Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond

St Antony’s College, University of Oxford
“The past is never dead, it’s not even past”
William Faulkner

“Prediction is difficult, especially about the future”
Mark Twain
The workshop on Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements and Beyond was organized by South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) in association with the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and LSEE, the Research Unit on South East Europe based at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. The event was sponsored by the Centre for International Studies and Department of Politics and International Relations (University of Oxford), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, LSEE and NATO Public Diplomacy Division. The convenors of the workshop were Professor Richard Caplan, Dr James Ker-Lindsay and Sir David Madden. Overall, an impressive array of expertise was assembled at the workshop, where discussion was free and open in line with the Chatham House rule. The following report conveys some of the main issues and questions raised.

The aim of the gathering was to exchange ideas and lessons learnt from the first successful round of negotiations on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Four separate panels were organized, each covering a different aspect of the negotiations: the background, the negotiations, implementation of the agreement, and future prospects of success.

The following report conveys some of the main issues and questions raised at the workshop, and represents SEESOX’s interpretation of the discussions. It does not purport to reflect the views of any of the participants.

Panel I: Getting to the Negotiating Table

Discussion in the first panel focussed on the period leading up to the latest phase of negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. In particular, it underscored the factors which created the conditions for the successful conduct of the negotiations and the eventual agreement, while participants presented their perspectives from the point of view of the international community, Belgrade and Pristina.

From the international point of view, the 1999 NATO intervention and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 created an uneasy stasis in Kosovo without a more permanent solution for Kosovo’s status. KFOR, the NATO peacekeeping mission, was status-neutral. The international community sought to maintain the status quo, but the March 2004 riots demonstrated that it was becoming unsustainable. The likelihood of a successful negotiated solution was small, as the Ahtisaari process demonstrated. One part of the international community therefore opted for supporting a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, seeing it as the least bad way to break the deadlock. Another part of the international community objected to this and refused to recognise the new state. The Serbian side, and President Boris Tadic in particular, reacted in a restrained manner to the new situation; in
particular by seeking to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. By doing so, they chose a mature approach to opposing Kosovo’s independence. The eventual ICJ decision proved to be a crucial turning point. It failed to support Serbia’s contention that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was contrary to international law. But equally it did not give the Kosovo side everything it wanted. In particular, it took no stand on whether Kosovo was in fact a state. This allowed the international community to persuade the two sides to come to the negotiating table. The other key factor that transformed the situation was Serbia’s application for EU candidate status. This resulted in the EU-brokered dialogue that continues to the present.

The question that remains open is where is the process going? What is the final outcome or goal? In particular, the dilemma for the international community is whether being more flexible on the issue of autonomy for Kosovo’s Serbs can be used to secure greater flexibility on the Serbian side regarding the question of Kosovo’s sovereignty.

Viewed from Belgrade, it was important to understand the local context for decision-making. During the 1990s, one half of Serbia believed that the problem in Kosovo was one of a democratic deficit created by Milosevic and his regime, which would be resolved through his departure; the other half of Serbia believed that there was an international geopolitical conspiracy against Serbia. After 2000, discussing Kosovo’s independence was a taboo. Successive governments failed to explain to the public the reality of the situation and clung on to the lowest common denominator: the idea that UNSCR 1244 guaranteed Serbia’s continued sovereignty over Kosovo. Although there was considerable anger in Serbia over the unilateral declaration of independence, and Belgrade actively opposed Kosovo’s independence on the world stage, supported by Russia, the ICJ verdict forced the government to change its approach.

