Law and Security Issues

Ms Bridget Kendall ��

'Britain and Russia: Changing Attitudes to Chechnya'

Ms Kendall began by asserting that the issue of Chechnya was a �poisoned chalice� and proceeded to present a personal view from a media insider on the change in public and official opinion. There had been substantial changes in both the way the story had been covered, and in public and government opinion surrounding it. During the second Chechen war, the UK media had featured daily coverage, accompanied by frequent government statements. There was no longer a war but the situation had not stabilized and brutality continued. Chechnya rarely figured as a main news story any longer. The international community had de-emphasized the issue in its relations with Russia. Public opinion had changed for several key reasons. Firstly, media coverage had changed. Not only was it difficult to sustain coverage and interest in long-running tragedies but the nature of the war had also become murky, lacking an obvious good and bad side.. At the same time, in contrast to the first Chechen war, there was a deliberate Russian policy to control access to sites, in effect creating a cordon sanitaire around Chechnya for both foreign and Russian press. The press could only visit in official groups, with minders intent on showing how the situation had normalized. For broadcast journalists in particular, it was difficult to gain any access. Furthermore, the continuing violence had led to the virtual elimination NGO presence in Chechnya with many organisations being based in neighbouring areas and only entering on missions when it seemed safe to do so.

The external context of the global war on terror had cast the Chechen conflict in a different light, making it harder to condemn Russian actions. After 9/11, the Russians had allowed the US to station troops in Central Asia. Additionally, the links between Chechnya and international terrorism limited Western criticism of Russia. Terrorist connections also had an impact on public perceptions. The theatre siege in Moscow had diminished public support for the Chechens, since ordinary Russians had been the victims of Chechen terror rather than the oppressors. Russian diplomacy had solidified the belief that the Chechens would not give up the methods of terror. Britain�s new policy was one of �wait-and-see�, based on a support for the political process. Unlike Russia, which tarred all Chechens with the same brush, the British distinguished between the different wings of the movement. The changing balance between human rights and security, as in the case of the Al Qaida members held by the US in Guantanamo, made it harder for the west to pressure Russia since this implied double standards. As a result of the war in Iraq, a widening gulf had emerged between the US and the UK on one side and Europe on the other. Yet influence on Russia would have more impact if the West as a whole could stand united. Therefore under current conditions, it was likely that resolution of the conflict in Chechnya could be yet another victim of the Iraq crisis.

Dr Jeffrey Kahn ��

'Russia�s �Dictatorship of the Law� and the European Court of Human Rights'

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was a key institution for managing Russia�s integration with Europe. In the five years since Russia had became a signatory, ECHR law had exercised some influence in the country. In particular, the Human Rights Treaty had abolished the death penalty and ECHR legislation was increasingly cited in Russian legal opinions. However, cynics pointed to the disadvantages of the ECHR, citing the fact that it was overwhelmed by Russian cases and pointed to the delays and limited relief given to victims; also the Court had yet to deliver a single judgment on Chechnya. Putin�s �dictatorship of law� was meant to restore federal power over the regions rather than empowering human rights norms. However, in ensuring closer ties to Europe, Putin was also increasingly bound to European norms. Russia had accepted the jurisdiction of the ECHR in judging compliance with the human rights obligations detailed in the Charter. The rights regime was not merely aspirational but included an absolute right to life as well as other human rights and freedoms such as the right to a fair trial. Russia�s moratorium on the death penalty was a direct result of the ECHR.

Reforms had been introduced but the recent public report from the Committee for the Prevention of Torture described a deplorable state of affairs. There had been difficulties in accessing the Court. In the first three years, no single Russian case had been accepted. It had not been until 2001, when 6300 cases had been lodged, that two of them had met the requirements. Rejections were mainly technical, something which could be remedied by further education of the public and lawyers. Aside from an increase in cases heard, the Court had also referred cases to the government, often with an immediate response. While a limited number of cases had been admitted, at least three had received judgments, all against the government. These cases were at the heart of Russian legal reform, and involved unwillingness to enforce domestic rulings and extensive detentions. The ECHR judgments were equal in power to the Constitution, superior to much of Russian law. Judges had cited ECHR cases even when they had not directly cited Russian ones. New Russian legislation such as the Criminal Procedure Code had also been influenced, and changes in practice introduced, including ones requiring a judge�s approval to detain a suspect. But it was the implementation that really impacted on decisions and Chechnya provided a key testing ground for both policies and opinion. Continuing violence in Chechnya made it difficult for Russia to be treated as an equal in the Council of Europe. Recently, however, there had been an increase in applications and in cases which concerned Chechnya. Such judgments had the potential to continue the process in which the ECHR had been moderately successful, pushing Russia to make reforms, and strengthen the rule of law.

