Plenary Session—Russian Political and Security Perspectives 

Academician Nodari Simonia (Director of the IMEMO, Moscow) ��

"The EU and Energy Security: The Role of Russia"

Academician Simonia argued that the EU had serious problems in the area of energy security; these had become especially difficult after 9/11, which had been a disaster for everyone. The US engagement in Iraq had added to an atmosphere of general destabilisation of an area that contained energy resources for the rest of the world. Bush had apparently ignored the problems of his allies because the US did not suffer directly from instability in the Middle East. Washington had diversified its sources of oil supply, taking much from Mexico, Canada and Venezuela, as well as Africa. This was not the case with the EU, which relied on the Middle East, Russia and Norway as its principal sources of oil. The majority of EU states had no domestic oil or gas production; production levels within the EU (for example in Britain) were in decline. It was expected that the UK would become a net importer of gas in forty years� time. Russian gas fields were near to exhaustion, and further exploration would cost a great deal. In the US, the Californian energy crisis had led to blackouts practically every month. The crisis had been a result of the liberalisation of the energy business, with long-term contracts for the supply of energy practically banned in favour of spot markets. Academician Simonia argued that a hundred percent spot market in energy in Russia would be a disaster, both for Russia and the EU. Furthermore, the notion of Russian joining the EU market space was bizarre because there was no unified Russian economic space. Russia had pieces of economic territories but no unified economic space, but oil and gas might prove to be a unifying factor.

Dr Lilia Shevtsova (Moscow Carnegie Centre)

"Russia between Europe and America"

Dr Shevtsova began by assessing Putin�s Western credentials, claiming that by the end of his first term of office we would have enough evidence to conclude that he was pro-Western, that he was a Westerniser. Dr Shevtsova argued that Putin had finally solved Russia�s dilemma, and had chosen the West. If he sustained this during his second term of office, it would be his major achievement. Putin�s strategic choice after September 11th had withstood the test of the Iraq crisis; he had apparently rejected the paradigm of being an alternative to the West. He could have pursued an alliance with China but had not done so and had not tried to save Saddam Hussein. Even Russian �lites hostile to the West were not trying to confront the Atlantic but were even seeking to enter the WTO, asking how to behave at G8 summits, and how to join Western civilisation.

Dr Shevtsova said that many Russians wanted Russia to be a �normal� country, rather than one seeking superpower status, and many also saw the US as a benevolent power. This pro-Western outlook was based on the premise that Russia was a participant in the struggle against the common enemy of international terrorism. It was also based on Russia�s weakness and an acknowledgement of an asymmetry between itself and the West. This outlook was based not on common values or principles with the West nor legitimised by �lite and national consciousnesses, and therefore further vacillation might continue. The Russian elite was largely still hostile to the US. However, Russians longed to have special relations with the US and wanted to look at the world through the prism of this relationship because it prolonged their impression of being a superpower and the appearance of Russian relevance and global impact on international issues. Advisors to Putin were encouraging him to emulate US attitudes in foreign and security policy. The pattern of the current relationship on security issues created an impetus that provided a stumbling block to Russia�s development and dialogue with the EU. Besides, the Russian political class soon discovered that Russia and the EU had very different strategic objectives and different decision-making mechanisms. However, Russia needed stronger international institutions and this could give more impetus to its relationship with the EU because some of its members are interested in a more radical Russian transformation. Rifts between Western allies were very unfortunate for Russia, as it did not know which �West� to join. The question was whether a rift was based on means or aims and values. Rifts in any case contributed to Russian uncertainty and ambiguity in its policy towards the West. The emphasis of some in the West on stability and the status quo in Russia had reinvigorated the traditional balance of forces in Russia. There was also a major concern that Russian participation in the fight against international terrorism had the direct or indirect consequence of reinvigorating forces of Russian nationalism and militarism. Only a united West could be a helpful force for Russia�s transformation, a process which should be seen as a joint venture between Russia and the West. The West might also need Russia�s engagement to heal its deep divisions.

At the end of Putin�s tenure, one might envisage two difference scenarios. Firstly, modernisation continuing with cautious reforms from above and continued security co-operation with the West without fundamental internal transformation. This might plunge the country into crisis. Secondly, integration through transformation, by establishing viable independent institutions, a free market, and full demilitarisation of relations with the West, with a partnership based on common values and principles rather than on a common enemy. This was a riskier and more uncertain path, and it was not clear whether Putin had the courage to pursue it. In order to start a new phase in Russia�s transformation, alternative visions would have to be created. There would also be a need for national and elite consensus and approval; a security and policing community would need to be reconstructed, and there would also have to be pressure for transformation from both Russian society and the West. Dr Shevtsova concluded by saying that developments gave cause for optimism that such a transformation would occur.