




Bosnia-Herzegovina at a Crossroads

Workshop Report
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*Report from the workshop organized by
South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX)*

*The following report draws on the discussions at a brainstorming session on **Peace Stabilisation in Bosnia – Lessons Learned** which took place at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford on 27 April 2006, under Chatham House rules. It represents the SEESOX interpretation of the debate and does not implicate the participants or the institutions they represent. SEESOX wishes to thank NATO's Public Diplomacy Division for its financial support.*

More than a decade after the fateful Dayton Peace Agreement (1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) still faces the dual challenge of state-building and successful integration into the European Union (EU) and NATO. The country has advanced well beyond the post-conflict reconstruction stage. The three major ethnic groups – the Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Croats - have mostly accepted the country's indivisibility, regardless of the threats of an independence referendum often heard in Republika Srpska (RS). Meanwhile, over a million refugees and internally displaced people (around half of the total number) have returned to their homes, the town of Mostar has been reintegrated, BiH has moved towards a single army, freedom of movement has been established across the territory of the country and a reform process is under way which should create a single police force. However, there is a long way ahead towards the build-up of functional state institutions, the development of a healthy civil society transcending ethnic divisions and the achievement of sustainable economic growth.

I. Peace Stabilization in BiH: Recent Achievements and Shortcomings

Present-day BiH differs immensely from the war-battered place of the mid-1990s and, at least on the surface, looks like what Bosnian citizens would call a 'normal country'. Yet, structural problems continue to obstruct progress. Amongst these, governance remains key. BiH remains fragmented; there are four levels of authority: the state, the two entities (RS and the Federation of BiH), the cantons forming FBiH, and the municipalities. The country also has two police structures, 13 prime ministers, 150 ministers, over 700 representatives and three presidents. The tenth anniversary of Dayton created momentum for reforming the burdensome structure but despite the overwhelming pressure from the EU and the US the constitutional reforms aimed at streamlining government (the so-called Hays package) failed in April 2006 to gather the necessary majority.

One of the key questions is how to create support for reform from within and how to deal with the tensions between moderate and nationalist forces. The former are

usually associated with reform, while the latter are seen as obstructing positive change. In the case of BiH, nationalists were in power since the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2002. Their power has only partly declined in the elections on 1 October 2006. The international community is often blamed by liberal Bosnians averse to ethno-politics for having cooperated with the nationalists. However the nationalist political actors have changed and are no longer simply networks of war criminals, corrupt office-holders and shadowy 'businessmen' as in the past. In fact, most of the parties in question backed the constitutional amendment package. The main achievement of the local political establishment has been the build-up of a more or less democratic system based on fair elections. At times, the international community has to work with those who are in power and respect the popular vote irrespective of its own leanings. And it would be fair to say that nationalist politicians have delivered on army reform and have committed themselves to merging the entity police forces. One such case is the post-Tudjman HDZ in Croatia, proving that nationalists may undergo change over time when presented with the right incentives.

There are, of course, limits to this logic of 'taming' the nationalists. The chief problem for BiH remains the lack of domestic agreement regarding the shape and character of the political community underwriting the state. This was shown very vividly by the recent controversies over the election of the Croatian member of the state presidency. There cannot be consensus on economic reforms or EU-oriented measures if basic questions such as the future shape of the Bosnian state are not answered. This is illustrated by examples such as the existence of two competition councils – one for each entity (two offices and the degree of coordination that that requires). These arrangements have benefited nationalist parties and the criminal political economy which such parties wish to preserve. The international community faces the dilemma that while they should work with all democratically elected politicians, Western institutions, notably the EU, also have to think about ways to boost moderate actors which are more likely to engage in transformative politics. The

nationalists' long-term commitment remains questionable. When the international community comes to an agreement with local politicians, it takes the commitment very seriously. The politicians on the other hand may well sign with their fingers crossed behind their back, and plan to manipulate the agreement to their advantage as exemplified by the ambiguous attitude of Milorad Dodik on the police reform issue.

Beyond its political system, BiH has faced multiple challenges linked with its economy. In spite of the growth in output and foreign investment registered over the past three years, frustration about living standards is still high. Expectations of the Bosnian citizenry regarding the improvement of the economic situation might have been too high given the legacy of war but perceptions should be taken seriously. In addition, robust growth could have been achieved if the reforms aimed at the development of a vibrant private sector, rather than just macroeconomic stability, had been implemented earlier. Yet the current constitutional arrangements have made the decision-making process difficult and have helped vested anti-reform interests to become further entrenched.

