the apparent European strategy up till now – to use economic and cultural instruments to foster democracy through a subtler and more long-term approach – will work by itself. For these reasons, in Mr Garton Ash's view if a European approach exists or is formulated, it needs to be transatlantic to be effective.

## **Biographies: chairs, speakers and respondents**

### **Lord Ahmed of Rotherham**

Lord Nazir Ahmed was made a peer in the County of South Yorkshire in 1998. He was educated at Thomas Rotherham College, and Sheffield Hallam University. Lord Ahmed is a member of USDAW and the Metropolitan Borough Council Trades Unions. His career accomplishments include being a Company director, as well as a Business Development Manager for Kilnhurst Business Park. Lord Ahmed is a member of the Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Commission, has previously served as Chair for the South Yorkshire Labour Party and as Vice-Chair of the South Yorkshire Euro-constituency Party.

### **Professor Stefano Allievi**

Stefano Allievi, PhD, is currently working in the Department of Sociology, University of Padova, where he is Professor of Sociology, Faculty of Sciences of Communication and at the Faculty of Political Sciences. He specialises on migration issues, sociology of religion and cultural change and has particularly focussed his studies and research on the presence of Islam in Europe, to which he has dedicated many publications. Professor Allievi has recently participated in research on Islam in Europe financed by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission, for which he has written several chapters: on Muslims and politics, the media, tensions and debates in the public space, and inter-religious dialogue (*Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, forthcoming 2003). His other publications include *Islam italiano, Viaggio nella seconda religione del paese* ('Italian Islam. A Voyage into Italy's Second Religion'), Torino, Einaudi, 2003; *Musulmani d'occidente. Tendenze dell'islam europeo* ('Muslims of the West. Tendencies of the European Islam'), Roma, Carocci, 2002; *Un Dio al plurale. Presenze religiose in Italia* ('A God in Plural. Religious Minorities in Italy'), Bologna, EDB, 2001 (with G. Guizzardi & C. Prandi); *Il Libro e la spada. Le sfide dei fondamentalismi* ('The Book and the Sword. The Challenge of Fundamentalisms'), Torino, Claudiana, 2000 (with D. Bidussa & P. Naso).

### **Mr Mahmud Al-Rashid**

Mahmud Al-Rashid is a barrister in independent practice. He is an Executive member of the Association of Muslim Lawyers (AML), Chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), formerly Deputy Secretary-General of the MCB, a Council member of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), former President of the Young Muslims (UK) and former editor of *Trends* magazine. He is editor of a new Muslim lifestyle magazine EMEL to be launched this summer.

### **Dr Ahmed Al-Shahi**

Ahmed Al-Shahi, MA, MLitt, DPhil (Oxon), has been a Senior Associate Member of St Antony's College since 1996. His specialisation is Social Anthropology with specific references to Sudan and the Middle East. His fields of interest are economic development, social differentiation, sectarian politics, oral traditions and immigrants. Dr Al-Shahi was a University Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Khartoum from 1965-70 taught at the Institute of Social Anthropology and the Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford, between 1970-75. He was a Lecturer at the University of Newcastle from 1975-1996. Dr Al-Shahi has published widely on Sudan, the Middle East, Islam and the Gulf Shaikhdoms. Among his publications (as author, editor and co-editor): *The Arab World and North Africa* (1973), *Wisdom from the Nile* (Clarendon Press, 1978), *Islam in the Modern World* (Croom Helm, 1983), *Themes from Northern Sudan* (Ithaca Press, 1986), *The Diversity of the Muslim Community: Anthropological Essays in Memory of Peter Lienhardt* (Ithaca Press, 1987), *Disorientation, Society in a Flux: Kuwait in the 1950s* (Ithaca Press, 1992) and *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia* (St Antony's Palgrave Series, 2001).