Pristina faced a range of problems: it did not have control of the entire territory of Kosovo; governing structures were dysfunctional and under the influence of organized crime; Kosovo was an unfinished state, whose international legitimacy was undermined by the lack of a UN seat. Additionally, its EU perspective was seen to be unequal as compared to Serbia’s because five EU member states did not recognize Kosovo (although it is important to note that Britain, Germany and France did recognise Kosovo and that, generally, cooperation among the UN, NATO and the EU was good). Despite the ICJ verdict, Kosovo remained in a weaker position, in part due to the dubious international and domestic legitimacy of its leaders, but also because of its lack of experience and institutional memory in conducting negotiations. The domestic dynamics in Kosovo were particularly unfavourable in the run up to negotiations. The political elite was divided while the Prime Minister’s legitimacy was undermined due to the election fraud as well as international accusations regarding organ trafficking. Moreover, Kosovo did not enter into the negotiations with a clear idea of what it wanted. Instead it had a better sense of what it did not want.

Discussion also focused on whether the existence of five EU member-
states which did not recognize Kosovo was positive or negative. On the one hand, their stance complicated decision making within the EU and prevented the Union from offering Kosovo a clear perspective of membership, which would both have increased its leverage and incentives in relation to Kosovo. On the other hand, they also played a positive role. In Serbia, their position allowed President Tadic and his government to maintain the position that the EU could not be blamed for Kosovo’s UDI, as well as that the Union was neutral when it came to Kosovo. This allowed him to keep the goal of EU accession in Serbia alive at a difficult time, which in turn ensured – later on – that the EU had considerable leverage over Serbia.

It was also clear from the discussion, and reports of comments made and actions taken, that the five did not constitute a single united bloc.

Generally, this session demonstrated considerable agreement on the various factors which brought the two sides to the negotiating table, under EU auspices.

**Panel II: Getting to Yes**

The next topic of discussion was the actual negotiations in Brussels. The workshop considered how the “technical” dialogue began, and some of the problems associated with it.

From the beginning of this period of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina which began in early 2011, the EU was in the driving seat of mediation efforts. Initially, EU mediators went into the talks with what was more a list of issues that they wished to solve rather than anything like a strategy. The overall objective was to bring the two sides together and resolve practical problems (low hanging fruit), which would help to build trust and thus open the way for political issues to be tackled. An example of such a problem was civil registry books from Kosovo – Serbia had most of them, Kosovo needed them to function as a state. From the point of view of Pristina, these books needed to be returned, yet from the point of view of Belgrade this was an illegal regime and Serbia was the rightful owner of these books. How could you resolve this situation? One way, and the solution adopted, was by making copies of the civil registry books and handing those to Pristina. There were a number of similar issues, including freedom of movement of individuals and vehicles which were resolved with varying degrees of success. The establishment of integrated boundary management was a major step forward. The issue of Kosovo customs stamps was more challenging, however; and the inability to resolve this successfully led to the violence in northern Kosovo in July and August 2011. The issue was eventually resolved (with the help of integrated boundary management) just ahead of elections in Serbia when it was agreed that the stamps would simply refer to ‘Kosovo’ rather than ‘Republic of Kosovo’. By this time, the technical dialogue had exhausted itself. It was clear that behind almost every technical issue there was a political difficulty and that the dialogue therefore had to be raised to a higher political level.

The next phase of the dialogue emerged after the election of a new government in Belgrade. The new government, led by the Serbian
Progressive Party (SNS), had to start implementing what was previously agreed in order to improve Serbia’s credibility within the EU. It also became aware that Serbia’s position on Kosovo was becoming weaker. Initially, Belgrade’s idea was to go for a more comprehensive settlement, where nothing was agreed until everything was agreed. From Belgrade’s point of view, the agreement could have gone further than it did, but in the end the idea that a more gradual approach might be better was accepted. Serbia did not want to see the Serbs in Kosovo cut off, or to have a permanently hostile neighbour.

From the point of view of Pristina, there was a certain reluctance to engage in negotiations with Belgrade yet again, particularly in light of memories and wounds stemming from the conflict, as well as a lack of apology from Serbia. However, Pristina realized that the only way to integrate the north would be through dialogue; there was also a desire to follow the advice of its friends in the West and open up its own EU accession path.