Dr Neil Melvin (University of Leeds) �

'Russia in the Changing European Security Architecture: the Future of the OSCE'

Dr Melvin made clear that he was speaking in a personal capacity. The last decade had provided a vast number of multilateral challenges and opportunities for cooperation between Russia and the OSCE. In the 1990s, the OSCE had seemed to be the way of the future, though subsequently NATO has emerged as the main multilateral body in Europe. By the mid 1990s the involvement of the OSCE in Kosovo and Chechnya had led Russia to believe that there was a double standard operating on key questions, including the rights of persons belonging to national minority rights. Nevertheless, the OSCE had some significant achievements, notably in dealing with Baltic national minorities. The OSCE had, however, been largely ineffective with respect to Chechnya. Russians had also felt that a geographical divide operated which largely excluded engagement with issues west of Vienna. Of the OSCE�s three dimensions, human, political/military and economic /environmental, Moscow appeared to believe that the first had been privileged while areas two and three had been neglected.

Three structural changes had impacted the OSCE�s success. Firstly, from the mid-1990s, the US had focused on institutions other than the OSCE. Other institutions had gained a broader scope. The military reach of NATO and the US continued to expand, with the establishment of bases in CIS countries. The EU also had an ambitious agenda in the area. EU enlargement had distracted attention from the OSCE. Thirdly, the OSCE had suffered from different conceptions of its role. Whereas in the West the Organisation was seen to have a modest purpose, in the East it had been viewed as having the potential to act as an important policy forum to address inequalities. Yet the OSCE was far from inactive. The impact of 9/11 and the common agenda around terrorism could not be ignored. At the same time, there had been an attempt to look at new issues, particularly transnational threats. The conflict in the Caucasus and emerging issues in Central Asia provided the OSCE with an opportunity for multilateral engagement, especially with the CIS states. In the future, the OSCE was likely to be a part of a network of institutions, providing a means for the international community in general and Europe in particular, to influence neighbouring states. But an increased EU role would not necessarily make it easy for the OSCE to act. For example, the EU desire to take common action in the Balkans had impeded OSCE involvement. The issue of treatment of national minorities provided a key opportunity for the OSCE, both in EU candidate countries and in the EU as a whole. Chechnya was not the ideal place to rebuild OSCE engagement because of the need to build trust there. Yet there was potential for involvement in the stabilization of the North Caucasus.

Dr Tiffany Troxel ��

'Putin, the Constitutional Court and the Duma'

Since its creation in 1991, the power of Russia�s Constitutional Court had steadily increased, as it had gained power to determine whether laws and decrees were constitutional. This power helped ensure that laws were adhered to and that there was a balance of power between the President and the Duma. However, the President could issue decrees which had the weight of law, though they could not suspend existing laws. A powerful Constitutional Court could limit the role of the presidency. While judges were appointed by the President and approved by the upper house of the parliament, they could rule on the constitutionality of decrees. The ability of the Constitutional Court to rule on presidential impeachment placed substantial power in its hands. The 19-member body is meant to remain strictly impartial and apolitical. All of its decisions are final and not subject to appeal. It is not supposed to rule on political issues, and members could only express their opinions in court. To ensure impartiality, judges could not belong to any political party. Recent reforms had strengthened the Constitutional Court, though this raised the question of why Putin would want to strengthen a body which could curtail his power. Yet, strengthening the Court formed part of a larger programme of centralization which obliged government bodies to implement Constitutional Court decisions. There is currently a two-month time limit to change decisions and a three-month period to introduce new laws to comply with rulings. However, as yet, there are no sanctions for presidential noncompliance. Since the 2001 amendments, the power of the Constitutional Court had increased though implementation of its rulings and wider issues of constitutional checks and balances remained critical for its role in Russia�s political development.