The failure of the constitutional reform process raises questions about the nature of external intervention in Bosnian politics. To some extent, the Hays package was undermined by US assertiveness. Ten years after Dayton, Washington needed a foreign political success and the media exposure generated opposition within BiH. But the reality is that the EU is more affected by developments in the region and can have a wider and more long term impact. In many ways, it therefore has the duty to take the front seat in steering Western efforts. It is clear that BiH cannot join the EU with its current constitutional structure. One remarkable feature has been the lack of any pressure from the EU Commission regarding the adoption of constitutional amendments which would revise existing arrangements. Had the EU intervened more forcefully, progress might have been registered. Moreover, the EU dimension is important for the future of Bosnia because consociational arrangements, like those devised for Northern Ireland, tend to work when they are embedded in a larger supranational context.

The experience of BiH shows that the key for tackling similar post-conflict cases lies in the timely implementation of rule of law reforms. Corruption is the "soft underbelly" of nationalism: it is easier to mobilize public support about corruption in nationalist parties than it is to mobilize them to attack nationalism frontally. One of the lessons learnt from the Dayton implementation process is that these reforms and measures involving the build-up of more competent and independent law enforcement structures should have come much earlier in the game. The gap that was left in the Dayton arrangement allowed corruption to seep into the very core of the body politic.

II. BiH, the Balkans and the European Union

Although BiH has made important strides towards EU membership Bosnian politicians have not been involved to a sufficient extent. It is impossible to set the

Europeanization process in motion with the European Commission on one side of the table and the international officials, many of whom represent EU agencies, on the other. BiH politicians need to make the decisions about their economic preferences and policies in the context of integration so that the joining the EU translates into greater policy-making capacity at home.

The EU's transformative power is often at the micro-level, that is at the level of sectoral policies and institutions, where many problems faced by Bosnia are rooted. A state has to develop institutional capacity and the habit of cooperation amongst its bureaucracies before being able to fully absorb funds from the EU. If these structures are created, then the money could be put in the hands of the Bosnians. Development financing tied to institutional capacity to draft and implement projects and mobilize resources might be a more effective tool to address Bosnia than the top-down intervention of constitutional reform. The pre-accession process gives money for development, but requires having capacity for national development plans and ability to mobilize resources to that end. That is why it is crucial for Bosnia to begin the pre-accession process as soon as possible.

BiH's path to Europe is closely linked with that of its neighbours. The EU has to continue supporting regional initiatives in the Western Balkans - such as the free-trade area - if it wants to succeed in Bosnia. Through the promotion of regional cooperation across various issue-areas, notably law and order and economic integration, the EU has to address the problem of gray, cross-border economy which currently provides livelihood for substantial parts of the population.

Amongst all international actors, the EU has the greatest leverage for promoting reform in Bosnia and its neighbours through accession conditionality. Conditionality focuses in great part on institutional and economic restructuring. However, nowadays enlargement fatigue and the protectionist turn in the Union are threatening to derail the process and turn the Western Balkans into a black hole in the middle of the EU, beset by crime and instability. The EU should adopt a strategic rather than formalistic approach to BiH. The integration process should be attuned to the situation in the country. The EU has to stop treating Bosnia and its neighbours as if they are just another Hungary or Poland and not forget about the war of the 1990s. The criteria underpinning the accession process should be coupled with instruments aimed at building-up state capacity, which is considerably lower in BiH compared to countries which joined the Union during the fifth enlargement (2004/2007).

Europe has to speak with a single voice to the Balkans. This is where it compares unfavourably to the US which sets up tough conditions, but which ultimately follows through. Finally, the EU has to be more political as it is undermined constantly by its bureaucratic mode of operation. To the extent it is possible, the EU has to be both a skillful operator and honest referee, to

manipulate politics in the target countries but also to be able to uphold its norms, values and standards impartially.