The idea of setting up an Association of Serb Municipalities arose from the tension between Pristina’s desire to dismantle Serbia’s institutions and the desire of Belgrade and Serbs in the north to preserve them. The compromise solution was to ‘repackage’ them in their existing form but within Kosovo’s administrative system. The broad sphere of competences of the Association was agreed, but many of the details were left to be thrashed out later – in a sense, both sides accepted and embraced the idea of constructive ambiguity. Much remained to be done in negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. For example, while the First Brussels Agreement dealt with northern Kosovo, a second agreement will be needed to define the representation of Serbs in Kosovo central institutions (the majority of Serbs in Kosovo live south of the River Ibar) and the protection of cultural and religious heritage. The workshop was not therefore looking at a final deal, but at work in progress: indeed it coincided with further talks taking place between the two sides.

Discussion also focused on how the Brussels agreement could be reconciled with Serbia’s constitution, which defined Kosovo as an integral part of the Serbian state. While some of the discussants argued that the political foundations on which the Brussels agreement was based were more important than the legal ones, others took the view that some kind of legal grounding, or reconciliation, with the Serbian constitution was necessary in Serbia to give durability to the agreements. One idea for how this might be done was through a special constitutional law, which would somehow “legalize” Kosovo’s legal system and political structures in the eyes of the Serbian constitutional and legal system.

This session produced a particularly clear picture of how and why the technical talks had turned into a political dialogue; how and why agreement was reached; and how far there is still to go in the process.

Panel III: Implementation

The third panel focussed on the implementation of the Brussels Agreements and their successes and failures. The Brussels Agreement from April 2013 was assessed as a plan of management of the relations
between Pristina and Belgrade, rather than a clear roadmap with a series of milestones and objectives. Six points of the agreement drew upon the Ahtisaari plan, while only two points addressed the issue of normalization.

From Pristina’s point of view, the Agreement ruled out the option of creating a multi-national state in Kosovo by de facto establishing a bi-national state, which was compared to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By creating the Association of Serb Municipalities, governance and administration in Kosovo had become dual, while leaving a lot of unclear points in terms of implementation and the validity of legal systems.

This approach was labelled as gradualism, which had previously failed in Israel and Palestine, and not been attempted elsewhere in former Yugoslavia. Its application in the Kosovo case was therefore deemed wrong by some. In this view, the process had no end and there was no finality and no stable point of direction, since the EU prospect for Kosovo was ruled out until the five non-recognizers changed their position.

Apart from the top political significance, the agreement was also discussed in terms of actual impact on citizens. First, a lack of transparency during the talks was criticized as it allowed for a raft of interpretations and confusion about what the Agreement was aimed to achieve. In Serbia, the Brussels agreement was sold as a necessity, as saving what could be saved for Serbia to maintain its international position and European progress. To the Kosovar Serbs, they were presented as an inevitable necessity to protect the Serbia community in Kosovo from disappearing or being disenfranchised. In Pristina, the agreement was criticized as inconclusive, as raising more questions than it resolved. To both the Serbian and Kosovo publics the Brussels negotiations were “about us without us”. There has thus been a clear distrust of the process since its start.

The term “normalization”, which is usually offered as the main outcome of the talks, was discussed at length. It especially meant that Serbia would stop meddling in Kosovo’s internal politics, while at the same time having some positive effects on daily life in Kosovo. To some, normalization had a meaning at the top political echelons but these changes did not percolate down to the local level. People were affected by the unresolved status of Kosovo on a daily basis. For example, it was difficult for sportsmen from Kosovo to participate at world sporting event without a clear political status. Divided education was also a thorny issue, which was difficult to resolve, since there was no common language which Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs could use. In schools, children learned only Albanian or Serbian depending on which group they identified with. Education of Serbs in Kosovo was agreed to be left under the competence of Belgrade. The young generations in Kosovo did not speak any other language than the language of their parents, which significantly complicated cross-community communication. Overall, the reality of the separate social and economic life between northern Kosovo and the rest, as well as in divided Mitrovica, was seen to be affecting social progress.

