



UNIVERSITY OF
OXFORD

DAHRENDORF
PROGRAMME for the
STUDY of
FREEDOM

Freedom in Diversity

Ten Lessons for Public Policy from Britain, Canada,
France, Germany and the United States

Timothy Garton Ash, Edward Mortimer and Kerem Öktem



This publication results from a research project of the
Dahrendorf Programme for the Study of Freedom
St Antony's College
University of Oxford, OX2 6JF
Tel: 01865 274474 Fax: 01865 274478
<http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/dahrendorffreedom.html>

Typeset and printed by the Medical Informatics Unit, NDCLS, University of Oxford



This report is published under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial ShareAlike 2.0 UK Licence. Any use of the work other than as authorised under this licence is prohibited. Users are free to copy and distribute the report under the licence's terms. Any copy distributed is to be on a non-commercial basis with sufficient attribution given to the original authors.

ISBN 978-0-9926819-0-6

This report is also available as a pdf at
<http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/freedomanddiversity.html> and as an e-book.

The cover photograph shows Londoners responding to a social media appeal to clean up the streets after the London riots of 2011. The image was taken on 11 August 2011 by Flickr user Sparrow Union.

Freedom in Diversity

Ten Lessons for Public Policy from Britain,
Canada, France, Germany and the United States

Timothy Garton Ash, Edward Mortimer and Kerem Öktem



DAHRENDORF
PROGRAMME for the
STUDY of
FREEDOM

Contents

Preface

Introduction

Lesson 1: **The importance of citizenship**

All long-term residents in a democratic state should be citizens of that state.

Lesson 2: **The acquisition and obligations of citizenship**

New citizens must be made welcome in their new country, and be willing to contribute to its success.

Lesson 3: **Dual citizenship**

Citizenship of another country should not prevent people being citizens of the country where they live.

Lesson 4: **Education**

Schools must have the curriculum and resources to perform their vital function of preparing pupils for life as active citizens in a free society.

Lesson 5: **Labour markets and the workplace**

Employers and colleagues must give migrants and postmigrants equal opportunities, and help them integrate socially as well as economically.

Lesson 6: **Cities and local communities**

Towns and cities have a unique role to play in creating a sense of shared community and common purpose.

Lesson 7: **Representation in the media**

Minorities must be fully represented both in the media and by the media.

Lesson 8: **The duty to speak out**

Public figures, and people with a significant presence online, should challenge stereotypes and misleading generalisations about any group.

Lesson 9: **Politics**

Active steps need to be taken, notably by political parties, to ensure that minorities and their members are fully represented through established democratic institutions.

Lesson 10: **How attitudes are changed**

For everyone in a diverse society, the feeling of belonging together depends crucially on the social and cultural signals sent and received every day.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Preface

The reality of diversity should complement the first-order value of freedom. If there were no diversity, there would be no alternatives for us to choose freely between. Since people differ, freedom will also naturally result in diversity.

Nonetheless, the rapidly growing cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of Western societies, mainly as a result of mass migration over more than half a century, has produced challenges to our living together in freedom. This short report seeks to suggest ways in which those challenges can best be addressed, so that we can find the greatest possible freedom, not against or in spite of diversity, but precisely in diversity.

Numerous distinguished scholars, policymakers, writers and journalists, as well as many institutions and funders, have contributed to the Oxford University project upon which this publication draws. They are listed in the Acknowledgements. We are deeply grateful to them all, but we alone are responsible for the views expressed and the recommendations made here.

Timothy Garton Ash

Edward Mortimer


Kerem Öktem

Oxford, August 2013.

Introduction


Western societies – like all human societies – have always been diverse in many ways, being composed of people of different origins, languages, faiths and opinions. One major source of diversity has been the arrival of successive waves of immigrants – waves seldom absorbed without some degree of stress and even conflict, but which have also enriched and developed the identities of both migrants and “hosts”. This project focuses on one specific set of new diversities, derived from large-scale immigration over the last five or six decades. We are fully conscious that there are many other forms of diversity, including gender and sexual orientation, which it does not address. It seeks to compare the experiences of five major liberal democracies during this period, examining in particular the strategies that have been adopted with the aim of integrating migrants and “postmigrants” (a term coined by Robert S. Leiken to describe the children and grandchildren of immigrants, born in the “host country”) into wider society, and of ensuring that people of different cultures and backgrounds can live together in peace and freedom. We have tried to use the words “migrants” and “immigrants” only to refer to people who have themselves moved, during their lifetime, from one country to another. Our broader concern is with the minorities that have come into existence, or greatly increased, in these five countries as a result of migration during the past two or three generations; and with the way they relate to, and are regarded by, the wider societies around them.

Figure 1: Inflow of migrants by country of origin, 2010



Source: OECD International Migration Database
 Note: Percentage of inflow from each of the top ten countries of origin represented as a percentage of total inflow of migrants.

Figure 2: Cities with largest communities of foreign-born residents, 2010




City names printed in red have 25% or more foreign-born residents

Source: Migration Policy Institute


Note: While in the European case study countries, only London and Frankfurt have more than 25% foreign born residents amongst the city population, this 'hyper-diversity' is now the norm in many of the United States' major cities, as well as in two cities in Canada.

Figure 3: Share of foreign-born population and foreign population among the total population, 2010



Source: OECD Migration International Database.
Note: The "foreign-born population" covers all persons who have migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence. The "foreign population" consists of persons who still have the nationality of their home country. It may include persons born in the host country but lacking citizenship.

Figure 4: Hyper-diversity, the case of Toronto




Source: Migration Information Source, MPI, Canada Census 2001.

Note: In Toronto, 45% of the population in 2001 was foreign-born. The trend towards hyper-diversity has become prevalent in a number of US and Canadian cities (and is confirmed by the 2011 census data, which is not yet available in the same level of detail).


Figures 5 and 6: Hyper-diversity in Toronto

Toronto's immigrant population by birthplace, 2011



Source: Statistics Canada, Census 2011.

Percentage of Canadian population born abroad, 2011



Source: Statistics Canada, Census 2011.


What's new?

Although there have been large-scale migrations in the past (for example, to the United States in the late 19th century), until 1948 Europe was a net exporter of population. During that period, on both sides of the Atlantic there was a widespread assumption of racial superiority. These recent migrations, by contrast, have produced an unprecedented growth in diversity, at a time when people in the West have been coming to assume, at least in theory, that all human beings have equal rights. By 2010, London, Paris, Toronto, and eight United States cities all had one million or more foreign-born residents, while the proportion of the country's population that was foreign or foreign-born ranged from 14.6% in France to 25.3% in Canada. By 2011 no fewer than 51% of those living in Toronto were foreign-born, of whom one third had arrived in Canada over the previous ten years.¹ Twenty per cent of the German population now has a "migrant history", and every second child born in Hamburg has a "migrant background". Moreover, cheap travel and vastly improved communications (the internet, satellite television, mobile phones) make it far easier than it was in the past for people to remain in close touch with their countries of origin, with the result that many second- or third-generation postmigrants still feel they belong to a wider space than their country of residence, which may include the country of origin of their parents or larger religious or cultural worlds (such as the Muslim world, the Hellenic world or the Slavic world).

The **political context** of this mass migration into Western Europe and North America is also new. In earlier periods there was little or no welfare state, and therefore less scope for arguments about the relative contributions made, and benefits derived, by different sections of society. Nor was there democracy as we know it today. There is plenty of evidence that indigenous populations, or host societies, felt as negative about newcomers in the past as they do today, but they may not have had the same sense of "ownership" of the country. In any case it was usually easier for governments to ignore their feelings, and to suppress any violent expression of those feelings without significant political cost. Today, by contrast, we have the phenomenon of democratic impatience: governments are subject to greater pressures, and expected to maintain harmony, or social cohesion, in a fast-changing society. The results are constantly measured, and often found wanting, so that policy shifts back and forth, sometimes with unintended or perverse consequences. These arguments have been sharpened, in the last two decades, by attempts to restructure the welfare state with a view to reducing its cost. Some European countries experienced a particular increase in immigration in the 1970s, at a moment when the demand for labour was actually

shrinking and governments were imposing tougher immigration controls. One major cause of this was that hitherto single “guest workers” were given the right to bring in their families. They thereby transformed themselves, and their children, into long-term residents.


Figure 7: Percentage of Muslims in population, 2009



Source: “Mapping the Global Muslim Population”, October 2009, Pew Research Centre, Forum on Religion & Public Life.

Note: The size of Muslim communities in Europe is highly disputed. Particularly in France reliable figures on religious affiliation are not available. None of these figures can therefore be regarded as definitive.

Many would argue that **cultural and religious differences** between the existing population and the new minorities have been greater in this period than in the past. In particular, European societies which had hitherto been predominantly Christian and were becoming more secular found themselves absorbing large numbers of Muslims, who may now form as much as eight per cent of the population in France, five per cent in Germany and three per cent in Britain (compare Figures 7 and 8). While the second and third generations of these new communities have been growing up in the West, much of the postcolonial Islamic world has experienced a strong reassertion of the primacy of religion in social and political life, often expressed as a reaction against Western influence or domination; and this, moreover, is a time when vastly improved and accelerated communications have made people far more aware of events in other parts of the world. The result has been that many non-Muslims in the West have come to regard Islam as a religion that embodies a particularly

Figure 8: Religious diversity

Source: CIA World Factbook 2013, comparing census and survey data where applicable.

Note: For France the religious make-up is a gross estimate, as religion is not a census category. The CIA World Factbook 2013 classifies France as 85% (nominally) Roman Catholic, however surveys suggest that over 60% of French citizens self-define as 'agnostic' or 'atheist'. The category 'Other' therefore includes Roman Catholics as well as agnostics and atheists.

indigestible culture, harder to reconcile with the Western way of life than the traditions brought by earlier waves of immigrants. However inaccurate this perception may be, in such matters it is the perceptions themselves that count. If strong enough, they may even become self-fulfilling prophecies.