III. Challenges ahead for BiH

BiH has been on the path of stabilization for some time. Macro indicators are positive: GDP has been on average 5%, inflation is low, exports are rising, fiscal consolidation has been achieved. Other trends are less rosy: the level of output is still only around 65% of the prewar level, the current account deficit is large, unemployment, by any measure, is very high (around 20 % if not higher). Bosnia has skilled low-wage labour, but the wages have been increasing, which hinders the economy's competitiveness. BiH faces the challenge of the second-generation transition reforms such as the development of private sector and flexible labour markets, which are more difficult to implement and take more time than measures aimed at macroeconomic stabilization. The fragmentation of politics is an obstacle for the implementation of those reforms and as a result the economic situation remains dismal. Skilled labour force is still being lost to emigration abroad and the economic and institutional capacity has decreased. What Bosnia needs badly are policies and frameworks which would increase its competitiveness and generate more robust recovery.

Another challenge concerns the development of a political culture of compromise. Bosnian politicians, including reformists, appear to want everything, instead of focusing on priorities. Consensus building needs to be driven by a political process at the local level, without the involvement of the international community. Bosnians need to open a political space for interest groups that are not ethnic in nature, such as business community interests. This will increase the complexity of the dynamics and conceivably speed up reform. The more BiH shifts away from the debate of symbolically charged agenda of borders and history, the more scope there is for normal politics to emerge. In the longer term, one should hope that this process will lead to the growth of a self-sustaining and lively civil society. Despite Western efforts, the latter can only be created internally, and only when the international community gives up its tutelage.

A more fundamental question concerns Bosnian identity. One has to accept the fact that Bosnian society remains fragmented. Ethnic affiliations still trump loyalty to the state bearing in mind that Bosniaks have clearly been the ones to most identify with the single state when compared with the attitudes of Serbs or the Croats who more often than not show allegiance to their respective mother countries. The real promise of EU integration, supported equally by all communities, relates to the potential of building up an overarching identity. Beyond the notion of a unitary state and identity it could be accepted that Bosnians can have multiple identifications. The most important tool for the state to win its citizens' support are the incentives it offers – health, education, a healthy economy. Identity is, therefore, a process and not an event.

Another set of questions concerns the future of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the transition into a EU Special Representative (EUSR). Even lacking the special Bonn powers, EUSR has to be proactive towards Bosnian politics. One of the interesting things about Bosnia is that there is hardly anyone in the country itself looking forward to the end of the OHR, with the possible exception of the Serbs. The war created a dependency syndrome vis-à-vis the OHR within the population. This is not a paradox as Bosniaks, for example, put a premium on the security blanket provided by the international presence. Yet there has to be a visible sign that the international community is not always intrusive. Mediation should replace robust intervention for BiH to move forward thanks to its own efforts.

Though the EU's policy is very important for the future of Bosnia, Bosnia matters for the EU too. The Union needs to turn the Western Balkans into success story if it wants to assert itself as a credible actor in global politics. BiH is critical in that endeavour. It was in Bosnia where the EU's foreign-policy ambitions suffered a severe blow during the war in 1992-1995. Conversely, stabilising and turning BiH into a full-fledged member state will boost the profile of the EU's soft power. In addition, BiH could prove an asset in the EU's quest to conceptualize its own identity. Though largely secular, the country will bring to the EU a tradition of home-grown Islam to the Union at a time when integration of Muslim migrants becomes one of the central issues in the debates in a number of old member states.

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State-Building in a Post-Conflict Environment: Lessons Learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina

*Public lecture delivered by the Rt Hon Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
Former High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Nissan Lecture Theatre, St Antony's College
26 April 2006*

The post-Cold War world doesn't look at all as we expected it to look, as little as ten or so years ago. The bright vistas conjured up in 1989 and 1990 – with democracy and prosperity breaking out everywhere – now seem more like the product of over-exuberant imagination, than of clear-headed political or historical analysis.

Far from being the End of History as described in that comforting idyll by Francis Fukuyama, history is alive and kicking – and kicking rather hard at the moment.

Far from being more tranquil, our global village is looking increasingly more troubled.

Among the issues that have come to haunt us – or come *back* to haunt us – are some very old geo-strategic cultural antagonisms, like the ancient struggle between Christendom and Islam, and some very new challenges such as globalization and resource competition.

These were either completely invisible or on the very margins of debate a decade ago.

Today they are full blooded, front and centre and demand our attention.

Yet – I think most of us will agree – our post-Cold War world remains, overall, a better world than the one in which most of us grew up, where the two superpowers were locked in a chronic conflict that placed the whole of

humanity just one push of a button away from nuclear annihilation.

That, however, does not diminish our need, at the beginning of the 21st century, to come to grips with a different range of challenges.