To this extent, some argued that only technical aspects of the process had so far been successful. They had
resolved issues such as recognition of diplomas, civil registries, personal documents, and regional meetings; however, the free movement of people was a more challenging topic. Agreement on courts, implementation of policing, freedom of movement and license plates were crucial. Kosovo representatives also noted that Kosovo had, due to its inclusion into EU conditionality, become a hostage of the Serbia-EU accession negotiations, while leaving Kosovo’s EU prospects to one side and for a distant future. Prospects for the success of the Association of Serb Municipalities were now dependent on how the newly elected mayors would embrace the new reality. The entire agreement and process thus depended on a lot of goodwill in the future for its own continued success, which was not guaranteed as it depended on individual actors. It was stressed several times that in the early phase the dialogue was destructive in terms of confidence building because these agreements were not implemented.

The non-participation of Kosovo Serbs during the negotiations was viewed as of marginal importance, since the majority of Serbs in Kosovo followed Belgrade’s lead. Kosovo Serbs held onto Belgrade but they were against the talks from the start. They did not support the dialogue but would ultimately follow what Belgrade said, which was demonstrated during the recent elections. It had been overall very hard to communicate the process to Kosovo Serbs and change their allegiances. They were very protective of the Ibar River and there had not been sufficient effort to rebuild their confidence. Their non-participation, though, was generally seen as adding to the sense of lack of transparency in the process.

The topic of the latest elections was also tackled, the assessment being that despite international views to the contrary, they were a clear failure on a variety of grounds, such as low turnout, some violence and the use of coercion and threats by Belgrade against Serbs. Some assessed them as the worst election yet. It was not the first time Kosovo Serbs had participated. The 2002 UNMIK-organized elections were successful with an overall 60% participation in the North: though it was pointed out that these were held under different circumstances and different electoral laws. In the latest elections, there was clear evidence that some Kosovo Serbs were pressurized and threatened to participate. Violence in the elections took the vote away from some of the Albanian candidates in the North, while bringing the victory to some Kosovo Serbs, who had only a limited knowledge about the administrative and legal system in Kosovo. It was underscored that they will have a lot of difficulty navigating through the current system in Kosovo. The failure of the last electoral round could potentially lead to a serious lack of confidence in the outcomes of any upcoming talks. A view was also presented that only the 2014 elections would be decisive in terms of the future of the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia.

However, any potential for a violent conflict or attempted partition was now greatly reduced, which was a view shared by all participants. Although security was previously the main objective of the international community in Kosovo, the need for worrying about security risk was long
gone. Security risk was now very low and the level of violence also negligible. The few instances in 2004, and approximately once a year after that, were rather exceptions that proved the rule that Kosovo was not prone to conflict at the moment.

There was some discussion of the poor state of economic development in both Serbia and Kosovo, despite the amount of money being made available to the Serbs in Kosovo. Economic difficulties and weaknesses were a theme returned to in the 4th session.

Perhaps because of the subject matter of this session, implementation of ambiguous agreements reached in a process of confidential discussion mediated by the EU, critical voices were to the fore, and many aspects were found wanting. Again, a clear theme was how far the process had to go. But it was accepted that some aspects e.g. free movement were better; and it was widely agreed that the likelihood of serious violence was fortunately low.

Panel IV. The Longer Term

The last discussion panel focused on the long-term perspectives and the European path of both Serbia and Kosovo as well as the sustainability of the Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo. Overall, the progress in the past four years was praised. However, a lot remained to be done, especially for the EU in cooperation with the local actors. The EU had become the dominant player in Kosovo and kept the hopes of locals up. The main priorities stressed were economic reconstruction, support for the change of political culture through reconciliation efforts and stress on the media.

The external perspective was that the process of Europeanization needed to be locked in on both sides, which required clear sticks and carrots for both Serbia and Kosovo. The agenda for Kosovo had for a long time been driven by security concerns but it was now more about economy. Once the EU recovered from its current crisis, energy and institutional reforms in Kosovo should be the priority. The process also needed to get locked in by presenting Kosovo with a clear path. Economic mismanagement was clearly destabilizing and the international community should focus on improving the economic performance in Kosovo. In brief, many commentators agreed that the focus should now shift to economic rather than security-related issues.

