Russia and Western Europe

David Gowan ��

'Russia and the EU'

Mr Gowan made clear that he was speaking in a personal capacity. He began by noting that trade alone made the relationship with the EU a critical one for Russia. The EU was Moscow�s largest trading partner and, after enlargement, was likely to account for as much as 50% of Russian exports. This relationship was highly asymmetrical, with Russia accounting for only 4.4% of the EU�s imports and 2.1% of its exports. However, Russia did provide a critical amount of the oil and gas consumed in the EU. The overall EU-Russian relationship was based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which came into force in 1997. Dialogue under this agreement was based on a complex committee structure, which needed reform. Until now, there had been a greater emphasis on bilateral ties between Russia and the member states than on Russia�s relations with the EU as an entity. The institutional structure of the rotating EU presidency had hindered long-term relationships. While Yeltsin had shown little sustained interest in the EU especially towards the end of his time as President, Putin had from the outset recognised the benefits of greater interaction.

Mr Gowan described ways in which interaction with the EU could help Russia: technical assistance (the TACIS programme), critical help with WTO membership and support for structural reform. While previous EU-Russia summits had often been marked by attempts at �eye-catching diplomacy�, the combination of EU policy and Putin�s diplomatic skills had contributed to some valuable results, including the compromise over travel to and from Kaliningrad in 2002.

Mr Gowan listed several issues that posed problems and opportunities for EU-Russian relations: EU enlargement, the euro and the ESDP. Russian policy towards enlargement had varied, ranging from indifference to the expression of practical concerns. Russia tended to focus on the drawbacks of enlargement for their own relations with the accession countries. However, there were important advantages for Russia, such as the reduction of high tariff barriers in some accession countries e.g. Poland. Overall, EU enlargement could be beneficial to Russia. So far, Putin had been reasonably successful in promoting Russia�s interests, as he had done over Kaliningrad. Many Russians saw the euro in political terms as a symbol of the EU�s strength. However, its economic significance for Russia remained limited. Russia�s exports, especially in energy, were mainly denominated in dollars, and Russians had substantial dollar cash holdings ($40-80 billion). However, it was likely that as trade increased, the euro would become more important for Russia. The ESDP process was likely to be a source of mutual interest for Russia and the EU. This area of EU policy was still being developed, and Russia�s involvement, for example in Bosnia, remained important.

According to Mr Gowan, both Brussels and Moscow recognised there was a need for change in EU-Russian relations. There were new fora for discussion, including the energy dialogue, the �common economic space�, a forum for justice and home affairs and discussion of co-operation in the field of external security. Putin�s approach to the EU was part of a wider reform agenda. Eventual accession to the WTO would probably result in the redrafting of the PCA, with the EFTA as a model for convergence. This in turn might also form part of a broader web of shared values (the Council of Europe would also play a part in this) and could open up prospects of even more substantial co-operation in the longer term.

The future of the relationship in the longer term would depend in large part on how the EU evolved. It would also depend on the extent to which Russia was prepared to adapt to, and work with, the EU.

Dr Alexei Gromyko �(Institute of Europe, Moscow)�

'Britain and Russia in the European Context'

Both Britain and Russia had competing interests that gave them a Janus-faced outlook on policy. Disputes between Westerners and �men of the soil� had characterized Russia for centuries and had become again noticeable in the 1990s. These disputes were an integral part of Russia�s world outlook, and reflected problems of identity. Britain and Russia had a surprising amount in common. They both had a history of Scandinavian invasion and settlement. Both had a triple core of ethnic groups. They had been united by shared geopolitics, as both had had to search for a new role because of changing power dynamics, including the loss of empire. In the case of Britain, self-definition was hindered by the existence of so many conflicting names for different areas: the United Kingdom, Great Britain, England etc. Both countries were distinct from Continental Europe and had complicated relationships with the EU. Some in Britain were lobbying for an �anglosphere�, uniting the English-speaking Atlantic community. Economic developments seemed to support such a proposal. By the 1990s American FDI in Britain had increased to twice that of the EU and British investment in the US and Canada had far outgrown that of all the EU states combined.

