Regional Dimensions

Dr Tomila Lankina, Humboldt University, Berlin�

'The Influence of the European Union on Russia�s North West'

Dr Lankina spoke about the impact of the EU on the relationship between local, regional and federal governments in Russia. Russia itself was divided between core and periphery, with the Europeanized northwest contrasting with other areas of the country, with EU-led programs helping some of the adjoining regions become insiders. Dr Lankina�s main argument was that Putin�s domestic institutional reforms had the potential to constrain EU influence in Russia in general and the Northwest regions in particular. The Europeanisation of Russia�s northwest was the result of direct programmes and increased contact. Regions and localities were seen as key pillars in building a Europe of regions and creating interconnections beyond the state. As a result, the EU and other Western institutions and organisations had pushed for more efficient regionally-targeted aid and projects, including the Finnish Northern Initiative, the German proposal of the �new Hansa�, and WB, IMF and EBRD projects which supported �islands of normality� within Russia. Such programmes could allow specific areas to benefit from their proximity by increasing democratization and development to reach the standards of their European neighbours.

Putin�s �unambiguously Europeanist� credentials ought to indicate that he would support such projects, especially as he emphasized the commonality of European values. Yet, his "modernization" policies challenged the decentralization that fostered European integration. Putin�s reforms limited the power of regions, increasing that of the Kremlin. The reforms had also limited regional foreign and economic policy freedom, undermining regional ability and willingness to attract investment. As the EU was preoccupied with integrating new members, Putin�s hard security view of frontiers contrasted with its perception of porous borders and community building. Such differences were revealed when one examined the rhetoric in the EU charter on local government and that in Putin�s law, which included words with punitive connotations which serve to constrain, rather than enable local initiative. Dr Lankina concluded by saying that as yet it was difficult to measure the impact of Putin�s reforms, as many had still to be implemented. However the rejection of the principles of decentralization and subsidiarity that facilitated European integration increased the difficulty of building linkages, making it less likely that Russia�s Northwest could become more of an insider in an enlarged Europe.

Dr Martha Merritt (University of Notre Dame)

'Russia and the Baltic States: together again in Europe?'

The Baltic States, a seemingly small part of Russia�s external relations, provide a lens for the rest of Putin�s foreign policy. Dr Merritt argued that Russia�s policy towards the Baltics reflected a clash of nationalisms and different perspectives on nation building. From the Russian perspective, membership in Europe was assumed, as Russia has always claimed its place as a major European country. At the end of the Cold War, the Baltics were perceived to be a gateway to Europe by progressive Russians, in the sense that their quicker transition could provide an example for Russia. It was not long before more conservative voices from Russia depicted the Baltic states, particularly Estonia and Latvia, as barriers dividing Russia from the heart of Europe. President Putin in particular has at the heart of his nation-building project a policy of centralization, invoking the European model of nationalism to assist in forging one nation from diverse peoples. Following Hobsbawm, the classical model of European nation-building is no longer sustainable. As such, state-building was not necessarily doomed but suffered from the difficulties of any system to govern Russia effectively. Putin uses an unlikely combination of European nationalism, with 21st Century PR and mass media, to broadcast his message. A �single information space� reflected a desire for clear foreign policy, generally consisting of a single relatively unchanging message. For example, when the Baltics joined NATO, Putin�s policy had been very consistent and mild in manner, recognizing the lack of Russian leverage in the matter while registering dislike for the policy action.

By contrast, the all three small Baltic countries are participating in a different process of state- building. Their �new nationalism� has an ethnically driven message and relinquishes many aspects of economic sovereignty, a traditional building block of statehood. The decision to pursue integration with the EU and gain support from the US led them to abandon trade barriers that could have been used to cushion their transition but would have made membership in international associations uncertain. Instead of economic nationalism, the transition had had an ideological aspect, providing citizens with a reason to sacrifice. Dr Merritt concluded by considering the crucible of Kaliningrad, where new nationalism was controversial and provoked tension between Russia, the Baltic States and the EU. Some believed that Kaliningrad could be Russia�s window to the west, yet this is stymied by the contradiction between Russia�s nation-building model and the Baltic alternatives. Lithuania sought cooperation on several issues, hoping to use Kaliningrad as a model for broader Lithuanian-Russian relations. However, Russian reluctance towards regional involvements and the priority of centralization has threatened such proposals. For Putin, Kaliningrad must be integrated into a centralized Russia. Thus, Kaliningrad is likely to remain a testing ground for Russian nation-building and foreign policy.

Dr Alexander Lukin �(MGIMO, Moscow)

'Russia between China and Europe'

Dr Lukin presented a series of surveys and opinion polls depicting how contemporary Russians viewed their place in the world. As other speakers had noted, Putin stressed that Russia was European though his rhetoric varied, depending on the nature of the audience. When addressing the West, Putin emphasized Russia�s Europeanness and shared values. However, when in China or India, Putin insisted that Russia is Asian. Turning to the West, Putin was following the policies of many Russian leaders, such as Catherine the Great, who outwardly emphasized Russia�s European nature but insisted that the Russian peasants were uncultured and could not have the freedom of Europeans but required direct control. Lukin used a series of polls to detail Russian attitudes at various periods and in different regions of Russia. In a poll concerning on perceptions of development, Russians agreed that the US was the most developed country, but believed that China was more developed than Russia. Results of polls detailing Russia�s relations with different countries depended on concurrent geopolitical events. During the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, 48% of Russians believed that the US was an enemy, while only 20% believed it was friendly. Since 1990, there had been a steady decline in positive Russian perceptions of Americans as well as of most other nations. In one recent poll China had emerged as the most friendly nation (52%). Such results had to be viewed with some caution, as respondents were given a list of countries to put in rank order. More open polls showed that the US was still perceived as the least friendly country (27%) but few friendly countries were listed in any case. In detailing perceived threats, Russians were mainly Western-oriented, thinking of the West as the centre of the world. Even when Russians in the east of the country were questioned, they still focused on the West, and expressed little interest in visiting or working in the East. Countries like the US, Canada and Australia attracted far more interest. However, many of these polls had high results of uncertainty and it might be difficult to draw conclusions on more than general trends. Lukin concluded by arguing that the Russian people, even those in the Far East thought of Russia as being a key part of the West.