The next set of problems that should take priority was a top-down promoted reconciliation. In this view, social reconstruction, initiated by top political actors, should take priority: since it took a long time to change deeply ingrained attitudes. Unless gestures turned into action, no one would believe in them. That was why reconciliation needs to be promoted top-down and not left up to the citizens. Local and community-driven initiatives alone were not sufficient as they did not simmer up to the highest political levels and thus have an impact on the general political culture. Moreover, although civil society contacts had always been good between Kosovo and Serbia, they had never really had any influence. Civil society was not perceived as part of the general public but as part and parcel of the privileged elite.

Emphasis should also be placed on the support of independent media as they held the key to changing mindsets.
More importantly, as stressed by some of the speakers, there were some prevailing and harmful stereotypes of the war and national identities, which had been constantly presented in the regional media. Such behaviour was not consistent with the maxims of professional journalism anywhere. Journalists should be encouraged to speak in favour of democracy and the European Union. The fear of being labelled as unpatriotic by presenting a different type of news was considered as a crucial factor in this respect. Media in Serbia in general needed to re-examine its role during the conflict and finally start acting as a bridge between the public and the state. The EU should push harder on the media sector and reforms, which would lead to more transparency and a real free press.

There was a consent in the room that what brought Serbia to the negotiating table was the prospect of EU accession. Serbia’s EU perspective was seen to be conducive to a gradual recognition of Kosovo in the future. The huge progress in the past four years was acknowledged, as well the positive and encouraging role of the EU. The EU was now the main player in the Balkans, although its efforts were still supported by the US. This was also reflected during the successful negotiations led by Baroness Ashton, whose diplomatic skills had a significant impact on the positive outcome of the talks. It was stressed that Baroness Ashton was able to skilfully navigate between the two parties and make them hatch deals which were previously impossible. However, there were also some carrots involved, which played out especially on the Serbian side. The initial carrot for Serbia was visa liberalization, but now it was the upcoming start of negotiations and their finish, estimated to be in about 8 to 10 years’ time. As the momentum was underway it needed to be continuously nourished by the EU.

As for Kosovo, the question of non-recognisers was frequently cited as a major problem by a number of participants. However, it was pointed out that such fears may be groundless. A legal assessment of the accession process concluded that Kosovo could legally pursue EU membership up until the very last stage, when it would have to seek a unanimous voice of all EU members on its accession. Three out of the five non-recognizers had already been softening their positions, claiming that a candidate status could be pursued. The reality of the Kosovo unresolved status leaning towards independence had been accepted by all and would also, some believed, be gradually accepted by Serbia. But there was a need for innovative thinking regarding institutional models for autonomy of the north. The Serbian community in Kosovo should serve as a bridge between Belgrade and Pristina rather than an obstacle. A seat at the UN, though, was a much more pressing issue, which should be pursued now.

From Pristina’s point of view, the Agreement could have been bolder and aimed higher so that a clear set of aims was presented to Kosovo, which had no other carrot than the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Any territorial reconfiguration or partition was ruled out. Autonomy with more innovative territorial and governance arrangements was now the only potential way forward but needed to be negotiated quickly. It was argued that some issues needed to be closed, rather than
endlessly debated on the recurring principle of “Yes, if...”

The strongest elements in this session were acceptance of the enormous and central role of the EU, and the feeling on the Kosovo side that, whereas Serbia had a clear run to the EU, albeit over several years, the five non-recognisers stood in the way of Kosovo. Attempts to demonstrate how this difficulty might be tackled, and how there were gradations of opposition among the five, did not appear to provide immediate succour.

**Robert Cooper’s Keynote Lecture**

At the conclusion of the Workshop, Robert Cooper (Counsellor, European External Action Service) gave a public lecture on the theme “Serbia/Kosovo and the place of enlargement in EU foreign policy”. This continued and developed some of the themes discussed during the day, but from a broader perspective.