In the United States this problem has not been so acute, partly because Muslims make up a smaller percentage of migrants and postmigrants, and tend to be at or slightly above the average in terms of socio-economic and educational standards. Also, since the United States has a much more religious society, and one that has always been open to multiple sects, the idea that people should express their religious beliefs and identities in public is not controversial in itself, as it has become in more highly

secularized European societies. Indeed, some Muslims have commented that they find it easier to live among religious people of other religions than among atheists. On the other hand, the public identification of Muslims with terrorism, and consequent prejudice against them, is just as strong in the United States as elsewhere.

Five different starting-points

The countries in this survey are five of the largest that are generally recognised as part of the West, and all five have experienced large-scale immigration during the last half-century. In north-western Europe the post-war reconstruction boom created a large number of urban job vacancies, which were filled initially by internal migration from the countryside but soon sucked in workers from further afield – south Europeans (including Turks) in Germany, North Africans in France, and in Britain people from former colonies in the Caribbean and South Asia. In the early 1960s, the United States too opened its doors to a massive wave of immigrants, after a 40-year period of tight controls, with the result that the number of first-generation immigrants living in the United States quadrupled from 9.6m in 1970 to about 38m in 2007. In Canada, since the Immigration Act was revised in 1967, immigrants have come overwhelmingly from the developing world, and latterly in growing numbers from South Asia and China.

Each of the five has reacted to immigration differently, not least because of attitudes acquired during its earlier history. Most obviously, the United States and Canada, as states founded by European settlers in North America, have from their beginnings been “immigration countries”, subjectively as well as objectively, and have therefore found it relatively easy to see new immigrants as continuing the national history and making their own contributions to it. European countries, by contrast, have tended to see their national identity as already fully formed – often in the crucible of war, ethnic cleansing, forced migration and genocide – and their history as what happened in the past. This adds a challenge to absorbing different cultural traditions imported from other parts of the world. (The North American countries do, though, have specific problems of their own – in relation to indigenous minorities, and, in the case of the United States, a large African-American minority resulting from the slave trade of previous centuries.)

There are, however, other historical fault-lines dividing countries from each other, both within Europe and within North America.

Germans by the 20th century had come to think of themselves as a single people, defined not only by a common language and geographical space but also by heredity. Nationality was conferred not by birth within the national territory but by *jus sanguinis*, being passed down through generations from parent to child. Thus people of German stock living in eastern Europe, and as far away as the Volga, were seen as members of the German nation with the right to settle in Germany as full citizens – a right that many of them exercised when the Soviet bloc dissolved in 1989-91.

By contrast, the other four countries in our group have all traditionally adhered to *jus soli*, under which anyone born within the territory of a state is automatically a citizen of it, with the same legal rights and obligations as other citizens. In other respects, however, they differ. France and the United States both use their education systems to inculcate a strong sense of national identity based on a civic culture of loyalty to the state and its institutions. But whereas in the United States, the local culture allowed this to coexist with a wide variety of ethnic identities, usually associated with countries of origin (the concept of “hyphenated Americans”), France saw national identity as having a strong cultural component, and expected its citizens to think and act in a distinctively French way. Also, while both set great store by the separation of church and state, they interpret secularism in very different ways. The United States excludes religion from state or state-funded activities but allows – even expects – its citizens to have strong religious affiliations which may dominate their voluntary activities. France has a strong culture of *laïcité*, which is secular but does not prevent the French state from funding religious schools or religious social and cultural activities. In addition there are strong anticlerical forces in French society, which are actively opposed to any attempt by religious organizations to influence public policy.

Britain and Canada differ from both these models in having a more pluralistic understanding of their own history and national identity, derived not from first principles but, pragmatically, from experience and necessity. Even the official name of the British state – the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – implies the coexistence of separate nations within a single polity. The very words Britain and British came into general use in the 18th century as part of a largely conscious effort to allow Scottish (and to a lesser extent Welsh) subjects to feel loyalty to the Union without having to identify themselves as English. In Canada there was the additional need to win the loyalty of French Canadians, by recognising their separate identity and culture while discouraging any close connection with France. Both countries had also achieved a degree of national harmony through religious

toleration, gradually expanded to give equal rights to members of different Christian denominations, and in due course non-Christian faiths, although Britain has retained separate established churches in England and Scotland, even after disestablishing them in Wales and Northern Ireland.

Policies tried, and mistakes made


These different patterns may partially explain differences in policy among the five countries, but they should not be exaggerated or oversimplified. In all five, governments have reacted to mass immigration and its societal consequences in different ways at different times, experimenting with different approaches which have seldom been applied as coherently or consistently as rhetoric might suggest. All have confronted similar dilemmas – economic arguments for immigration versus political ones against it; peaceful coexistence of diverse communities versus their freedom to insult each other; the rights of established citizens versus the need for special efforts to assist postmigrants and promote integration – and none can claim to have resolved them in a complete or permanent way. Each has been humbled in some degree by recent failures of integration, and all may be more willing now than in the past to study what the others have done, with a view to learning lessons both positive and negative. Such, at least, is the premise of this study, and the process to which it aims to contribute.

Figures 9 to 11 compare the policy performance and openness of the five countries on the main issues affecting integration. This is necessarily an approximate and somewhat subjective exercise – though it is striking that on almost all indicators Canada scores better than the other four. What follows is a brief attempt to describe the different approaches that have been tried, but it too can only be a cursory overview.

Initially, governments were either oblivious of the profound social changes that mass immigration would bring or, notably in Germany, believed they could avoid them by admitting workers who were not supposed or expected to become permanent residents, under bilateral recruitment agreements with sending countries. Indeed, Germany made efforts to ensure that these *Gastarbeiter* (guest-workers) and their children kept in touch with the language and culture of their countries of origin. Workers were usually admitted on short-term visas, and expected to return home – to be replaced by compatriots – when these expired. This, however, did not suit employers, who preferred to keep workers they had already trained rather than start over. As a result, by the early 1970s, when the oil shock caused a sudden contraction of the labour market and the recruitment agreements came to an end, Germany had


unintentionally acquired a large resident population of foreigners. They were not offered German citizenship, but many of them, and notably many Turks, opted to stay in the country and were allowed by new legal provisions to bring their families to join them. But the policy of homeland orientation in education continued. Some of these migrants and postmigrants developed a hybrid culture which contained Turkish – or in some cases Kurdish – as well as German elements. Some also availed themselves of greater freedom in Germany than then prevailed in Turkey to organize Islamic political groups – especially when German state agencies still expected that most Turks would eventually return to Turkey.

Figure 9: Policy performance according to the Migration Policy Index (MIPEX) in 2010




According to the MIPEX key indicators (access to residence, citizenship, labour markets, education, political participation and anti-discrimination), the USA and Canada are classified as slightly favourable in their policies towards immigrants and immigration. The European case study countries (France, Germany and the UK) are deemed slightly unfavourable, mostly due to more restrictive policies in terms of access to labour markets, citizenship and residence rights. The suggestion of slightly more immigrant-friendly policies in the USA (and also in Scandinavia) and slightly less immigrant-friendly policies in most European countries is largely supported by the relevant literature. At the same time, many observers of migration policy have also challenged the view of immigrant-friendly Scandinavian policies (or for that matter southern countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy). They argue that formal policies may be welcoming, but the everyday experience of immigrants in these countries may in fact be as frequently shaped by precarious living conditions, an unwelcoming society and anti-immigrant violence as in countries such as the UK or Germany, which have long-standing immigrant communities and support networks for immigrants in place.

Figures 10 and 11: Policy performance and openness to immigration (MIPEX), 2010



Copyright 2011 Migrant Integration Policy Index, www.mipex.eu



Both charts compare the performance of the five countries in terms of the seven MIPEX policy areas. Canada tends to have the most inclusive policies towards immigrants, with the exception of political participation where the UK and Germany fare better, particularly in terms of representation of immigrants in political parties and decision-making bodies. In Germany, however, this has less to do with inclusive policies than with high levels of politicisation among some immigrant communities. France and Germany have the least inclusive policies towards immigrants and fare worst in terms of anti-discrimination efforts.

MIPEX is based on the evaluation of seven policy areas:

Labour market mobility: Equal opportunities for access to employment, absence of discriminating barriers, dedicated support for immigrant jobseekers.

Family reunion: Family reunion as a right based on a broad definition of the category, absence of policies to impede family reunion and the immigration of spouses.

Education: School programmes dedicated to the needs of immigrants, language support, empowerment of educators and administrators.

Political participation: As close to equal political rights as possible (before acquisition of citizenship), election rights in municipal elections, existence of elected consultative bodies for immigrants and high representation in formal political bodies (mostly after citizenship).

Long term residence: As a status attained before citizenship, the more rights long term residency entails, the better it prepares for citizenship.

Access to citizenship: Straightforward process of acquisition after a limited period of legal residence, citizenship as a right rather than a favour, citizenship tests and standardised language tests with targeted group support.

Anti-discrimination: Legal, administrative and political efforts to discourage (penalise) discrimination of immigrants and members of minorities, a public awareness of discrimination and its negative effects on social cohesion.

In France and the United States, the state initially saw no reason to make special provision for the new waves of immigrants or their descendants. Each applied its particular model of national identity and civic culture as described above. Thus the United States acquired new minorities, whose members were left to become Americans in their own way, as earlier waves of immigrants had done before them. But while regular immigration became much easier after 1965, and those who arrived by this route have generally been accepted as new US citizens without too much difficulty, there is intense and bitter debate about the large number of irregular, “undocumented” or “illegal” immigrants (the terminology itself is hotly contested) who now form a significant part of the workforce: should they be sent home, or benefit from an “amnesty”, or be allowed to remain on sufferance, with an ill-defined legal status? For many years, stalemate between supporters of the first two solutions resulted in perpetuation of the third, even though few, if any, of those involved in these debates regard it as desirable in principle. France has tended to emphasize an assimilationist policy at the level of national politics, while at times incorporating multicultural elements (especially in local and regional settings), developing a conception of France and French culture which reflects a Mediterranean world view (hence seeing an Islamic and North African heritage as internal to France), and occasionally, especially in more recent years, seeking to incorporate more “Anglo-American” notions of anti-racism and racial equality. In Britain, meanwhile, it was left largely to local authorities

to identify new communities that had sprung up in their cities, to decide who represented them and to make such special provision for them as seemed necessary, for instance by printing leaflets in various languages to explain local regulations or services. At the national level perhaps the most widely noticed accommodation in the 1970s was the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976, which exempted Sikhs from the law requiring motorcyclists to wear crash helmets. This was generally acclaimed as a triumph of British pragmatism.