### **Dr Valerie Amiraux**

Valérie Amiraux is a Research Fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique since September 2000. After the completion of her PhD (1997) in political science on Muslim Turkish associations in Germany, she was appointed as a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute where she was co-ordinating the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Her research topics focus on Muslims in Europe and more specifically on the institutional path toward recognition of Islam in various countries. Her publications include: *Acteurs de l'islam entre Allemagne et Turquie. Parcours militants et expériences religieuses*, Paris, L'Harmattan, coll. Logiques politiques, 2001; 'The Situation of Muslims in France', in *Monitoring the*

*EU Accession Process: Minority Protection*, volume II Case Studies in Selected Member States, Country Reports, Budapest, OSI, 2002, pp. 69-140 (accessible at [www.eumap.org](http://www.eumap.org)); 'Turkish Political Islam and Europe: Story of an Opportunistic Intimacy', in J. Nielsen, S. Allievi (eds), *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe*, Leiden, Brill, 2003, pp. 146-169; 'The Perception of Political Islam in Europe after September 11: Changing Paradigm or Changing Actors?', in A. Karam (ed.), *Transnational Political Islam*, Pluto Books, 2003 (forthcoming).

#### **Dr Walter Armbrust**

Walter Armbrust is Albert Hourani Fellow at St Antony's College and University Lecturer in Modern Middle Eastern Studies. He is a cultural anthropologist whose research interests focus on popular culture and mass media in the Middle East. He is the author of *Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), and editor of *Mass Mediations: New Approaches to Popular Culture in the Middle East and Beyond* (University of California Press, 2000). Dr Armbrust is currently working on a cultural history of the Egyptian cinema.

#### **Lord Bhatia, OBE**

Lord Bhatia works in the City of London in financial services and is actively involved in a wide range of voluntary and charitable work. He has been a trustee of Oxfam, the Community Development Foundation, WaterAid and a Board member of National Lottery Charities Board. He is the co-founder and chair of The Ethnic Minority Foundation which promotes and supports voluntary effort in ethnic minority communities across the UK. He has also been involved in health, education, training and employment sectors in London as a trustee of St Christopher Hospice, Project Fullempley, and The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund. He is the chair of SITPRO (Simpler Trade Procedures Board) a body sponsored by the Department of Trade. He also chairs the Local Investment Fund and the British Muslim Research Centre.

#### **Professor Stephen Castles**

Stephen Castles is Professor of Migration and Refugee Studies, and Director of the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. Until January 2001 he was Director of the Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies at the Universities of Wollongong and Newcastle, Australia. Stephen Castles studied sociology at Frankfurt am Main, and took an MA and DPhil at the University of Sussex. He has carried out research on migration and multicultural societies in Europe, Australia and Asia for many years. He has also been involved in community education work in the UK and Southern Africa. From 1994 to 2001, Castles helped establish and co-ordinate the UNESCO-MOST Asia Pacific Migration Research Network. He has been an advisor to the Australian Government on immigration issues, and has carried out work for the ILO, the IOM, UNESCO, and other international bodies. His books include: *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (with Godula Kosack, Oxford University Press, 1973); *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities* (Pluto, 1984); *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (with Mark Miller, Macmillan, 1998); *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging* (with Alastair Davidson, Macmillan, 2000); and *Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen* (Sage, 2000).

#### **Dr Jocelyne Cesari**

Jocelyne Cesari is Principal Research Fellow at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS). Her training, professional experience, and academic expertise are in Political Science, the Middle East area and Islamic Studies. Dr Cesari has written numerous books and articles, in Muslim minorities in France and in Europe and their transnational links with the Muslim world at large. On behalf of the European Commission, she is currently coordinating 'the Network on Comparative Research Islam Muslims in Europe' (NOCRIME, see [www.nocrime.org](http://www.nocrime.org)). Dr Cesari's continuous investigation on Islam as a minority in secular and democratic contexts took her to the United States. Since 1998, she held several fellowships and professorships at Harvard and Columbia Universities. She is currently Research Associate at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University where she is in charge of a research seminar on Islam in Europe and in the US in the aftermath of September 11th. She is also teaching on Muslims in Multicultural America and Transnational Islam at the Anthropology Department. Her publications include: (ed.) *Musulmans d'Europe* ('European Muslims'), Cemoti, 2002; *Marseillais que moi tu meurs: Migrations, identités et territoires à Marseille* ('Migrations, Identities and Territory in Marseille') L'Harmattan, 2001; (ed.) *Les anonymes de la mondialisation* ('Anonymous Agents of Globalization') *Cultures et Conflits*, No. 33-34, Paris, 1999.