The problems of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction stand among the top rank of this list of modern challenges. From Iraq to East Timor, from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone, in Central and South America, in the Caucasus and the Middle East, in Africa and in South and East Asia, countries are struggling to recover from conflicts, many of which erupted as a result of the collapse of the Cold War system and the power vacuums which followed.

Each of these conflicts has thrown down new challenges to the International Community, and in each case new, and often very distinct, solutions have had to be developed. We have had to learn on the job.

None of us should forget that this learning process – proceeding by trial and error – has exacted a substantial price from the civilians caught in these conflicts, and they number in the tens of millions.

Tonight I would like to share with you some perspectives that may, tentatively, help illuminate this important debate, from the viewpoint, not of the theoretician, but of the practitioner in the field, after four years as High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These perspectives, at least in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are predominantly positive.

Here is what we have learned, in a nutshell:

If you have a clear vision, the right resources, a firm destination to head for, a good plan and the will to carry it through, you can, in at least some cases, successfully rebuild a secure peace even after the most devastating war. In this speech I will deal with each of these elements of successful peace stabilization, in turn.

First, resources.

These are time, money, troops on the ground and a united International Community. It helps to have the troops – and by the way lots of them - at the beginning and the money in the middle and at the end.



Lord Ashdown

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, no less than ten divisions of NATO-led troops were deployed along the front lines in the space of just three weeks in the winter of 1995. Their authority was never challenged after that. And not one of them has ever been killed in anger. Successive reductions in the size of the peacekeeping force – from 60,000 in the initial deployment to around 6,000 today – reflect a process of steady consolidation.

Was this a lucky break?

No.

One thing we have learned in Bosnia is that troops plus a workable political settlement will succeed – but one without the other won't. And the Dayton Agreement, for all its shortcomings in the later phases of the re-building of Bosnia – proved to be a workable settlement in the early phases.

At least, it proved so when the International Community resolutely set about making it work.

In the early stages of peace implementation the domestic signatories to the agreement appeared determined to honour its provisions to the letter, while undermining its very clear intentions whenever the opportunity to do so arose.

They did so while channelling the influx of international aid money away from strategic projects into their own projects, often ones that allowed them to deliver benefits to their constituents, while cutting out potential beneficiaries from other groups. Their aim was to use the Dayton process, not to build peace, but as a framework within which to continue the pursuit of their aims by other means.

If not actually going backward – since any possibility of a return to violence was quashed by the overwhelming presence of international peacekeepers – BiH appeared at best to be standing still.

During this period the International Community concentrated much of its effort on holding free and fair elections. On the face of it, this made sense.

But it didn't take into account the hard fact that democratic norms are attained and sustained by more than elections – they depend on recovery across a broad front that includes – crucially and early – the rule of law and a viable economy.

Corrupt and politicized judges and police, mass unemployment, endemic poverty and clientelist politics will all confound the democratic process, even if elections are technically free and fair.

Democratic elections without the rule of law, simply allow the criminals to be elected to political office, the better to undermine the rule of law. What this leads to is not democracy but the criminally captured state.

Now, this may appear to be obvious, with the benefit of hindsight. But it was by no means obvious in the first

months and years of peace implementation in BiH. Intervention is at best messy, at worst bloody. It is invariably attended by pressure for quick results. In situations where peacekeepers are engaged in full-scale military operations against opponents of a political settlement – not, happily, the case in BiH after 1995 but all too blatantly the case in certain intervention exercises today – it may be hard to understand and focus on the need, for example, to upgrade the judiciary and depoliticize the police.

In situations where a massive segment of the country's housing stock has been destroyed or badly damaged, where GDP has collapsed and economic life is controlled by black-marketeers, it may seem fanciful to start talking about improving the business environment, let alone the need to introduce an efficient Value Added Tax.

But what we learned, too slowly, in BiH is that these things really are on a par with emergency relief and a robust security posture. They are indispensable elements in making a political settlement work. You can't have constructive politics if you don't have a growing economy; you can't face down obstructionists if parliamentary and judicial institutions are weak and infected with corruption.

Reconstruction – like politics as a whole – is complex. It can't be accomplished piecemeal.