Authorities in all these four countries were slow to acknowledge how mass immigration had rendered their societies multicultural in a sense that previously they were not (although the change was more radical in this respect for the European countries than for the United States). Canada, by contrast, recognised this at a relatively early stage and adopted a set of policies to deal with it, pioneering the use of the term “multiculturalism.” This sought to help all cultural groups contribute to Canada by removing barriers to their participation in society and encouraging interactions among them, as well as helping all immigrants acquire either French or English language skills. Critics of this policy have often argued that such an approach undercuts the sense of belonging to the nation as a whole, and at times encourages the creation of ethnic enclaves or the concentration of ethnic groups in a particular area. One might therefore expect Canada’s urban immigrants to anchor their sense of belonging either beyond Canada’s borders or at the more micro-level of the city or neighbourhood. However, a number of surveys have revealed that these immigrants identify most strongly with Canada as their nation. In 2006, 87% of immigrants surveyed in Canada’s three biggest cities – Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver – reported that they felt a “very strong” or “somewhat strong” sense of attachment to the Canadian nation, more so than to their city (81%), province (78%), or country of origin (66%). This figure is much higher than corresponding ones recorded among immigrants in the United States.

More research needs to be done on why exactly this is so. No doubt there are as many reasons for belonging as there are immigrants. But one possible explanation is that, by encouraging immigrants to feel that they and their cultural background are embraced in the Canadian context, Canada’s “multiculturalist” policy may have succeeded in creating a sense of Canadian attachment among them, and thus made it possible to combine broad and genuine diversity with a strong sense that all belong to a shared national state. (Of course, at the same time the past generation has seen a rise in Québécois nationalism and the threat of secession.)

In Europe, and to a lesser extent in the United States, the term multiculturalism has also been widely used, but without any clear or consistent definition. In the winter of 2010-11, the German Chancellor, the French President and the British Prime Minister all took it upon themselves to declare, in quick succession, that multiculturalism had failed, or was dead. What they were drawing attention to was really the failure of *integration* in parts of their societies, where culturally distinct “parallel societies” had evolved, composed of people who had relatively little contact with the wider society around them, sometimes not speaking its language, sometimes cultivating different values and even obeying different laws. What these failures may reflect, in some cases, is a mixture of well-meant but ill-thought-out tolerance of diversity and not-so-benign neglect. National and especially local authorities had often felt they should not interfere with the internal dynamics of “communities” they neither knew nor understood, and which may not initially have existed in the form that they imagined; and preferred to deal with them through self-appointed “community leaders”, some of whom were actively promoted by the state in its search for *interlocuteurs valables*.

That policy, which had indeed failed, is a version of multiculturalism and may have been what the national leaders who condemned multiculturalism had in mind. Yet their words were widely interpreted as signifying an abandonment of all attempts to recognise and manage diversity within European societies, even as a denial of the reality of diversity or a promise to reverse it. The ensuing debate showed that, at least in a European context, the term multiculturalism is used in many different ways, meaning different things to different people and in different countries. Is it an ideology? a set of policies? a social reality? In the end it confuses more than it clarifies. We have therefore decided not to engage in this increasingly sterile debate, but instead to concentrate on identifying policies and approaches that will enable democratic societies to combine diversity with freedom.

Reacting to these failures, public opinion and governments have turned towards a stronger emphasis on civic integration and national identity. Instead of taking it for granted that new citizens would abide by the basic principles necessary for peaceful coexistence within a free society – the rule of law, respect for individual rights, legitimacy of duly elected authorities, settlement of disputes by discussion and vote rather than violence – states have started to demand explicit acceptance of these principles, and also to define their national values in more detail, insisting that would-be citizens demonstrate knowledge and acceptance of these before being admitted. The caricature version of this is the “Tebbit test”, named after Norman Tebbit, a British

cabinet minister who, in the 1980s, complained that British citizens of Caribbean origin were cheering for the West Indies rather than England in international cricket matches. He did not actually suggest that support for national sporting teams should be made a condition of citizenship. But many states – including, at different times and in different forms, all five of those under consideration – have in the meantime introduced more reasonable tests that people wishing to become citizens are required to take, as well as ceremonies to mark the admission of successful candidates into the national community. The content and value of these tests and ceremonies will be considered in Lesson Three below.

Purpose of the report

Our aim in this report is modest. We do not claim to have made any new discoveries. Rather, we started by surveying a large body of research and reflection by others. A team led by Kerem Öktem prepared a series of indicators based on such sources as the comparative Migration Policy Index (MIPEX), and quantitative survey data, including the OECD's International Migration Outlook and the Continuous Reporting System on Migration. Many of these indicators are included as Figures in this report. We have also sought to build on the Council of Europe report *Living Together: Combining Diversity and Freedom in 21st Century Europe*, to which two of us – Timothy Garton Ash and Edward Mortimer – contributed.² In early summer 2013, we gathered a distinguished group of scholars, policymakers, writers and journalists specialising in our five countries for a major conference in Oxford, and we have benefited greatly from their contributions. The conference programme, the complete set of Indicators, and a number of Analyses by contributors to the conference are all available on the project website,³ as is this report in pdf format.

From this body of research and debate we have tried to distil a few clear **lessons for public policy** – meaning not only the policies of national governments, or indeed of international organizations, but also those of a wide range of other actors in the public arena, whose words and actions may often have as great or even greater consequences for those living together in free societies. Such actors are enumerated in the Council of Europe report,⁴ which also gives some concrete examples of actions taken by people or groups in each category. They include local authorities, churches and other religious groups, civil society or voluntary organizations more generally, celebrities and role models, employers, trade unions, mass media (both old and new) and, probably most important of all, educators.

The fact that there are ten lessons may prompt some readers to think of the Ten Commandments. Self-evidently, these are nothing of the kind. They make no claim to be comprehensive. There are many vital areas of policy, such as housing, welfare systems, freedom of expression and worship, and, not least, immigration policy itself, which we do not cover at all. Rather, we have only addressed an issue when we felt a clear lesson emerged from our enquiry.

We understand, of course, that there are no “one size fits all” solutions. Each country is different. Policymakers need to be open-minded and flexible, to listen to all stakeholders and to take careful account of all the particular circumstances in which a given policy might be applied. They also need to recognize that all globalised and economically advanced societies are immigration societies, and that immigration, integration and the formation of identities are, and always have been, messy processes of negotiation and struggle, in the course of which societies are changed. American history, as described by the historian Gary Gerstle, is an eloquent example of such “transformational incorporation”, in which “newcomers claim America for themselves and if necessary change it to make it their home” – a process involving “lots of conflict and ugliness over a long period of time”, but one through which the United States went from being “Anglo-Saxon” to “Judeo-Christian”, and may now be transforming itself again to incorporate a Latino identity. Gerstle admits that he does not know whether this is “generalizable to other countries”, but Europeans may be well advised to hope so. They need to realise that their societies were never truly homogeneous, but have been, and continue to be, constantly reshaped and re-defined, despite all efforts to create and maintain clear and permanent markers of national identity. The messiness of the process – in which, of course, the identity of migrants and postmigrants is also subject to constant change – must be taken as a given, and a balance found between pragmatism on matters of detail and a principled stand on essentials, with a recognition that even the definition of the latter may change with the passage of time. (Who would have thought for instance, as little as 30 years ago, that the right of same-sex couples to marry would come to be seen as an essential manifestation of equality in Western liberal societies?) Only thus can we begin to shape the process and bring some order into it, with benefits for immigrants, postmigrants and indigenous populations.

In a seminal article published in 2007,⁵ the Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam argued that, while ethnic diversity is, on balance and in the long run, an important social asset, in the short-to-medium run “immigration and ethnic diversity challenge

social solidarity and inhibit social capital”. In other words, during and after periods of mass immigration and rapidly increasing diversity the stakes of public policy are very high. If these processes are well managed, a society can in time emerge from them greatly enriched, with the prospect of more interesting and rewarding lives for all its members. But the processes themselves can involve a lot of pain and trauma, as trust declines not only between groups but even among members of the same group. It follows that, if the processes are not well managed, the result can be a fragmented society full of resentful and alienated people, who are less willing to engage in collective voluntary activities and contribute to the public good.

Our fear is that a number of developments referred to above – the cumulative effect of immigration itself and failed policy responses to it, but also globalisation, the restructuring of the welfare state, the more precarious position of the West, the presence of some extreme and violent forms of Islamism and (since 2008) a seemingly unending economic crisis – may have increased the danger of an unhappy outcome. Freedom and diversity have come to be viewed in many quarters as in acute tension, if not irreconcilable. To prevent this misapprehension from becoming self-fulfilling, it is vital to make the right diagnosis and apply the right remedies. We therefore ask the question: What can we do to ensure that freedom and diversity not only do not become irreconcilable but actually reinforce each other, so that as our societies become more diverse they become not less but actually *more* free? The ten lessons set out below are offered as a contribution to an answer.

Lesson One: The importance of citizenship


Free societies must manage the actual inflow of migrants better than they have done in the past. How exactly they should do that is a vital and complex question. Since demographic and other circumstances vary significantly between our five countries, we do not pretend to offer any general prescription for immigration policy as such. Rather, our first lesson concerns the large number of people of migrant background who have been resident in a country for a long time, often having children born there, but are not citizens of it. The overwhelming preoccupation in the United States is with the legal or illegal status of these people, which is determined by the route and circumstances of the original migration. But we believe that in the case of long-term residents the problems are essentially the same in either case. What should be our first guiding principle in relation to such people?

Figure 12 shows that between 2000 and 2010 Canada admitted nearly 70 new citizens for every thousand that it already had, while the figures for our other four countries are all below 30, and in Germany's case below 20. The pie charts in Figure 13 show that the proportion of citizens among the foreign-born population varies from 73% in Canada to as low as 42% in the UK.

