The Political Economy of the End of Empires
The Political Economy of the End of Empires
CIS/ECS/Nuffield co-sponsored event
Current research in international relations mostly takes for granted the state-based structure of world politics, but historically empires dominated the landscape. Why did empires vanish after World War II, and why then? Their demise was facilitated by changes in the political economy of metropoles. Many imperial powers crossed a threshold of motorization and energy consumption nearly simultaneously, leading to three changes: the balance of economic winners and losers from imperialism changed to the detriment of empire; the net fiscal costs of empire increased; and changes in foreign investment reduced the need for colonialism. These economic changes supported an ideational shift in favor of anti-colonial norms. A political economy-based explanation also helps to account for some of the variation in the timing of decolonization, across both metropoles and types of colonies.
Jeff Colgan
Jeff Colgan is Richard Holbrooke Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the Watson Institute of International Studies of Brown University. Previously he was on faculty at American University in Washington DC, and was a Residential Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He completed his PhD in politics and public policy at Princeton University, a Master’s at the University of California-Berkeley, and a Bachelor’s in nuclear engineering at McMaster University. He previously worked at McKinsey and Company, the Brattle Group, and the World Bank. His academic work is published journals such as International Organization, World Politics, International Security, and Foreign Policy.
Dr. Colgan’s research specializes on oil and international politics. He is author of two books and a dozen articles, including Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War (Cambridge University Press, 2013). His article on global oil politics in International Organization won the 2010 Robert O. Keohane award for the best article published by an untenured scholar. His 2014 article in the same journal argues that OPEC is not a functioning cartel, but rather a strictly political club.