This initial and nearly mortal dysfunction in Bosnia and Herzegovina's recovery arc was, at last, addressed at the end of 1997 with the introduction of the Bonn Powers, enabling the High Representative to cut through the thickets of obstruction by removing recalcitrant officials and where necessary enacting reform legislation. This was combined with a new focus on making the political and economic institutions work as opposed to propping them up with international largesse.

It would have been better to have taken these tough measures from day one, rather than two years after the peace had been signed; another lesson for peacekeeping here, incidentally. It is better to be tough at the start and relax later, than to be weak at the start and pay for it later.

The result of this new tough approach by the International Community was almost immediately felt. From then on BiH has made remarkable progress.

Here is what has been achieved in the intervening years:

- More than a million of those who were displaced from their homes during the war have since returned;
- The armed forces, which for years continued to maintain organizational and ideological divisions created by the war, have been unified and brought under the exclusive command and control of the state;

- A programme of reform that will in the coming years provide BiH with a democratically supervised and rationally organized police service has been agreed;
- The two customs services have been unified
- The three intelligence services have been welded into one and brought under democratic control;
- The judiciary has been cleaned up, depoliticized and placed within a single countrywide framework• A single criminal code, written by the Bosnians themselves, has been established;
- The ruling Council of Ministers has been expanded and made more efficient;
- After years of frustratingly slow progress, the city of Mostar has at last been unified;
- A single, countrywide system of VAT has been introduced;
- GDP growth has been maintained in recent years at 5 percent or above, the fastest growth rate in the Western Balkans;
- The inflation rate stands at 0.5 percent, one of the lowest in Southeast Europe;
- Foreign direct investment is now five times higher than it was in the late nineties;
- Exports and industrial production are up;
- Interest rates have halved since 2000;
- The real unemployment is about half the official rate of 40 percent.

I haven't recited this litany as an exercise in puffing up the achievements of the International Community in BiH. That would be simplistic and rather pointless. I've drawn attention to these facts because they show in a very tangible way that postwar reconstruction has to be holistic.

One step forward facilitates another step forward. You can't have economic progress unless you clean up the legal environment; you can't have democratic progress unless you tackle corruption. You can't have social progress unless you deliver tangible improvements in living standards, and so on.

And the second reason is to demonstrate that with a range of activities this broad and this complex, you simply cannot have progress by fiat. A small band of foreigners, empowered by military force and limitless funds cannot make a country recover.

The only people who can do this successfully are the people of that country.

This too may appear rather obvious – yet it has not been heeded in the case of several notable and still problematic international postwar reconstruction exercises in various parts of the globe.

The International Community may have everything it needs to fix a failed state – but this is essentially beside the point. The failed state won't stop failing until the people of that state have a clear idea of where they are going, are prepared to take the necessary steps to reach

that destination and have what they need to fix problems along the way.

I cannot overstate the issue of a common destination, shared by the domestic authorities and the International Community. This is something we have had in BiH but which has been, up to now, lacking in Kosovo and, after that, in Afghanistan and Iraq. In BiH the International Community and domestic opinion have worked together to reach the same agreed destination. This has provided a common project around which both the International Community and constructive domestic forces could gather. The absence of such a commonly agreed project can seriously debilitate or even, in the worst case, destroy stabilization efforts – a fact to which the events in Kosovo and Iraq bear testimony.

In BiH we were lucky. Membership of the European Union and NATO provided the obvious destination, and getting there has been an undertaking supported by all, or nearly all, across the whole political and ethnic spectrum. This made our job much easier. And agreeing objectives – and setting clear benchmarks on the road to reaching these objectives – has been applied to good effect inside the Office of the High Representative. The Mission Implementation Plan (MIP), which we introduced in January 2003, sets out the core tasks remaining for OHR, and provides us with a means of evaluating our progress. The priorities in the MIP reflect the fact that, against a backdrop of declining donor resources and with new and pressing priorities vying for the International Community's attention, we need to distinguish rigorously between what is essential and what is merely desirable if we are to make peace in BiH self-sustaining.

Administratively, this has meant increasing efficiency against a backdrop of systematic staff reductions. In 2003 OHR had more than 800 staff. By the end of 2005 the number had dropped to just over 300.

But the Mission Implementation Plan was not just an internal management tool.

It was also the compass which kept OHR on course, by keeping us targeted on the issues that mattered and preventing mission creep.