This is a matter of concern. Citizenship of a state does not, of course, guarantee full inclusion or integration in a society. There are many examples of people who are citizens but still feel excluded and marginalised, or live – by choice or otherwise – isolated within their own communities. But several recent studies show that citizenship, without being a panacea, can play a valuable role in helping immigrants to become willing and useful members of society in their new country of residence. A 2011 joint study by OECD and the European Commission points to a strong correlation between citizenship and labour market access, particularly in the public sector.⁶ In the same vein, the director of the Migration Policy Group, Jan Niessen, argues that citizenship of migrants strengthens trust in institutions, and is a

prerequisite “for the legitimacy of the democratic political systems of Europe’s increasingly diverse societies.” He suggests that the lack of citizenship results in migrants’ concerns not being considered sufficiently by political parties, and hence turns them into objects rather than subjects of policy. “Integrating migrants into civic life and political participation”, he adds, “thus enhances their civic participation and social responsibility but also the effective implementation of policies.”⁷ In other words, citizenship can be a valuable *tool* for integrating newcomers into society. This has clearly been understood by the Mayor of Hamburg, Olaf Scholz, from whom individual non-German residents of the city receive signed letters urging them to become German citizens and providing them with information on how to do so.

Figure 12: Citizenship acquisitions between 2000 and 2010, per thousand host-country citizens



Source: OECD International Migration Database.

Note: This chart shows the degree to which citizenship acquisitions have contributed to increases in the population between 2000 and 2010 as a proportion of the population in each country in 2000. It can also be read as an indicator for relative inclusivity and the effort of the host society to fully enfranchise large portions of the immigrant communities.

Some confusion arises, however, when – as is increasingly the case – states present citizenship as a *reward* for, or certificate of, successful integration, requiring residents to demonstrate that they have achieved this before they can become citizens. This may deter them from applying for citizenship, or at least delay their acquisition of it, and can thus defeat its own object by delaying or impeding the integration process itself, maintaining a large body of foreign residents who do not enjoy full civic rights.⁸ The example of Canada also suggests a strong correlation between openness and inclusiveness demonstrated by the state and its institutions on the one hand, and a positive identification among immigrants as Canadian.

Figure 13: Share of citizens among foreign-born population, 2010

Source: OECD International Migration Database
 Note: The foreign-born population covers all persons who have ever migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence.

It seems an obvious point, but the more openness you demonstrate, the more immigrants feel welcome. The more hurdles you erect, the more suspicion you convey, and the less migrants will be inclined to identify with their country of residence.

As between tool and reward, we would therefore prefer the former. But we would go further and argue that, for all long-term residents, citizenship should be considered a democratic *right*.

The founding principle of democracy is, after all, that the government is chosen by the governed; that all who have to live under the law should have a share in choosing the lawmakers. If large numbers of them are disenfranchised by being denied citizenship there is a greater risk of them being treated in an arbitrary way. The claim

of the state to be democratic is also weakened, as are the chances that these long-term residents of migrant origin will fully identify with it. Therefore our first lesson is that

All long-term residents in a democratic state should be citizens of that state.

Lesson Two: The acquisition and obligations of citizenship

A healthy democracy is composed of active and law-abiding citizens. With this in mind, in recent years states have tended increasingly to make explicit requirements of those who wish to become citizens, and to set tests to establish whether they fulfil those requirements or not. For an indicative summary of tests used in our five case-study countries, see Figure 14. Behind this lies the desire to make sure that new citizens understand that citizenship brings with it obligations as well as rights, and that they are both able and willing to fulfil those obligations. This desire is in itself very reasonable, but of course it applies to all citizens, not only new ones. The point of asking new citizens to pass tests must be to establish that they share some basic knowledge and understanding, which those who are already citizens can be assumed to possess.

Unhappily, this assumption is far from being self-evidently correct. Even well educated citizens who take the tests very often fail. As Bridget Anderson of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at Oxford University points out, many native-born citizens of modern democracies fail to reach the standard of good citizenship that is required of foreigners seeking to become citizens. Unlike foreigners, they cannot be rejected, but are often excluded in other ways, notably by rhetoric which emphasizes the rights of “taxpayers” (thereby excluding welfare claimants, dependent spouses, etc.). Thus by looking at citizenship through immigration spectacles we emphasize its more formal aspects, and avoid thinking about these “failed citizens” in our midst.

Figure 14: Citizenship tests

	FRANCE	GERMANY	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA	UNITED STATES
1. What is tested in the citizenship test?	French history society and culture. Values of the republic. Rights and obligations of citizens of France.	Important historical dates. Administrative structure of the Federal Republic. Basic principles of democracy. Europe. National symbols. Gender equality.	Most important national days. Basic legal regulations and administrative structure. General knowledge about how life in the UK works.	Right to vote and run for elected office. Election procedures, citizen rights and responsibilities. Canadian social, cultural history and political history. Physical and political geography.	US history, traditions, basics of US government.
2. When was it introduced?	2011, and revised in 2012.	2004 by Baden Württemberg (first only for Muslims), 2008 at the federal level for all applicants	“Life in the UK” test introduced under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act in 2002.	1947 by the Canadian Citizenship Act. The current version of the test was introduced in 2010.	Introduced in 1986 under the Immigration Reform and Control Act.
3. Who administers the test and the procedure?	Civil servant in the office of the ‘ <i>préfét</i> ’, the state’s representative in the département.	Test is administered after attending a course in test centres working on behalf of the local authority	Administered by a private company on behalf of the UK Borders Agency.	Citizenship and Immigration Canada, a federal government body.	The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services agency.

Source: Open access data and citizenship literature.

It is tempting to suggest that native-born citizens as well as immigrants be required to take the tests. Could not all residents of a country be required to pass a citizenship test before they are allowed to vote – just as they have to pass a driving test before they are allowed to drive? This might be an attractive suggestion in theory, but would be politically unacceptable, not least because it could be seen as a step away from universal suffrage. Instead, the problem should be addressed through improvements in our national education systems, which are the subject of Lesson Four. But the point should be borne in mind by those who design and set citizenship tests. It is certainly reasonable to ask people applying for citizenship to declare explicitly that they wish to become active and law-abiding citizens. Beyond that, while tests do have a value in drawing new citizens’ attention to the content of citizenship and its obligations, they should not become, or be seen as, arbitrary and discriminatory hurdles, making

citizenship more difficult to acquire and resulting in the exclusion of large numbers of residents from the body politic.

As a general rule, citizenship tests are designed for new immigrants – that is, those who apply for citizenship after a relatively short qualifying period of residence (usually about five years). Should they also be used for people who have already lived in a country for a long time but have not yet become citizens – for instance those who came to Germany as “guest-workers” in the 1960s or 70s? Can such people be expected to attend language classes and take a citizenship test when they have already lived and worked in the country for 30 years? In such instances there may be a case for an “amnesty”, dispensing people from the test if they can establish that they have lived in the country for a certain number of years. Yet there is also a strong argument for asking them to take the test as a way of establishing whether they need language classes or other forms of assistance to enable them to enjoy the full benefits of citizenship and to make a greater positive contribution to society.

Overall, tests should be relatively simple and encouraging, rather than setting high bars which are unattainable for immigrants with only basic education or skills. What is important in all cases is that failing the test should not be the end of the story, resulting in permanent denial of citizenship to people who will remain as residents in the country. There must be an active policy to remedy whatever failures of knowledge or understanding the test reveals, by organizing special classes for those who fail and allowing them to re-sit the test after a short time.

With or without tests, accession to citizenship should be treated as a matter for celebration, both by the new citizens themselves and by the community they are joining. It should be marked by an appropriate ceremony – one that makes the new citizen feel welcome and included, rather than intimidated, excluded or unwelcome. This is how one of the authors of this report, Kerem Öktem, describes his experience of the difference (albeit a narrowing one) between becoming a citizen in Germany and in the UK:

- In **Germany**, ceremonies used to take place within the local authorities that organized citizenship, sometimes with a speech by the civil servant in charge of the individual’s file. In the *Bezirksamt* of Prenzlauer Berg (Berlin) in 2000, this official embarked on a long speech, which he concluded by saying that today “you are starting a new life, you are born again as German”. This

statement was made as a digression by the civil servant, in a council office where most of the applicants were ethnic German immigrants from Russia. More recently, ceremonies have become more formal, with an oath of allegiance, and are attended by local dignitaries such as mayors or councillors who seek to create a welcoming atmosphere for the new Germans.

- In **Britain**, the ceremony is a formal event organized by the county or city council and led by the Lord Lieutenant or other dignitary. As in Germany, the ceremonies are locally organized, so they differ significantly from place to place and incorporate local history and culture. Yet they all include a speech by a dignitary on the county or city, the contributions immigrants have made and can make, and a welcome to the new citizens into their community (not national, but local). There is also an oath of allegiance to the Queen and her successors, and a pledge of loyalty to the United Kingdom including respect for its rights and freedoms: “I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British citizen.” At the end of the ceremony, sandwiches and tea are served and the new citizens receive a welcome pack which includes the passport application.

Our general conclusion is that citizenship ceremonies are very desirable, particularly when they really are about welcoming immigrants into the polity. The guiding principle for both tests and ceremonies should be that

New citizens must be made welcome in their new country, and be willing to contribute to its success.

Lesson Three: Dual citizenship

When residents in a country are not citizens of that country, it is often because they hold the citizenship of another state and are not willing to renounce it. Different countries have different traditions on this point. France and Britain have traditionally taken a relaxed view of the matter, being normally content for their citizens to hold the nationality of another state, while stipulating that they could not then avail themselves of French or British protection when on the territory of that state. By contrast the United States for a long time considered that it was entitled to expect exclusive loyalty from its citizens, and that allowing new citizens to retain citizenship of another country would impede their integration into their new homeland. To this day, under legislation originating in an Act of 1795, an alien who becomes a US citizen is required to “declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen”. Since 1967, however, this oath has been rendered virtually meaningless by the Supreme Court’s ruling, in *Afroyim v. Rusk*, that a US citizen will not lose his citizenship by acquiring foreign citizenship, so long as he does not express an explicit intent to relinquish his US citizenship.⁹ This effectively legalised dual citizenship.

