Dr. Lindsay Clutterbuck

(Not to be cited without the consent of the speaker. )

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I'm going to talk a bit about the other side of the coin, not terrorist networks, but counter terrorist networks and the kind of systems and structures that are set-up to enable us to counter the terrorist threat. First of all I'd just like to say I'm an officer in the specialist operations department at New Scotland Yard. However, what I'm about to say are my personal thoughts and opinions and in that context it is a view from New Scotland Yard but it is most definitely not the view from New Scotland Yard. These are personal thoughts. The nature of the threat from terrorism is continually changing and the once prevalent view that terrorism and serious crime were distinct and separate entities is becoming increasingly unsustainable. Not only are terrorists becoming firmly rooted in acquisitive crime in order to pursue their political objectives, with increasing amounts of it at a surprising low and unsophisticated level, but the gap is also closing from the other end as organised and serious criminals turn to the use of terrorist weapons and tactics to pursue their own criminal enterprises. Another area of congruence between terrorists and criminals is their transformation from hierarchical style groups into network forms of organisation. Undoubtedly this increases the difficulties faced by those charged with countering them as network structures are resistant to disruption, have a high degree of resiliency and are adaptable to changing environments. On the other hand, counter terrorist organisations are by their very nature both hierarchical and bureaucratic. However, it may be precipitate to infer that they are bereft of all the advantages possessed by a network form of organisation and therefore will always be at a disadvantage in countering them. In counter terrorism organisational terms, the task is to emulate the way in which the brain functions. Here each nerve cell has it's own specialised function and yet it is also joined by a complex series of linkages into a vast network of cells, some of which are similar and some of which are very different. The end result of this co-operation and co-ordination is a fully functioning organism able to operate for the common good. The business of counter terrorism is carried out by many different organisations and agencies and each of them, in effect, acts a central node for its own specialist network. Each of these is different as they've been specifically developed to achieve differing organisational goals. However, all these simple nodes are linked together by one sense of common purpose: the deterrence, prevention, detection, disruption and investigation of terrorism. If these linkages, nationally and internationally, are constructed and maintained in a robust and effective way, a network of networks can then be achieved. The challenge now is to encourage new points of linkage between the nodes to strengthen the existing ones and to expand the network to include linkages to any organisation that can make a contribution to countering terrorism. Internally, rigid structures focussed only on internal objectives must be replaced by flexible systems targeted on a common goal. Much work has already been done to create such a linked network at the international level by the U.N., the European Union, the G8 nations and within other relevant fora. Various structures now exist, formal and informal, to facilitate police to police co-operation in both the investigation of terrorist offences and in the exchange of information and intelligence. In terms of an international approach to the traditional problem of trans-national crime and criminals, the main structure for this since its formation in 1923 has been the International Criminal Police Organisation otherwise known as Interpol. However, it is not an investigative body, but acts as a conduit for requests for assistance to be channelled from one member country to another, in effect acting as a kind of glorified post-box. Its strength is that most countries in the world are members. Despite this, its impact on terrorism and terrorists has been minimal. Article 3 of the Interpol constitution, which was drafted in 1956, prohibits it from taking any action in cases of political, military, religious and racial character. In order to enable it to become engaged with violent crimes committed by terrorists, Interpol adopted in 1984 a resolution which states "In general offences are not considered to be political when they are committed outside the conflict area and when the victims are not connected with the aims or objectives pursued by the offenders." Despite this, Article 3 still applies and accordingly any assistance that Interpol renders must be in accordance with Article 3 of the constitution and as far as national legislations allow. From a trans-national perspective, a formal international structure to co-ordinate national responses to terrorism first crystallised in Europe in 1975 with the formation of TREVI. TREVI was formal in the sense that it had a structure and all the governments involved acknowledged its existence, but it was not constituted by treaty and hence it should strictly be considered as informal. It involved regular meetings at three levels: government ministers, senior officials and practitioners. Its activity was focussed within three working groups covering