The closing down of OHR departments and the phasing out of OHR tasks was not haphazard or arbitrary; it was executed in lockstep with a rigorous programme aimed at completing short and medium-term tasks, and handing over the long-term ones to the BiH authorities, whose proper role it is to oversee and execute such tasks. In this way real BiH ownership of its own recovery was systematically increased as the international presence was systematically decreased.

The framework within which this took place was our joint overarching plan, achieving membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions

In recent years, BiH has benefited hugely from the fact that its aspiration to integrate in Euro-Atlantic structures,

most notably the European Union and NATO – an objective that has the support of the vast majority of citizens – comes with very clear policy benchmarks. Making this dream a reality has involved the implementation of a long and coherent list of economic, social and political reforms – essentially a practical blueprint for taking BiH into the modern democratic world.

Throughout this process we have had to contend with the fact that the state bequeathed by Dayton is a bureaucratic monstrosity. BiH has no fewer than 13 prime ministers, and that is the tip of a vast administrative apparatus set in place in 1995 when the demands of representative government – and by representative we are talking about representation of groups rather than individuals – outweighed the requirements of efficient and effective government.

Substantial progress has now, at last, been made in tackling this issue. But there is much further to go and this will become a key task after Bosnia's next elections in October this year. No state can prosper which spends 70 percent of its hard-pressed citizens' taxes on salaries for government employees and only 30 percent on services. BiH politicians have at last come to accept the rather obvious truth of this.

Our experience in BiH has been that, in the first phase, the agreement hammered out at Dayton proved to be an indispensable and durable mechanism for preventing a return to violence. But now we are in the second phase – building a viable state. And here we discover that Dayton is not so much a help as a hindrance. We had to move beyond Dayton – and Europe provides the means to do so. We have to find a new framework within which BiH can complete the second phase of its journey, to create a modern market economy – and the EU provides just the framework we need.

I have sketched some of the salient aspects of post-war reconstruction in BiH. I believe we have only to compare what we know now to what we clearly and painfully didn't know in 1992 to see how far we have come.

I mentioned earlier that this learning process has not been carried out without cost – to the people in the states that the International Community has sought to help. The people of BiH endured three and a half years of slaughter and hardship because the International Community dithered, and then several more years in which the least constructive political forces were allowed to rule the roost, because the International Community was learning on the job.

Our priority now must surely be to make sure that the lessons that have been learned in the last decade are applied, where appropriate (because each country in recovery has its own distinct requirements) in a disciplined and effective way.

What we do know is that peace implementation and nation building can work. BiH demonstrates that (although, in the beginning, few thought that it would work).

We must learn from the successes; we should not give up in those cases where success has not yet been achieved. If there is one final lesson for peace stabilization it is this. Fighting a modern, high-tech war can take days or weeks – but building the peace that follows such a war must be measured in decades.

That time frame – not months but decades – represents a sound investment. If we reduce the proposition to one of material expense, we find that a week of war routinely costs more than a year of peace stabilization, so, clearly, avoiding a recurrence of war is better value for public money than letting failed states keep on failing.

But this is not just about economics.

Recovering states make sound allies, promising trading partners, useful allies in peace stabilization elsewhere – Bosnia has recently sent forces to Iraq to help the coalition effort there.

In short – though there are moral reasons for intervention and peace stabilization, there are powerful reasons of self interest in getting it right as well.

Getting it right takes time and it takes resources but it can work - as Bosnia and Herzegovina, arguably the world most successful large scale peace stabilization exercise in recent times, shows.

We owe it to ourselves and perhaps above all to the citizens of failed states – our fellow citizens in the global village – to make sure that where possible that example is followed, intelligently and effectively, in other parts of the world.

Thank you.



Lord Ashdown and Timothy Garton Ash

ABOUT SEESOX

SEESOX South East European Studies @ OXFORD



South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) is part of the European Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. It focuses on the interdisciplinary study of the relationship between European integration and the politics, economics and societies of the Balkans, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Drawing on the academic excellence of the University and an international network of associates, it conducts policy relevant research on the multifaceted transformations of the region in the 21st century. It follows closely conflict and post-conflict situations and analyses the historical and intellectual influences which have shaped perceptions and actions in the region. In Oxford's best tradition, the SEESOX team is committed to understanding the present through the *longue durée* and reflecting on the future through high quality scholarship.

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- To spearhead intellectual exchanges and debate on these issues among networks of individuals and institutions beyond Oxford;
- To foster cooperation between the academic and the policy making communities.

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