**Dr Lindsay Clutterbuck**

Lindsay Clutterbuck is a Detective Chief Inspector in the Metropolitan Police Service, London. The great majority of his career has been spent in its Specialist Operations Department where he has been involved in numerous aspects of counter terrorism, ranging from policy through to strategy and operations. He recently graduated with a PhD from the University of Portsmouth after carrying out research into the origins and evolution of terrorism and counter terrorism in Britain during the Victorian period.

**Professor John Esposito**

John Esposito is a University Professor and founding Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University. His specialty is political Islam and the impact of Islamic movements from North Africa to Southeast Asia. He is Editor-in-Chief of the four-volume Oxford *Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, *The Oxford History of Islam* and the *Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, and his more than 25 books include: *What Everyone Should Know About Islam: Questions and Answers*; *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*; *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*; *Islam and Politics*; *Islam and Democracy* (with J. Voll); *Islam: The Straight Path*, and *Women in Muslim Family Law*. Professor Esposito teaches classes on Islam and Politics, Islam and the West, and Women in Islam, among others.

**Mr Timothy Garton Ash**

Timothy Garton Ash is Director of the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College, and Gerd Bucerius Senior Research Fellow in Contemporary History. He has written extensively about the recent history of Europe in general and Central Europe in particular. His books include *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (1983); *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe* (1989); *We the People: The Revolution of '89 witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (1990); *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (1993), *The File: A Personal History* (1997) and, most recently, *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in the 1990s*. His current research interests include the way in which nations deal with difficult pasts, the development of the EU in the context of the larger Europe, and the shaping of European identity.

**Sir Marrack Goulding**

Sir Marrack graduated from Magdalen College, Oxford, following which he joined the British Diplomatic Service. In 1975 he was seconded to the Home Civil Service to serve with the Central Policy Review Staff at the Cabinet Office and led the CPRS team which reviewed Britain's overseas representation, and produced the controversial Berrill Report, a majority of whose recommendations have since been implemented. His last post before moving to the UN was as British Ambassador to Angola (1983-85). As United Nations Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs (1985-97) he was in charge of a number of UN peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, Africa, southern Europe and Central America. He worked with Cyrus Vance in 1991-92 in negotiating the first UN plan for peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia and negotiated the military aspects of the agreement to end the civil war in El Salvador. In June 1997 he was made a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG) in the Queen's Birthday Honours. Sir Marrack became Warden of St Antony's in October 1997.

**Dr Jeroen Gunning**

Jeroen Gunning has recently been appointed Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth. He holds a Masters degree in Politics of the Middle East from London University's School of Oriental and African Studies and obtained his PhD from the University of Durham in June 2000. From 2000-2, he held a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship at St Antony's College, Oxford, where he conducted research into the impact of political participation on the evolution of the political theory and praxis of the Lebanese Islamist movement Hizballah. He is currently developing and teaching a Master's programme in critical terrorism studies, while completing a book, based on his doctoral research, on pluralism, democracy and the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas. His research interests include Islamist political movements, Islamic political thought, social movement theory, conflict and critical terrorism studies, and democratisation studies.

**Mr Roger Hardy**

Roger Hardy is a Middle East and Islamic affairs specialist with the BBC World Service. After studying English at Oxford, he worked in book publishing and edited a monthly magazine (*The Middle East*) before joining the BBC in 1986. His three areas of interest are the Arab-Israeli dispute, security

and insecurity in the Gulf, and the politics of Islam. His radio series 'Waiting for the Dawn', on the crisis of modernity in the Muslim world, was broadcast last year.