Current legislation and practice in our five countries are summarized in Figure 15. It can be seen that, despite changes in the law in 2000, Germany is, at this writing, the most restrictive of the five. Dual citizenship remains illegal, but there are so many exceptions that the denial of German citizenship applies in practice mainly to Turkish citizens. Indeed, according to one well-informed source, more than 50% of applications are allowed as ‘exceptions’, which makes this a very odd kind of rule. Both the Social Democrats and the Greens have come out in favour of full legalization of dual citizenship. In July 2013, the Bundesrat (the upper house of the federal parliament, representing the *Länder*) proposed a bill which would abolish the

requirement that naturalised aliens renounce their previous citizenship, as well as the “option system” for children born in Germany to resident foreign parents, thereby legalising dual and multiple citizenship.¹⁰

Figure 15: Dual Citizenship in the Case Study Countries

	FRANCE	GERMANY	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA	UNITED STATES
Is dual citizenship permissible?	Yes	No in principle. There are, however, many exceptions (EU citizens, countries that do not rescind citizenship, US). In practice, the ban on dual citizenship tends to exclude mostly Turkish citizens, who - unlike e.g. Iranians - can give up their citizenship, but often do not wish to do so for reasons of emotional attachment or inheritance rights. Interestingly, the ‘option system’ has introduced a form of temporary dual citizenship, wherein all children born in Germany to a resident parent automatically acquire German citizenship, but then have to renounce their parents’ nationality between the ages of 18-23. If they fail to do so, they lose their German nationality.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Since when?	Dual citizenship has never been outlawed in principle.	Until the Nationality Act of 2000, dual citizenship was tacitly accepted, but since 2000, many naturalised Germans, who had since reapplied for their Turkish passports, lost their German citizenship.	No restrictions since the British Nationality Act of 1948	Citizenship Act of 1977.	Dual citizenship is legal, at least since the Supreme Court ruling <i>Afroyim v. Rusk</i> of 1967. Restrictions for high government officials needing security clearance.
Background	Ius Soli.	Ius Sanguinis (citizenship by blood line) until 2000, since then the elements of Ius Soli, with the highly contested option model.	Commonwealth citizenship.	Commonwealth citizenship.	Ius Soli.

Source: Open access data and citizenship literature.

Meanwhile, many of the main countries of origin of migrants which formerly banned dual citizenship, such as Mexico, now permit and even encourage it. Since states are sovereign, they will always have the option of requiring their citizens to renounce the nationality of another state in the event of war with that state (though it is doubtful

how effective this would be, since any actual agent of a foreign power could presumably go through the motions of renouncing citizenship of that power whenever necessary). Happily, the fear that dual citizens would act as a kind of fifth column, exploiting their citizenship of one state to advance the policies or interests of another state, appears increasingly anachronistic. Few if any significant problems of “divided loyalty” have been reported in any of the four countries where dual citizenship is permitted. It has been observed that members of diaspora communities who retain the citizenship of their countries of origin do not always vote for the most enlightened parties or policies in those countries. But we are not aware of any comprehensive study of the extent of this phenomenon, or how far it may be counterbalanced by others who import liberal values from their new homeland into the politics of their old one. (The subject merits, we feel, further investigation.) In any case it would be folly for receiving countries to imagine that they could or should influence the politics of sending ones by forcing people to choose one citizenship over the other. Their proper concern is with the successful management of diversity within their own societies, and for this we believe the option of dual citizenship has clear advantages.

Citizenship and nationality are legal terms, and in a democracy they are normally synonymous. Their relationship with national *identity* – a subjective concept – is less clear. What is by now generally accepted and understood is that people have multiple, overlapping identities, and that these can include a subjective identification with more than one nation or state. Many people also have good practical reasons for wishing to retain the citizenship of a state other than the one they currently live in. Those who are forced to choose between nationalities will almost inevitably feel alienated and find it harder to integrate. Many will prefer to retain their nationality of origin, thereby excluding themselves from the democratic process in the state where they live. Conversely, by permitting dual citizenship in such cases a state can signify its openness, and thus make it easier for individuals to integrate into the surrounding society.

And so our third lesson, following from the first and second, is very simple:


Citizenship of another country should not prevent people being citizens of the country where they live.

Lesson Four: Education

Too often today, education is presented as though its sole function were to equip people for economic activity. That would surprise the founders of the French and American public education systems, to name but two. Their aim was, rather, to ensure the unity of their respective nations, and the effective functioning of their institutions, by forming a society of well educated citizens with a shared civic culture. An alternative, more liberal, approach would see education's primary purpose as being to ensure that individuals can develop their full potential to lead meaningful lives, by giving them the opportunities and the framework they will need. But that too includes playing their part as full members of a democratic society, with all the attendant rights and responsibilities.

Education therefore has a vital civic function: it should equip children to be active citizens, teaching them to respect the law and to understand democracy, as well as imbuing them with a sense of pride in being part of an inclusive society, whose members respect each other and are open to new ideas and associations. Such notions of civic pride and responsibility, rooted in the values of inclusivity, liberality and respect for others, should permeate the school curriculum – especially, of course, the teaching of social sciences and history – and, even more importantly, the mind-set of teachers and head teachers. Failures in this respect are easily transmitted from one generation to the next. Therefore, it is essential that those who face difficulties within the school system – underachievers and those who risk becoming drop-outs or delinquents – receive special attention. For current levels of achievement in intercultural education in our five countries, see Figures 16 to 19.

Figure 16: Intercultural education achievement levels in the case study countries




- Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in the school curriculum
- State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout society
- The possibility of modifying school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school population
- Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils
- Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and professional development programmes
- Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce

Source: MIPEX Database.

Figure 17: Educational performance of immigrant children

Difference in PISA reading scores between native-born children of immigrants and children of native-born parents




	Before Accounting for Socio-Economic Background	After Accounting for Socio-Economic Background
■ France	-55	-26
■ Germany	-54	-23
■ UK	-7	-3
■ Canada	-5	1
■ USA	-22	8

Source: OECD International Migration Database.


Note: PISA stands for the 'Programme of International Student Assessment'. It is administered by the OECD and aims to measure student success around the world and inspire policies to improve education scores. The students tested by PISA are aged between 15 years and 3 months and 16 years and 2 months at the beginning of the assessment period. To fulfil OECD requirements, each country must draw a sample of at least 5,000 students. The score is the average of all student scores in each country. The average score among OECD countries was 500 points and the standard deviation was 100 points.

Figure 18: Educational attainment, native- and foreign-born



Source: OECD, Education of the immigrant Population, 2008. USA figures not available.
 Note: The very high proportion of primary school graduates among the native-born UK population stems from the different school grades in the UK. The entry age for primary education according to the OECD is between 5 and 7 and its duration is 6 years. Secondary education follows the 6 years of primary and extends past lower secondary, which often is the end of compulsory education, to the beginning of university/tertiary education.

Figure 19: Educational attainment of the foreign-born population



Source: OECD, Education of the Immigrant Population, 2008.

Three subjects are particularly important in this context:

- First, children must be equipped to communicate with their fellow citizens in the main **language** or languages of the society, which will normally also be the official language or languages of the state. Language proficiency is essential for participation in wider society and for the exercise of citizenship rights and duties.

As with any other subject, schools achieve best results when they follow a needs-oriented approach that seeks to develop differentiated strategies for each disadvantaged group. If there are only limited levels of proficiency in the national language among a certain group of pupils, additional resources need

to be made available for teaching it. This is not something that can always be left to the local level, because schools which educate children from disadvantaged communities are often located in disadvantaged areas and suffer from underfunding. Both public and private funders (including, for instance, local employers) have a responsibility to overcome this problem. Deciding to allocate funding from state or provincial resources, or from company profits, for extra language tuition for pupils of immigrant background may not be easy in a time of austerity. It is a matter of priorities, and therefore a test of leadership.

The teaching of country-of-origin languages is also valuable, since it empowers children of immigrant backgrounds, strengthening their self-esteem and their ability to play a role within their own community. So far from being “lost” to the community from which they spring, children who are fully bilingual can become role models and spokespersons for it through their achievements in wider society, thereby gaining respect even from older and more traditional community leaders.

- Secondly, there should be more and better teaching of **history**. Children should learn at school “the story so far” of how and why the society and state of which they will be citizens came to take its current form. This will equip them to understand the contemporary culture and institutions of the country, and can enable them to develop civic pride and a sense of belonging, with local loyalties. But in a globalised world and a multicultural society, it must also equip them as citizens of the world. This means it must be set firmly in the context of world history, and include material on places, religions and cultures with which pupils and their families are likely to identify – as well as the history of migration itself. And it must develop their capacity for constructive controversy and critical thought, including the questioning of established narratives. If they leave school with *both* a secure sense of their place in the world *and* the ability to think critically, they will be well on the way to becoming good democratic citizens.
- Thirdly, school curricula should include more **civics**. One way to think about this is to set the education system the task of ensuring that *all* adult citizens would pass whatever test is set for foreigners seeking to acquire citizenship. In other words, they should have learnt at school to understand the general

principles of democracy and the rule of law, their rights and obligations in a democratic state, and the particular institutions and customs of the society they belong to, as well as the norms and values that hold it together and enable it to function. As with history, this knowledge should be set in a global context, including some understanding of the political or legal traditions and religious institutions that immigrant communities may have brought with them, as well as those with a longer history within the country. Education should help members of all different groups in society to understand each other, as well as themselves.

Beyond the teaching of specific subjects, and perhaps even more important, is the overall character of the school. As far as possible the composition of each school – both students and teachers – should reflect the diversity of the wider society.¹¹ But this is not enough in itself. A recent study¹² shows that even students in “desegregated” schools in the United States and South Africa often inhabit separate social worlds. “They take different classes, they play on different sports teams, and they sit with separate groups in the cafeteria. Additionally, integration has yet to arrive on a broader social level, in terms of acknowledging and attributing equal value to minority groups within the community.”