On the topic of EU’s foreign policy, he noted that the EU was not a state, but a community of law among states. This meant that it was not a foreign policy in the classical sense. It was neither so decisive, nor was it as well equipped for Hobbesian “force and fraud” as states were. But if it was not able to conquer it could enlarge by consent. This had enabled it to provide a framework which had contributed to stability and democracy in post-communist Europe. And, for the West, enlargement to the East brought both security and a wider concept of Europe.

The EU shaped not only institutions but also identities in Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect, the EU offered a different type of security – primarily economical – but also a new type of solidarity, which became only stronger with more members.

The Balkans was the EU’s great failure in the 1990s. Europe had known neither what to do in the face of the three wars in the former Yugoslavia; nor would it have had the machinery to act on a collective policy. The understanding that it needed to stop the wars came too late. The tragedies of that decade had been succeeded by some modest success in the last ten years. Slovenia and Croatia were already EU members. Montenegro had started negotiations and Serbia would probably join in 8 to 10 years. The main pressing issues turned around the name of Macedonia, the stagnation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

Robert Cooper's evaluation of the situation in Kosovo was generally positive. He commended the former President Tadic of Serbia for his decision to seek the ICJ opinion, and stressed the contribution of the political leaders on both sides involved in the Brussels Agreements. The ongoing series of talks and discussion meant a significant breakthrough. An array of technical issues had been resolved. Kosovo and Serbia had opened offices in each other’s capitals and had finally started to communicate on an equal basis.
**Session I**

**Getting to the Negotiating Table**

What was the situation after 2008? How did the ICJ Advisory Opinion affect/change political thinking? Why did Serbia accept the EU proposal for dialogue? What were the concerns and considerations in Kosovo? What were the external and internal political factors? How did events unfold? Who helped? Who hindered? What were the carrots and the sticks?

**Chair:** Richard Caplan  
**Speaker 1:** Jamie Shea  
**Speaker 2:** Dušan Spasojević  
**Speaker 3:** Veton Surroi

**Session II**

**Getting to Yes**

How was the process leading to the Brussels agreements planned, and conducted? Were there other models/experiences in mind? Who were the main players? What were the main topics, and how were they ordered? What proved the main obstacles? How were they overcome? Why did the process work? To what extent were the northern Kosovo-Serbs a factor in the process? How were they handled by all sides?

**Chair:** David Madden  
**Speaker 1:** Robert Cooper  
**Speaker 2:** Edita Tahiri  
**Speaker 3:** Marko Djurić

**Session III**

**Implementation**

How have the agreements been sold? Is there an implementation plan? What is the degree of support at elite and popular levels? Was there a price to pay? What have been the main obstacles to implementation to date? What will be the pace of implementation in future? What areas will need to be negotiated next? Is there a continuing security risk? How will spoilers and naysayers be managed? What pointers from the November elections?

**Chair:** Spyros Economides  
**Speaker 1:** Marko Prelec  
**Speaker 2:** Ilir Deda  
**Speaker 3:** Dušan Gajić

**Session IV**

**Serbia and Kosovo: The Longer Term**

How can Serbia and Kosovo proceed towards EU membership? Can we ever expect Serbia to recognise Kosovo and under what conditions? Is Kosovo likely to offer more to Serbia and the Serbian community? How will specifics such as religious sites and state property be resolved? Are territorial questions in Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans now off the agenda? When will NATO be able to draw down and eventually exit?