**Dr Murad Wilfried Hofmann**

Murad Hofmann, born in 1931 in Aschaffenburg, Germany, began his university education in 1950 at Union College, Schenectady, New York. In 1957 he graduated from Munich University Law School (bar exam; doctorate in jurisprudence). Following an Assistant Professorship in Civil Procedure, he studied American Law at Harvard Law School (LL.M., 1960). From 1961-94 Dr Hofmann served in the German Foreign Service, e.g. as Director of Information for NATO in Brussels (1983-7), Ambassador to Algeria (1987-90) and to Morocco (1990-4). In 1980, Dr Hofmann embraced Islam. He published *Diary of a German Muslim* (now *Journey to Islam*); *Islam: The Alternative*; *Journey to Makkah*; *Religion of the Rise – Islam in the 3rd Millennium*; *Islam and Qur'an*. He is also a regular contributor to *The Muslim World Book Review*, *Islamic Studies*, *Encounters*, and *The American Journal of Islamic Social Studies*.

**Mr Khaled Hroub**

Khaled Hroub is a former Visiting Fellow of the Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge, and a member of Queen's College. He is host of a weekly book-review programme on Al-Jazeera; author of *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Washington DC) 2000, and editor of *Arab Satellite Broadcasting: A Force of Integration or Fragmentation in the Arab World* (forthcoming, 2003). Mr Hroub worked for the Middle East Programme of the International Institute of International Studies, London (IISS); his latest publication related to this conference was 'Towards the deconstruction of Arab ghettos in the West after September 11, 2001', which appeared in *Shu'un Arabyya* ('Arab Affairs'), March 2002, the Arab League journal, Cairo.

**Professor Shireen Hunter**

Shireen Hunter is the Director of the Islam Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC. Her latest publications include: *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security*, forthcoming M.E. Sharpe Inc. Winter 2003/4; *Islam, Europe's Second Religion*, Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 2002; *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence*, Praeger, 1998. Professor Hunter has also written extensively on Islamic Revivalism, Iran, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

**Dr Gilles Kepel**

Gilles Kepel holds degrees in Arabic, English and Philosophy, a diploma from the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (IEP) and doctorates in sociology and political science. He is a Professor at the IEP, where he heads the post-graduate programme on the Arab and Muslim worlds. He was Visiting Professor at N.Y.U. in 1994 and at Columbia University in 1995-96.

**Dr Farhad Khosrokhavar**

Farhad Khosrokhavar is a professor at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales in Paris. He was born in Iran and from 1977-79 was Assistant Professor in Bou Ali University, Hamadan, Iran. From 1979-90 he was Associate Professor at the Center for Science Policy, Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, Iran, and from 1990-91 was Rockefeller Fellow. In 1991 he became an Associate Professor at EHESS-Cadis, becoming a full Professor in 1998. His publications include *Les nouveaux martyrs d'Allah*, Flammarion, 2002; *L'instance du sacré: essai de fondation des science sociales*, Cerf, 2001; (with Alain Touraine) *La recherche de soi*, Fayard, Paris, 2000; (with Olivier Roy) *L'Iran: comment sortir d'une révolution religieuse?*, Seuil, 1999.

**Mr Theodoros Koutroubas**

Theodoros Koutroubas is currently completing a PhD thesis at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) on the interaction between religion and politics in the Middle East. His interests in particular include democratisation, secularisation, inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue and interactions, minority rights, religion-related security issues and Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the past few years he has published on these issues, notably with the European University Institute (Florence), the Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels), the Royal Institute of International Relations of Belgium and the Belgian French-speaking press. Theodoros is also collaborating on a permanent basis with the European Council of the Liberal Professions, as Senior Policy Advisor.