In Germany, one pupil in every four, but only one teacher in every hundred, is classified as possessing a migrant background. Several studies suggest that postmigrant children of all backgrounds under-perform. Public debate tends to blame this on the pupils themselves and their parents. More scientifically examined, the reasons range from social exclusion and poverty, through underfunding and insufficient language teaching, to breakdowns in discipline and authority in the classroom. Many states and cities have started initiatives to make schools more friendly to migrants and postmigrants, and more effective in giving them a good education. Stuttgart, for instance, where 50% of children come from such a background, has launched a programme with the title *Migranten machen Schule* – which literally means “migrants make school” but could also mean “migrants are exemplary.” It is based on the assumption that teachers with a migrant background can change the dynamics of a highly diverse school because they are better equipped to reach out to a diverse body of pupils, and can also become role models for children who would otherwise not believe that someone “like them” could possibly study and become a teacher. The programme therefore aims at increasing the number of such teachers with a migrant background, while also promoting the teaching of migration-

related issues, and training teachers, as well as school and government officials, to think of diversity as an important resource. The programme's value has been acknowledged nationally, being included in the "integration plans" both of the federal government and of the *Länder*.

One example of a school catering to a diverse student body is Oxford Spires Academy, in Oxford, England. Formerly Oxford Community School, this once struggling school reopened in 2011 under its new name. It has gained national attention for its academic improvement, multicultural student body (over 50% of students have a first language other than English), and embrace of reforms in school culture, including a school uniform designed by the students themselves. Teachers at Oxford Spires use a pedagogical technique called "constructive controversy": students are encouraged to take a viewpoint and research the arguments for it. They make their case and then listen to the opposing view proposed by others in the class. Next, they prepare a debate from the viewpoint opposite to the one they first argued – after which all who have taken part have to explore what they have learnt from the process, and then bring together ideas to create a final proposal. The primary aim of this is to deepen their understanding of the issues under discussion, but other benefits have been noted: students get better at working and learning together, and more confident about speaking in public. We feel that this technique of "constructive controversy" is precisely the kind of innovation that enables us to see and use diversity as an enhancement of, not a limitation on, the primary value of freedom.

Children's performance in school is also strongly influenced by the degree of support that they, and the school, receive from their parents. In 2008-9 an experiment to demonstrate this, called *La mallette des parents*, was carried out in the Paris suburb of Créteil. Two sets of classes, with more than 5,000 pupils in each group, were chosen by lot and compared throughout the school year. In one set, the parents were invited to meetings with the team of teachers. Interpreters were provided for those who did not speak French. These meetings dealt with the way the school worked and the best way to help the children interact with the teachers. Three to five meetings were organized during the year, so that only a small investment (of about 1,500 euros per year for each school) was required, and the effect was very striking: more parents made appointments to talk to individual teachers, more signed up to join parents' associations, and the children were kept under better parental control. A definite improvement in pupils' behaviour was noted: less absenteeism, fewer suspensions, fewer formal warnings, more pupils congratulated for good work. This effect was

noticeable both among the children whose parents had spontaneously volunteered for the experiment and for those drawn in because the programme was made part of the class curriculum. The programme, evaluated by an independent team of researchers, was so successful that the following year it was decided to extend it to all secondary schools in France over a period of three years.¹³

To sum up: for education to fulfil its all-important civic function, resources must be made available where they are most needed – notably for teaching the national language or languages to those who do not learn them from their parents, but also more generally for ensuring that children from minorities or otherwise disadvantaged groups enjoy genuine equality of opportunity. For instance, if parents from certain communities are not sending their daughters to school, additional efforts are required to get the communities, and the individual parents, to understand why this is essential. The same will apply, in equal measure, to white working class boys, and their families, in places where they have been found to suffer from a lack of self-confidence.

The overall lesson that we deduce is:

Schools must have the curriculum and resources to perform their vital function of preparing pupils for life as active citizens in a free society.


Lesson Five: Labour markets and the workplace

Like education, the labour market and the workplace have an important civic function, and not just an economic one. It is through them that many immigrants have the most active daily interaction with the societies in which they live.

Historically in Europe employment in construction and large-scale industries such as mining, steel and textiles was an important integrating factor, with trade unions playing an important role, but in most countries the position of those industries, and of the organized labour movement, has weakened in recent decades. At present, things seem to work better in the United States, where labour force participation is higher and, until the recent crisis, unemployment was lower among immigrants than among those born in the country (see Figure 20). According to one leading American migration economist, Philip Martin, “the best integration policy is full employment”. Because there is no generous welfare system, low-skilled immigrants are quickly integrated into the labour market, and often it is employers who, out of self-interest, provide language classes and other services that enable immigrants to establish themselves.

The economist Martin Ruhs points out, however, that there is often a trade-off between the right to migrate to a country and the rights the migrant enjoys once he or she has got there. If low-skilled migrant workers are accorded all the same rights and benefits as indigenous workers, they are less likely to get jobs since they will be just as expensive as local workers and may not speak the language or have other relevant local knowledge. For this reason, the governments of some migrant-sending countries – both new European Union member states in eastern Europe and developing countries, led by India – have explicitly rejected equality of rights for their nationals working abroad on the grounds that it constitutes a restrictive immigration policy measure.¹⁴

Figure 20: Unemployment rates of immigrants



Sources: EU Labour Force Survey data (Eurostat); USA: Current Population Surveys; Canada: Labour Force Surveys. Note: Unemployment rates for native-born and foreign-born citizens aged 15-64.

In Germany, according to geographer Felicitas Hillmann, there is high unemployment among the foreign-born, but many immigrants, and even more postmigrants, find their own way out of a constricted labour market (exacerbated by prejudice) by becoming self-employed entrepreneurs. They set up small businesses which usually, though not exclusively, employ people from their own community. Such migrant entrepreneurship has not conventionally been recognised as a form of labour-market integration, but here reality may be ahead of academic thinking. In some German *Länder*, foreigners (including citizens of other EU member states) now account for more than 50% of all new business registrations, and the number of such registrations has been rising steeply. This phenomenon is most pronounced in big cities. It has created work opportunities for migrants, stabilised those neighbourhoods with a high presence of migrants and has often provided a space for everyday contact across different communities.

Of our five countries, France is the one with by far the highest unemployment rate among foreign-born residents, and the biggest differential between foreign-born and native-born unemployment (see Figure 20). While this may in part be attributed to an over-generous welfare state, it would be naïve to ignore the very real effect of prejudice and discrimination. In a country where Muslims of North African origin form the largest postmigrant minority, a carefully designed experiment has confirmed

already strong anecdotal evidence of discrimination. The study demonstrated that a job applicant with a Muslim first name is well under half as likely to be called back or summoned for interview by a prospective employer as a person with a Christian name but otherwise exactly the same qualifications and ethnicity.¹⁵

Other European countries, even if better than France in this respect, are far from blameless. In most of them the unemployment rate among migrants and postmigrants is significantly higher than that of the population as a whole. This is not always evidence of direct discrimination by employers, since sometimes it is caused by the collapse of heavy industries, such as coalmining and automobile production, where predominantly migrants and postmigrants worked; or by the application of a “last in, first out” policy. But employment continues to be the area of social life where discrimination is most frequently reported.¹⁶

The Open Society Foundations, in their “At Home in Europe” survey of the position of the Muslim population in 11 European cities,¹⁷ point out that “there is a recognised cycle of disadvantage that needs to be broken, as Muslims and other marginalised groups tend to be located in areas with poor opportunities in housing, education, employment and training, each of which reinforces and exacerbates the other factors, and make it very difficult for such groups to integrate or progress in the broader society... Employment patterns are a gauge of the relative standing of different groups in society. Access to vocational training and participation in the labour market remain at the core of economic integration, which requires not only opportunities for employment, but employment in the mainstream labour market and in jobs that are commensurate with individuals’ skills and qualifications.”

It is no doubt true that low-skilled temporary workers are more likely to find (or to accept) low-paid jobs if they do not have the alternative of living on welfare. But while this may contribute to higher labour force participation in the United States, where the welfare system is not very generous for anyone, there are obvious dangers in denying to longer-term residents – and *a fortiori* to postmigrants – rights and benefits that are available to the rest of the population. We noted in Lesson One that there is a correlation between citizenship and access to the labour market. Just as democracy is undermined by having a large resident population without voting rights, so justice is undermined by maintaining a large population of migrant workers with few rights and therefore very little defence against exploitation. This is especially true of undocumented migrants, who dare not complain for fear of being deported. It may

suit some employers, but it is likely to increase the risk of unemployment for indigenous workers, and generally to increase tensions between them and migrants or postmigrants.

Our fifth lesson is therefore that

Employers and colleagues must give migrants and postmigrants equal opportunities, and help them integrate socially as well as economically.

Lesson Six: Cities and local communities

In four of our five countries, immigrants and members of minorities were found to identify more readily with the city where they live than with the country of which it is part (the exception, Canada, is discussed in the Introduction). A classic example of this phenomenon is the young man in Marseilles who, asked whether he was French or Algerian, replied with a shrug “*Je suis Marseillais*”.¹⁸

This is not surprising, since throughout history towns and cities have been the main sites of human diversity, where people of different geographical background and culture came together and lived side by side. They are places where goods and ideas are exchanged, and this has always been the main motor of economic and cultural progress. In Arabic, as in Latin and the languages derived from it, the words for “city”, “citizen”, “civil” and “civilisation” are all related to each other – and in Greek that applies also to the word “politics”. The city, one could say, is the natural home of democracy.

Today, too, it is in towns and cities that most encounters happen between people of different faiths, cultures and ethnic identities. While debates about multiculturalism are carried on at the national level, it is in towns and cities that the reality of culturally diverse societies is lived day by day, with all its excitement and creativity, and all its problems. A sense of place is a vital element in identity formation – and this can include the place where people live now, as well as the one they are from. By helping define the place, civic leaders can help each resident to define her or his identity.

A special responsibility falls, therefore, on both the elected and the professional officials who lead towns and cities. National leaders may set the legal framework for their actions, and to some extent define the terms of debate. But it is the mayors and city or district councils, working with voluntary groups of citizens, who have to deal with the issues as they arise from day to day. In the last resort it is often their wisdom,

or lack of it, that determines whether or not people in a given area can live together successfully, without conflict or unmanageable stress.