**Chair:** James Ker-Lindsay  
**Speaker 1:** Dimitar Bechev  
**Speaker 2:** Boško Jakšić  
**Speaker 3:** Krenar Gashi  
**Speaker 4:** James Gow

**End of the Workshop**

**Lecture by Robert Cooper**

‘Serbia/Kosovo and the place of Enlargement in EU Foreign Policy’

**Chair:** Othon Anastasakis
Participants

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Dashiel Caldwell  Head of Kosovo Team, Western Balkans and Enlargement Department, FCO
Richard Caplan  Professor of International Relations, Linacre College, Oxford
Robert Cooper  Counsellor, European External Action Service (EEAS)
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Dušan Spasojević  International Secretary, Serbian Democratic Party
Veton Surroi  Publicist, politician and former journalist; Founder and former leader of the ORA political party
Edita Tahiri  Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo
Max Watson  Director, Political Economy of Financial Markets programme; Coordinator, Political Economy at SEESOX, St Antony’s College, Oxford
Peter Wilkinson  Desk Officer for Serbia, Western Balkans and Enlargement Department, FCO
First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations

1. There will be an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. Membership will be open to any other municipality provided the members are in agreement.
2. The Community/Association will be created by statute. Its dissolution shall only take place by a decision of the participating municipalities. Legal guarantees will be provided by applicable law and constitutional law (including the 2/3 majority rule).
3. The structures of the Association/Community will be established on the same basis as the existing statute of the Association of Kosovo municipalities e.g. President, vice President, Assembly, Council.
4. In accordance with the competences given by the European Charter of Local Self Government and Kosovo law the participating municipalities shall be entitled to cooperate in exercising their powers through the Community/Association collectively. The Association/Community will have full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning.
5. The Association/Community will exercise other additional competences as may be delegated by the central authorities.
6. The Community/Association shall have a representative role to the central authorities and will have a seat in the communities' consultative council for this purpose. In the pursuit of this role a monitoring function is envisaged.
7. There shall be one police force in Kosovo called the Kosovo Police. All police in northern Kosovo shall be integrated in the Kosovo Police framework. Salaries will be only from the KP.
8. Members of other Serbian security structures will be offered a place in equivalent Kosovo structures.
9. There shall be a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic). The Commander of this region shall be a Kosovo Serb nominated by the Ministry of Interior from a list provided by the four mayors on behalf of the Community/Association. The composition of the KP in the north will reflect the ethnic composition of the population of the four municipalities. (There will be another Regional Commander for the municipalities of Mitrovica South, Skenderaj and Vushtrri). The regional commander of the four northern municipalities will cooperate with other regional commanders.
10. The judicial authorities will be integrated and operate within the Kosovo legal framework. The Appellate Court in Pristina will establish a panel composed of a majority of S/K judges to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.
11. A division of this Appellate Court, composed both by administrative staff and judges will sit permanently in northern Mitrovica (Mitrovica District Court). Each panel of the above division will be composed by a majority of S/K judges. Appropriate judges will sit dependant on the nature of the case involved.
12. Municipal elections shall be organized in the northern municipalities in 2013 with the facilitation of the OSCE in accordance with Kosovo law and international standards.
13. Discussions on Energy and Telecoms will be intensified by the two sides and completed by June 15.
14. It is agreed that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side's progress in their respective EU path.
15. An implementation committee will be established by the two sides, with the facilitation of the EU.
This workshop was organised by South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) in association with the Department of Politics and International Relations (University of Oxford), and LSEE - Research on South Eastern Europe, London School of Economics and Political Science

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About SEESOX

South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) is part of the European Studies Centre (ESC) at St Antony’s College, Oxford. It focuses on the interdisciplinary study of the Balkans, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Drawing on the academic excellence of the University and an international network of associates, it conducts policy relevant research on the multifaceted transformations of the region in the 21st century. It follows closely conflict and post-conflict situations and analyses the historical and intellectual influences which have shaped perceptions and actions in the region. In Oxford’s best tradition, the SEESOX team is committed to understanding the present through the longue durée and reflecting on the future through high quality scholarship.

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- To support high-quality teaching and research on South East Europe;
- To organise conferences, workshops and research seminars;
- To promote the multi-disciplinary study of the region within the University of Oxford (e.g. politics, international relations, anthropology, sociology, economics) working in collaboration with other Centres and Programmes within the University, including student societies;
- To spearhead intellectual exchanges and debate on these issues among networks of individuals and institutions beyond Oxford;
- To foster cooperation between the academic and the policy making communities.