**Ms Maleiha Malik**

Maleiha Malik is a Lecturer in Law at the School of Law, King's College, University of London. Her research interests include discrimination law. Her recent relevant publications include: 'Racist Crime', 1999 (MLR 62:3 May) 409; 'Faith and the State of Jurisprudence', in *Faith and Law*, Douglas Scott, Oliver and Tadros (eds), Oxford 2000; 'Minority Protection and Human Rights' in *Sceptical Essays on Human Rights*, Campbell Ewing and Tomkins (eds), Oxford 2001.

**Professor Peter Mandaville**

Peter Mandaville is Assistant Professor of Government and Politics in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, Virginia. He previously taught at the University of Kent at Canterbury in the UK. He holds degrees from the University of St. Andrews and the University of Kent. Visiting affiliations have included the National Islamic University in Indonesia and American University in Washington DC. He is most recently the author of *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma* (Routledge, 2001), and has also co-edited *The Zen of International Relations* (Palgrave 2001) and *Meaning and International Relations* (Routledge, 2003). He has authored numerous book chapters, and contributed articles to journals such as *Millennium* and the *Review of International Studies*. In addition to various media appearances and consulting work, he has provided briefings to government agencies and testified before Congress on issues such as Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda. Born and raised in the Middle East, much of his recent research has focused on transnational linkages between Islamist movements and intellectual developments within Muslim communities in the West. Current projects include a teaching text, *Global Political Islam*, to be published by Routledge in 2004 and a study of the concept of cosmopolitanism in the Islamic tradition. In 2004, he will be a Fulbright Scholar in Indonesia.

**Professor Jorgen S. Nielsen**

Jorgen Nielsen is Professor of Islamic Studies, Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, and deputy head of the Department of Theology, University of Birmingham. He holds degrees in Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and a PhD in Arab History from the American University of Beirut. He regularly lectures and participates in conferences in various parts of the world, including Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the United States and various European countries, and has worked as a consultant to the Council of Europe on religious minorities, and to the Swedish Foreign Ministry on Islam and Europe. Since 1992 he has been a Trustee and Board member of the International Centre for Minorities and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), Sofia, Bulgaria. After many years of working on Islam in Europe, current research is concentrating on the Islamic debate on religious pluralism and relations with the West. Most recent publications include: *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh University Press, 1992, 2nd ed. 1995); *Arabs and the West: Mutual Images* as joint editor (University of Jordan, 1998); *Towards a European Islam* (Macmillan, 1999); *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe*, ed. jointly with S. Allievi (Brill, 2003).

**Professor Mario Nordio**

Mario Nordio is a graduate of Venice University, Oriental Languages and Literature (Hebrew) having a Semitic (Hebrew, Arabic and Neo-Aramaic, *suret* and *ghe'ez* -) and Iranic background. In 1976, he was grant winner CNR - Researches National Council (Semitic philology) and appointed professor in charge of Iran and Central Asia Religious History, full Researcher in Iranian Studies in 1982 and Associated Professor of Modern and Contemporary History of Iran and Central Asia in 1986. From 1987-97 he was in charge of History of Iran since Islam to contemporary time and from 1998 he has been Professor of Asian History and Institutions. From 1996-9, Professor Nordio was Chairperson of Oriental Languages and Civilisations Studies (Universita Ca' Foscari di Venezia) and from 2001 Vice-Chairperson of LICEM (Eurasian and Mediterranean Studies) at Ca' Foscari. He has been a member of the scientific and teaching board of Arab-Islamic Studies PhD at Ca' Foscari since 2001. He is a member of the Italian Orient Institute, Italian-African Institute, Armenian Studies Association (Padus-Araxes), Association Italia-Russia, and founder and chairperson of the Italia-Armenia Association from 1992-8. His main research field is on cultural inter-actions in political institutions. He is active in Italian and European social associations. From 1980-91 he was a member of the National Council of ACLI (Christian Workers Associations of Italy). He is also active in Italian NGOs and immigration organisations. From 1994-9 he co-operated with Vatican Radio Broadcasting, from 1996 with Switzerland International Broadcasting Services and from 1997 with the RAI (national radio news and cultural services), especially on the Middle East.