Cities bear a large responsibility for ensuring that culturally diverse societies are open ones, in which people belonging to different cultural groups, including those who are perceived as recent arrivals or temporary residents, can feel at home and make their own contribution, in their own way, to the common life of the city, and to its character as a social space that is, at best, liberating and inspiring. If this is to happen peacefully and fruitfully in diverse communities there must be dialogue between members of the different groups. It is necessarily a two-way exercise: members of the majority population need to feel able to accept difference and newcomers as a contribution to the future of their country, while members of the minorities must be equipped with knowledge of, and be ready to play by, local “rules of the game”.

The Open Society Foundations’ “At Home in Europe” project¹⁹ has identified a number of ways in which members of minorities can be encouraged to participate actively in the common life of their city.

Sometimes it is the local authority that takes the initiative. For instance, a project by Waltham Forest Council in London, which initially worked with young Muslims to help them with issues relating to citizenship and conflict resolution, has now been extended to include marginalised youths from all faiths, with a new emphasis on vulnerability to gangs and crime, an issue that affects youths from many different backgrounds. In Paris, the mayor has set up, and himself chairs, an advisory Citizenship Council of non-EU Parisians, composed of 45 women and 45 men from 36 different nationalities, with eight specialised commissions, dealing with such issues as access to fundamental rights, international social services, cooperation, economic development and training, information and communication, youth, culture and education, quality of life, and gender equality.

The city of Roubaix, in northern France, has gone much further. It has made a point of embracing its Muslim population, proportionately one of the largest in the country (about 20%), and has taken discreet but pointed steps to promote an active Muslim community. The mayor’s office has helped Muslims find places to worship, and has established a consortium including a representative of each of the city’s religious groups, as well as one from a group that supports *laïcité*, as a forum for discussing how to respond to the groups’ various needs. The local government has also allowed the appointment of a Muslim chaplain at the city hospital, and three areas of the city’s

cemetery are designated for Muslims, a rarity in France. As a result, and despite one of the worst unemployment rates in the country (22%), Roubaix is relatively exempt from the ethnic and sectarian tensions that have afflicted other parts of France. In the words of Sliman Taleb-Ahmed, president of the local association of Muslim institutions, “our leitmotif is to live together, and in this living together there’s an image that we wish to give of the Muslim community: that we are French citizens before anything, before the religious aspect.”²⁰

In other cases the initiative comes from civil society groups. In Marseilles they have set up *L’Université du Citoyen*, an association which aims to bridge the gap between institutions, public service providers and residents, and make it easier for citizens to join in public activities, including decision-making processes. In East London, the most diverse area of the UK’s capital, churches and mosques came together in 1996 to form the East London Communities Organisation, later renamed the more ambitious Citizens UK, as its popularity and networks spread throughout the country. It is a community-based, not issue-based organization, which means it is flexible in listening to the diverse interests of its members. Its most notable achievement has been the Living Wage campaign, since endorsed by a number of private sector businesses and the Mayor of London. In Toronto the Maytree Foundation and the Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance felt the need to respond to research findings showing that only 13% of Toronto’s municipal leadership were from a visible minority, despite the fact that 49.5% of the population were from visible minorities. The organizations launched the “DiverseCity” programme, with the goal of creating more diverse leadership for the city in a range of fields, including political, corporate, media, non-profit and legal.

It is sometimes groups from within the minorities themselves that take the initiative. In Marseilles, for instance, Franco-Algerians (French citizens of Algerian origin) and Algerians resident in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region have come together to form an organization which seeks to encourage participation in social and cultural life in France, while defending the identity and rights of the communities in question. They aim at “a kind of return to roots not directed at religion”, nor at allegiance to the parents’ country of origin, but rather at allegiance to France through a composite, “Anglo-Saxon-style” or “hyphenated” identity, which would lay the foundations for a new community.²¹ Another inspiring example of such initiatives from below came after the London riots of 2011, when people from all communities got together to clean up the mess. That genuinely popular initiative provides the cover photograph for this report.

Foreigners who are legally resident in a town or city should be recognised as valuable partners in a functioning local democracy, rather than being excluded from local public life. An important way to achieve this is through the identity of the public servants who carry out a city or local authority's policies and represent it in its many interfaces with the population. One European city that has tackled this responsibility in an imaginative way is Hamburg in Germany, where since 2006 there has been a special programme to recruit and integrate young people of migrant origin into the public service training system, using the slogan "We are Hamburg! Won't you join us?" Every year the city's public service department offers more than 500 training places in six different occupational fields: general administration, law courts, prison, police, fire service and tax authority. German or EU citizenship is not mandatory for acquiring *Beamte* status, a civil service category which brings with it the prospect of lifelong job security in the Hamburg administration. On successful completion of training, there are good chances of being taken into secure employment. (It is notable that the German cities which have the status of *Land* – Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen – have been the most active, and in some respects most successful, in combining freedom with diversity. This is partly because they have made intelligent use of their legislative power, which other German cities do not have, being within larger *Länder* and bound by the legislation of their *Land* parliament.)

Wherever possible – and for the same reasons – foreigners with the right of abode should be given the vote in local elections, even before they become citizens entitled to vote at the national level. This can improve relations between foreign residents and other sectors of the community, thereby benefiting not only the foreign residents themselves but the whole of society. Democracy begins at the local level, and true local democracy requires the participation of all long-term residents of the community.

Our overall conclusion, and sixth lesson, is that



Towns and cities have a unique role to play in creating a sense of shared community and common purpose.

Lesson Seven: Representation in the media

Almost all media are competing for market share, and therefore tend to report events in the way that is most likely to arouse public interest. So they emphasize what is dramatic, unusual or shocking – “If it bleeds, it leads” – with the result that almost all groups or individuals that receive extensive media coverage (including mainstream politicians) feel that they are being misrepresented, with undue emphasis on faults and unduly negative interpretations. The more the medium is aimed at a mass audience, the truer this is likely to be. Ethnic and religious minorities, and those most often described as “immigrants”, have a particularly strong sense of grievance, often feeling that they are *only* reported when they can be associated with crime, terrorism or behaviour that is perceived as antisocial. They also often feel they are only an *object* of media coverage, and never its subject – in the sense that they are being reported on but not given the opportunity to do the reporting themselves and describe the world as it appears to them. In particular, many Muslims feel that their religion and their community are the object of constant vilification in the media.

- Figures 21 to 24 suggest that, between 2000 and 2008, “terrorism” and “terrorist” were the most common nouns used in **Britain’s** national newspapers (tabloid and broadsheet) in conjunction with Islam and Muslims; that the most common discourses about them came under the heading of “Terrorist threat” or “Islam as dangerous”; and that terrorism was the news “hook” for over 35% of stories about British Muslims (with only a slight edge for tabloid over broadsheet newspapers).
- In **Germany**, media experts have repeatedly pointed out that the media are not representative of the country’s diverse society, either in the ethno-cultural mix of onscreen media figures or in the choice and presentation of themes. While Germany has become a country of immigration in recent decades,

Figures 21 and 22: Coverage of Islam and Muslims in the UK



Source for Figures 21–24: Julian Petley and Robin Richardson (eds.), *Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2011), p. 55.

Note: Based on a search of all UK national newspapers, both tabloid and broadsheet, in the Nexis database of newspapers.

Figure 23: Common discourses on Muslims





Figure 24: News coverage of Muslims




public discourse still often presents German society as being a homogeneous one, to which migrants and postmigrants do not and cannot fully belong. Nearly a third of all Germans (30.8%) think that “people who have always lived here should have more rights than those who have moved here later”; and nearly half (47.1%) agree with the statement “There are too many foreigners living in Germany.”²² In a laudable attempt to encourage the media to present a more accurate picture, the Freudenberg Foundation has sponsored the CIVIS Media Prize for Integration and Cultural Diversity, which awards film, TV, radio, print media and internet features that present issues related to migration, integration and diversity fairly and sympathetically.

- In **Canada** too, members of minorities are often negatively portrayed. The media were heavily criticized in 2010 over their portrayal of Tamil refugees, notably in coverage of the arrival on the West Coast of Canada of the boat *MV Sun Sea*, carrying 492 Tamil refugees. The coverage emphasized security and terrorism risks, demonizing the refugee population rather than focusing on their human rights. Even the leading weekly news magazine *Maclean's* caused a storm in 2010 with an article discussing whether or not Canadian universities had become “too Asian”.²³ More recently, in May 2013, the *Toronto Star* has been criticized for its portrayal of the Somali community in a controversy over a video of Toronto Mayor Rob Ford allegedly using crack cocaine. The paper highlighted the fact that Ford was with “a group of Somali men involved in the drug trade”, using the word “Somali” 11 times in a single article, thereby reinforcing stereotypes of this Toronto minority as being composed essentially of criminals.


Figures 25 and 26 show that, in at least four of our five countries (2011 data for Canada are not yet available), the increase in clichéd, unsympathetic media portrayals of minorities, especially immigrants, postmigrants and Muslims, has been accompanied by a similar increase in unfavourable or negative attitudes towards Muslims, expressed by respondents to major opinion polls such as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. It therefore seems not unreasonable to assume some causal connection between the two. Research by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia²⁴ in fact suggests a causal relationship between negative stereotyping in the media against minorities and immigrants, and the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment and violence.

Figure 25: Attitudes towards Muslims, 2008



Sources: Leger Marketing for Canada, 2008; Pew Global Attitudes Survey for all other countries, 2008.

Figure 26: Share of citizens saying that 'relations between Westerners and Muslims are bad', 2011



Sources: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2011; data for Canada not yet available.

Note: The two charts suggest a massive deterioration in attitudes towards Muslims between 2008 and 2011. In the 2011 survey, PEW went for a slightly different wording of the question allowing the respondent to voice a more negative sentiment, without expressing a personal preference. The 2011 figures are hence probably more accurate than the 2008 ones in measuring negative attitudes. The deterioration from 2008 to 2011 is hence not as significant as a quick glance at the charts would suggest.