Foreign policy also revealed these Janus-like faces. Britain and Russia both sought to act as a bridge between the US and Europe. In Britain Euro-federalists sought to resist the hyperpower or to make it more moderate. For Thatcher, Europe had encompassed both sides of the Atlantic, whereas for Gorbachev it had stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals. For Britain, the special relationship with the US was the bedrock of policy. Traditionally, Europe had been the third priority after the Commonwealth and the US, whereas now the US and the EU were on a par. Russia, similarly, had seen an increase in ties with Europe. Both states had suffered large territorial and military losses, and had sought to preserve their soft power in former colonies. It was unclear how successful Britain had been in this respect. Russians believed that they had been or would be successful; a recent poll revealed that respondents thought that the strongest powers in thirty years� time would be Russia, the EU, China and the US. Russia and Britain both looked East and West from their borders. This geopolitical approach occasionally made them overlook the limits of their strength. They both had important European frontiers but economic, political and cultural factors led them to other areas. However, neither Britain nor Russia were merely Trojan horses. Both had the means to enrich Europe by acting as bridges. Because of their history and position, Britain and Russia were likely to remain Janus-faced for the foreseeable future.

Dr Julie Newton , Paris �

'Russian French Relations'

Immediately after the Iraq crisis, Moscow re-focused on its relationship with the United States. The �summit of disobedience�, as it was called, between Chirac, Schroeder and Putin was quickly replaced by a new Russian-American strategic partnership. One Russian analyst called Putin�s shift �a return to rationality� after Moscow had irrationally flirted with Europe, which was incapable of giving Russia enough in return. But refocusing on the United States would not mean forgetting Europe. On the contrary, Moscow�s goal is to strike a balance (one that would fluctuate over time) between Europe and the United States in order to further Russia�s long-term goal of multipolarity.

The Franco-Russian relationship serves as an interesting barometer of such trends in Russia�s Western policy. The reason has to do with France�s relative significance in Moscow�s eyes. While France is only Russia�s fourth most important bilateral relationship after the US, Germany and the UK, it is particularly valued for its crucial role in key multilateral institutions, such as the EU and NATO. In addition, Moscow is keenly aware that France is the leading continental player in the EU�s foreign, security and defence policies, over which Moscow seeks some degree of influence. Third, both states share the desire to build a multipolar world order. Russia and France are also linked by mutual history: both were once great powers; both were belittled by the collapse of the Cold War system; and both are now seeking to restore a prominent place at the international table. Finally, major economic rewards, particularly in aeronautic and energy sectors, add even greater weight to the strategic substance of Franco-Russian relations in Moscow�s eyes.

But the history of Franco-Russian relations since 1989-91 has been troubled. Throughout the decade, France proved much less interested in Russia than Moscow had anticipated. The problem was that in the aftermath of German reunification, France was no longer politically preeminent in Western Europe. In response, Paris sought a new power base via the EU � rather than via strategic partnership with Russia, as Moscow had hoped. Worse still, from Moscow�s viewpoint, France treated Russia as the sick man on the continent that had to be managed, not privileged. Adding to the bad news, France strongly supported economic quotas, barriers and tariffs, particularly in the agricultural and textile domains, that impeded both Russian-French trade, but Russian-EU trade more broadly. In addition, Moscow lamented France�s harsh criticism towards Russia�s war in Chechnya. (From France�s viewpoint�especially that of the press �France is the EU�s spiritual mouthpiece for democratic values, and is thus obligated to criticize Russia�s handling of the Chechen crisis.) As a result, some in the Putin Administration concluded that it is easier to work with an increasingly realist-minded United States, rather than a value-oriented EU.

Dr Newton then turned to Franco-Russian relations during Putin�s tenure. The first phase, from Putin�s election to the end of 2000, was characterized by frostiness. Wanting to punish France over Chechnya, Putin reached out to Schroeder and Blair, repeatedly rebuffing Chirac. But France feared getting sidelined, so Chirac relaxed French criticism of Chechnya and reached out to Moscow. Putin responded immediately, since Moscow could ill-afford to ignore the French any longer given Paris� leading role in EU, particularly in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Franco-Russian relations flourished. Then, after 9/11/01, an event that greatly elevated Russia�s strategic relevance, the Putin Administration swerved back to close partnership with the United States in order to reap what it hoped would be a political windfall. Regarding partnership with the EU, benefits to Russia now seemed less apparent, given the EU�s lack of global leadership and its �crisis management� approach to Russia. Similarly, the French gave Russia mostly rhetoric, and it had showed little global leadership, particularly over Afghanistan. Then, after Chirac�s reelection in 2002, rid of cohabitation, Chirac set out to improve Franco-Russian relations as part of building a real European pole. From 2002, the French set out to engage Russia in a bilateral/multilateral security ties based on several interlocking layers. The latest phase in the relationship was the Iraqi crisis, in which Moscow joined hands with Germany and France to oppose US intervention. But the �peace camp� got a bitter lesson: influence is impossible without hard power to back it up. And if Russia is to gain genuine international influence, it must do so by linking arms with the world�s greatest �hard power�. Even so, �old Europe� will grow stronger as it continues to fuse, making the Franco-Russian relationship also important for the future.

Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe (University of Sheffield)

'Russia, Western Europe and the US Post 9/11'

Professor Kennedy-Pipe began by detailing factors which provided the current context for the relationship between Russia, the US and Western Europe. First, she argued that the structure of the International system mattered. Since 1989, the international system had moved from a bipolar world to a uni polar one dominated by the United States. Despite American dominance, the West European states had played an important role in thinking about international norms. For the West this had resulted in a question of when to intervene for humanitarian purposes. The New World order allowed unilateralism on the part of the United States but there had been an increasing emphasis on the importance of international institutions and the deployment of liberal values through humanitarian intervention. Whilst not everything in the garden was rosy there had been settlement of some of the outstanding issues of the Cold War. There had been resolution of the German problem and increasing dialogue between Russia and the West on thorny issues such as NATO expansion, the Balkan Wars and human rights. Russia having faced the shrinkage of empire had adjusted to its role as regional hegemon.

However, 9/11 had perhaps been a more important turning point than 1989 as it destroyed the myth of US invulnerability and shifted the balance between the United States and other great powers. Immediately after the attacks, an �axis of interest� had seemed to emerge between the US and Russia. Moscow had long experience of the fragility of power and Washington having experienced the hostility of those opposed to the United States seemed to look for allies. 9/11 raised questions of how great powers operated in the international arena and how action abroad could have repercussions at home. In this respect, Professor Kennedy-Pipe suggested that the US could learn from the Soviet experience and the break up of the Soviet Empire. She noted that since 1989 there had been many debates in Moscow over the successes and failures of Soviet foreign policy yet there had been little serious reflection in Washington about the consequences of US power. The US could learn from the fragility and ultimate decline of Soviet power. Professor Kennedy-Pipe also argued that realist thinking and the projection of great power politics had become more important. This was a negative feature of contemporary international affairs. Not least, because the fate of what she termed the European project was in question. She argued that since 1919 and Versailles the West Europeans had struggled to build a consensus built on certain liberal norms most notably the non-use of military power and the preservation of human rights. She claimed that the project had seemed successful after the end of the Cold War but following 9/11 it seemed to be losing resonance in both the US and Russia. In short, 9/11 and the response to the activities of al-queda and Chechen separatists could be seen as a rejection of liberal norms on the international scene. Most obviously, the seeking of any consensus within international institutions for the use of force was no longer important. Norms and human rights were jettisoned, as realist action and military power sidelined the European project. This was, she indicated, a pity not least in terms of Russia�s place within Europe. The US, after 9/11 tolerated the use of Russian military power and the abuse of human rights in Chechnya because of the supposed links between radical Islamist groups. Indeed, the forging of links between the US and Russia over the control of Central Asia meant that the European powers were more or less excluded from influence in this crucial theatre. She argued that this meant a return of raw Great power politics and was pessimistic about the ability of the West Europeans to influence Moscow over issues such as human rights in Chechnya. Russia, she argued would now also pursue a form of unilateralism albeit one that still sought to stress the coincidence of interest with Washington in the defeat of Islamic radicalism.

She also maintained that there had been a rejection of the tool of diplomacy by the US in favour of military power. This would she predicted prove to be tragic. This rejection of diplomacy in the operation of the balance of power would prove crucial to the stability of the international system. Professor Kennedy-Pipe argued that Morgenthau�s conception of the balance of power was important not least because it depicted how peace was maintained by managing power through institutions and with skilled diplomacy. History showed that the deployment of military power without due regard for collective diplomacy caused instability. Here she raised the case of Iraq and argued that the attempt to reshape the country using military force would prove a failure for the US. The tipping and tilting of regimes and military occupation would not prove an adequate substitute for diplomacy. This assessment also applied to Chechnya but there appeared little chance that either Bush or Putin would listen to voices opposed to war.