terrorism, public order, drugs and organised crime. In turn, TREVI had recognised and built upon an already extant loose network of police agencies from countries where terrorism was having the most impact. For example, the United Kingdom with the IRA and Middle Eastern groups, Germany, with the Red Army Faction, and Italy, with the Red Brigades. Representatives of the relevant police units from each of these countries established the Police Working Group on Terrorism. Its main objective was to facilitate the exchange of operational information on terrorist activity. The importance of this function was later acknowledged by TREVI with the absorption of the PWGT into the TREVI framework itself. In 1995, TREVI was superseded by the European Union Third Pillar as a governmental, criminal justice arrangement, but the police working group continues to this day. As well as the EU states it includes Norway, Switzerland, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. It's a true virtual network as it has no headquarters building, no secretariat and no formal constitution. Under the auspices of the PWGT, the concept of police counter terrorism liaison officers was developed. Initially three countries, the UK, France, Germany, agreed to exchange officers in the relevant police agencies in each country in order to improve the speed and flow of intelligence and information. The network has recently been expanded to include several more European countries. The next major step in enhancing police co-operation in the EU and probably the most significant and far-reaching one taken to date came with the establishment of the European Police Agency (Europol). It's genesis was long and complex, as things often are in the European Union, and it began in 1991 when the idea was first formally proposed by Germany at an EU summit. It finally took on tangible form when it moved into its permanent headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands, on February 16th, 1994. The initial role of Europol was to assist the states to improve their effectiveness in combating drug trafficking and organised crime. It did not encompass terrorism. However, after sustained pressure, particularly from Spain, the remit of Europol was expanded to include terrorism as from January the 1st, 1999 and subsequently a small unit was established to explore how best Europol could make a contribution to the existing systems and structures. 18 months later in the aftermath of 9/11, its efforts were given renewed emphasis and impetus. Over the last few years police intelligence agencies of the G7 countries have started to come together with increasing frequency to discuss matters of mutual interest with regard to terrorism and counter terrorism. The meetings tend to fall into two categories, the first one involving practitioners and the second one, focussed at a more strategic level attended by experts. At a formal G7 summit plus Russia in July 1996, 25 measures of counter terrorism were advocated. With the formal acceptance of Russia as a full partner of the G7, thus creating the G8, the span of its activities will inevitably now increase. Whether the pragmatic European model approach to international police co-operation involving, as it does, a judicious mix of formal structures and systems supported by informal contacts and liaisons continues to prove its worth in the face of the current and potential threat, will be of particular importance over the next few years. The form, scope and complexity of the terrorist threat is continually changing and in order to combat this, the response to it must be innovative, flexible and engage all the resources that are available. Terrorism is a crime and the primary mechanism of any liberal democracy is to use its criminal justice system supported by the intelligence service and, when necessary, by the military. All of these elements must operate in a co-ordinated way and do so in full accordance with the rule of law. Only if this is effectively achieved can the wide spectrum of response that is required to counter and mitigate terrorism be implemented. The experience of the UK over the last 30 years has led to its current concept of operations where policy, strategy, operations and tactics are firmly anchored in the criminal justice system and its implementation encompasses virtually all the organs of the state. In other words, there is a network of agencies and organisations able to counteract and respond to the threat from terrorism. It extends far beyond its most prominent and specialised core elements, the police, the intelligence services and the military and it encompasses many others that also play an active part. Her Majesty's Customs and Excise, the Immigration Service and the "blue light" emergency services to name but a few. However, new organisations will need to be added to the network as the type of attack that we face becomes clearer. For example, it now includes the National Health Service, the Department of Transport and local government emergency planners, all of whom now have a crucial role to play. It is often said that knowledge is power. But in counter terrorism that is just the first step. The acquisition of knowledge alone is insufficient as to transform it into power it must first be organised for timely and effective action. Achieving this is a challenge that constantly faces the practitioners of counter terrorism and the end to which all our efforts must be directed. Thank you.