### **Mr Cem Özdemir**

Cem Özdemir is currently a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC, where he is exploring how minority groups organise politically in the United States in comparison to Germany. He is also speaking and writing about Turkey and minority integration in Germany. Mr Özdemir has been a member of the German Green Party since 1981. He was elected to the German Parliament in 1994, where he served until 2002. Upon his election, Mr Özdemir became the Bundestag's first member of Turkish decent. In his first term he acted as speaker on migration issues for the Green caucus and, after his re-election in 1998, became speaker for internal affairs for the governing coalition between the Social Democrats and Greens. Additionally, he served as chairman of the Bundestag's German-Turkish parliamentary friendship group. He has been recognised for his efforts to promote multicultural understanding with the Theodor Heuss Medal, awarded for his work on prejudice reduction, and the Civis Media Prize, for his advocacy of integration in Germany. Mr Özdemir was also named 'Multicultural Man of the Year' by Radio Multikulti/SFB in Berlin.

### **Dr Eugene Rogan**

Eugene Rogan is Director of the Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, and University Lecturer in the Modern History of the Middle East, University of Oxford. His research focuses on the social and economic history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab states in the twentieth century. He is author of *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge University Press, 1999) and editor of *Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East* (IB Tauris, 2002); *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (with Avi Shlaim) (Cambridge University Press, 2001); *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Jordan* (with Tariq Tell) (British Academic Press, 1994), and *Agriculture in Egypt from Pharaonic to Modern Times* (with Alan Bowman). He is editor of the new Cambridge University Press book series, *The Contemporary Middle East*.

### **Dr Anja Rudiger**

Dr Anja Rudiger is a political theorist with policy experience in promoting race and gender equality. She holds the post of Executive Co-ordinator of the UK Secretariat of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, where her responsibilities include policy research, development and analysis. Anja is also a Trustee and non-executive Director of Women's Design Service, which works with disadvantaged women in London to improve the urban environment. Previously, she ran a small gender consulting organisation where she managed and carried out evaluations for the European Commission and other clients. Anja also works as a researcher and consultant on equality and diversity issues in Europe. Her research interests range from theories of democracy to comparative perspectives on politics of diversity. Her publications include *Social Integration of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities*, with Sarah Spencer (European Commission/OECD 2003); 'Equality in the Public Sector', *European Lookout*, Issue 7, Winter 2002/03; 'Diversity in Europe', in *Speak Out! European Citizenship* (London 2002).

### **Dr Nadim Shehadi**

Nadim Shehadi is Director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, and a Senior Associate Member of St Antony's College.

### **Mr Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen**

Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen is the head of the academic programme at the Carsten Niebuhr Institute of Near Eastern Studies, University of Copenhagen. His field is contemporary Islam, more specifically the emergence of modern Muslim media, publicists and intellectuals, and their role in modern Muslim states. In recent years his focus has been primarily on the role of Islam in the new pan-Arab television networks, and the innovations in classical Muslim literary genres such as Koran interpretation and fatwas. He is the author of *Defining Islam for the Egyptian State*, Leiden: Brill, 1997.

### **Dr Sami Zubaida**

Dr Zubaida is Reader in Sociology at the School of Politics & Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London. He is also Research Associate of the Centre for Near and Middle East Studies at SOAS. He has held visiting research and teaching posts in Cairo, Aix-en-Provence and Istanbul, and at Berkeley, California. He teaches Political Sociology and Religion, Culture and Politics on the MSc/MRes degrees, and the Formation of Modern Societies, and Magic, Science and Religion to undergraduates. His research interests are in religion, ethnicity and nationalism in Middle East culture and politics, and food and culture. Recent publications include *Islam, the People and the State* (1993, 2nd edition), A

*Taste of Thyme: Culinary Cultures of the Middle East* (1994) (edited with Richard Tapper), and *Law and Power in the Islamic World* (2003).



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Dr Fred Astren, Skirball Visiting Fellow, Oxford Centre for Hebrew & Jewish Studies and San Francisco State University  
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