But if Muslims regard the media as a threat, the reverse is also true. The furious reactions of some Muslims to perceived slights to their religion has led them to be widely seen as posing a threat to freedom of expression. This concern results from a number of episodes, including the Rushdie affair in 1989 and the Danish cartoons in

2005-6.²⁵ In these cases Islamist activists succeeded in instigating parts of the Muslim communities to react with violence and death threats (including at least two actual murders) to what they saw, or claimed to see, as extreme provocation – first, the portrayal of the wives of the Prophet as prostitutes (albeit only dreamt by a character in a novel), and then the publication of cartoons of the Prophet himself. Others demanded that sacred symbols or beliefs should be protected from public insult, citing the precedent of laws against Holocaust denial in some European countries. For a basic summary of the current state of legal provisions on hate speech, religious hatred and genocide denial in our five countries, see Figure 27. Partly as a result, the mainstream media have become very cautious in their handling of such issues, which in turn has led to charges, not without foundation, of self-censorship for fear of a violent response.

Figure 27: Legal provisions pertaining to hate speech, religious hatred and genocide denial

<i>Legal provisions</i>	FR	GE	UK	CA	US
<i>Incitement to violence (clear and present danger)</i>	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
<i>Hate speech law against racist speech</i>	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
<i>Hate speech laws against religious hatred speech</i>	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
<i>Holocaust-denial law</i>	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO

Source: Respective penal and criminal codes, laws and regulations in the countries as available in open access documents.

Note: Hate speech laws prohibit communications that vilify a person or a group based on some personal criteria such as race, ethnicity or religion. In all five countries there are laws banning hate speech in various forms with the notable exception of federal law in the USA, where, as a general rule, only speech that causes immediate danger can be punished. In the USA there are, however, state laws that define racial abuse as a punishable offence.

Germany and France have adopted so-called ‘memory laws’ as a form of hate speech law punishing the denial of genocides, most notably the Holocaust. In France further memory laws are in place, though attempts to criminalise the denial of the Armenian genocide have so far been unsuccessful. Overall, it can be said that among the countries that have hate speech laws, Germany and France take a more restrictive stance than the UK and Canada, while the USA has the least restrictions on free speech.

The difficult issues that constantly arise are illustrated by a recent episode in Britain – the trial and conviction of a group of men of South Asian Muslim background who had recruited young girls (mainly white) into a prostitution ring and subjected them to abuse. This time, conventional media outlets went to great lengths to avoid reporting the affair in prejudicial, ethnic or religious terms, but the opposite was true in online social media – by now possibly more influential, especially among young people – where freelance commentators described the ethno-religious aspect of the case as “the elephant in the room” (i.e. the dominant factor which mainstream media were deliberately tiptoeing round).

Such cases will continue to confront the media with delicate choices, which we cannot anticipate in detail, let alone prescribe. What does seem clear is that it is in the interest *both* of the essential freedom of expression *and* of good community relations that minorities should be properly represented in the media, in two distinct senses. First, the media should cover the affairs of minorities fully and fairly – without fear or favour; and secondly, minority faces and voices should be well represented among media professionals – those who can be seen and heard on TV and radio, those who report and comment in print or online, and also those with editorial or gatekeeper functions who decide what the public should or should not see and hear.


In this second sense, minorities remain underrepresented in the media in all of our five countries, even if the evidence here is still fragmentary at this stage.

- In **Britain**, the New Statesman magazine did a study in 2012, focusing mainly on the print press. It found that non-white minorities were “largely absent” from editorial and columnist positions, with a few notable exceptions in the Guardian, Independent and Sunday Times. (The Guardian in particular has made a serious effort to open its widely read Comment is Free pages online to a range of voices, including British Muslim writers who sharply disagree with each other.) Things seem to be significantly better on television, however, with the public broadcasters – BBC and Channel 4 – recognised as having made particular efforts to reflect diversity as well as to explain it.
- In **France**, under-representation of ethnic minorities in the mass media has become a topical issue, especially since the riots in the Parisian suburbs in 2005. The *Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel* issues an annual report on diversity in French television, which continues to find a persistent pattern of under-

representation, with no substantial change since 2011. In fact, the appearance of a non-white person in a visible leading position on TV – such as Harry Roselmack, a black presenter on TF1’s evening news, or Patricia Loison (born in India) on France 3 – is still rare enough to be treated as a major news item in itself.

- In **Germany**, only very few anchormen and women with non-ethnic German backgrounds can be seen on TV, with the notable exception of Dunya Hayali, anchorwoman of the ZDF breakfast news programme since 2007. But there are signs of a significant, if slow, process of change. A wide range of civil society initiatives aim at making the coverage of migration and cultural difference fairer, and at increasing the proportion of postmigrants working in the media. The Berlin-based *Neue Deutsche Medienmacher*, for example, is an association of media people from non-ethnic-German backgrounds, who aim at increasing the presence of migrants in the German media.
- In **Canada**, multiculturalism is a key principle of the Broadcasting Act of 1991, which states that the Canadian broadcasting system should, through both its programming and employment opportunities, “serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society”. Overall, Canada’s media is extremely diverse, with over 250 newspapers in languages other than English, more than two dozen ethnic radio stations, and many ethnic television stations.
- For the **United States**, figure 28 shows the representation of five main ethnic groups among guest interviewees on the three most widely watched evening cable news programmes. On all three channels, non-Hispanic whites (63% of the population) are heavily overrepresented, and Latinos (17%) grossly underrepresented. African-Americans (13%) are overrepresented on MSNBC but under on the other two, while Asians and people of Middle Eastern descent apparently do better on CNN. (All four minority groups are underrepresented on Fox.) There is an increase in minority-focused websites and online media outlets, but the Pew Excellence in Journalism Project notes that the Arab American news media are still only “nascent”.

Figure 28: Ethnic Diversity of interviewees on US cable evening news in April 2013



Source: Media Matters 2013.

Note: Media Matters conducted a review of guests on 13 evening cable news shows on CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC during the month of April 2013.

It is important that the two forms of representation are not conflated. Minority affairs should not be reported exclusively by minority journalists; nor should minority journalists be used only or mainly to report on issues affecting their own ethnic or religious group – any more than we would expect gay journalists to report only about LGBT affairs, or women correspondents only on women’s issues. It is essential that well-qualified members of minorities are seen to be trusted, not just to describe the experience of their own community, but as general reporters, authority figures and specialists in issues unconnected with their ethnic/religious identity – as, for example, in the case of Faisal Islam, the economics correspondent for Britain’s Channel 4 News.

And so our seventh lesson is

Minorities must be fully represented both in the media and by the media.

Lesson Eight: The duty to speak out

The state should not place limits on freedom of expression, except where absolutely necessary for the prevention of violence or material damage, and the protection of privacy when there is no public interest at stake. We recognise that this core liberal principle is interpreted somewhat differently in France and Germany, where denial of the Holocaust and some other historical facts is banned by law. While such “memory laws” need to be understood in the context of the experiences of World War II, we believe that they not only limit freedom of expression but may also have a negative effect on community relations, particularly when the hallowed truths of one community are protected by law, while those of others are not.

As a general rule, the battle for public opinion does not belong in the law courts. But that only makes it more important to fight it where it does belong, namely in the media and public debate. Slanders and stereotypes should not be left unanswered, as they may have a corrosive influence on social cohesion and our chances of living together in freedom and diversity.

The American political scientist Corey Brettschneider usefully distinguishes between the state’s “coercive” and its “expressive” role.²⁶ While it must maintain “freedom for the thought that we hate” in law, that should not prevent it “speaking” clearly itself—through memorial days (e.g. Holocaust memorial day), museums, monuments, ceremonies, parliamentary declarations and the statements of government leaders.

Yet this obligation does not lie only on the state, or on those holding power in it. Not only people in positions of authority, but also those whose celebrity or profession gives them privileged access to the public eye or ear, have a responsibility to give wherever possible a fair and accurate account of the beliefs, culture and activities of other groups, to condemn racial or religious abuse, and to refute misleading generalisations or stereotypes wherever they may encounter them. They must be aware of the impact

of their statements, even casual ones, on both minority and majority attitudes. This does not mean suppressing the adversarial nature of political and social debate, which is essential for democratic decision-making, and often valuable in itself. Rather, it means ensuring that there is indeed a robust debate about questionable generalisations which stereotype or insult members of a group or adherents of a religion, and which may otherwise be in danger of gaining acceptance by default.

As noted in Lesson Seven, even where mainstream media have begun to be more careful about their portrayal of minority groups, hatred and stereotyping are often given free rein in online social media, which are increasingly influential in forming public opinion. It is all the more important that they are not left unanswered there either, and here responsibility falls not only on public figures as conventionally understood, but also on everyone who is active online, and especially those who have a sizeable audience for what they write on these subjects. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue has published a useful guide to the skills and strategies needed to counter and refute extremist and radicalising narratives with some hope of success.²⁷

Needless to say, this applies with equal force to members of minorities, who should not only refrain from using the internet and social media to preach prejudice and intolerance, let alone violence, against the majority population or the institutions of the democratic state in which they live, but should actively oppose them wherever they appear. It is essential that people speak out against abuse and stereotyping not only *of* their own group, but also when it is done *by* members of their group. It will not serve the cause of living together in freedom if Muslims only speak out to defend Muslims, Jews only against verbal attacks on Jews, Somalis only against attacks on Somalis, liberals only in defence of liberals, and so on. Indeed, as George Orwell showed us, we have a duty to be especially critical of the falsehoods or half-truths produced by our own side.

Many civil society groups and public figures have spoken out. One of the earlier ones in France was “SOS Racisme”, the anti-racism NGO founded in 1984 with its catchy logo of an upheld hand bearing the slogan “*Touche pas à mon pote*” (“Hands off my pal”). In Britain, Searchlight magazine responded to the propaganda of the far-right British National Party and anti-Muslim English Defence League by launching the “Hope not Hate” campaign, whose supporters work within communities where organized racists are attracting support, for instance going into pubs and joining in or striking up conversations. At the same time, groups such as the Quilliam Foundation have worked hard to combat extremism within Muslim communities. In

football, FIFA launched its international “Say No To Racism” campaign in 2006. In Germany the then federal President Christian Wulff declared in 2010, at the height of the “Sarrazin Debate” (see Lesson Ten below), that “Christianity doubtless belongs in Germany. Judaism belongs doubtless in Germany. That is our Judeo-Christian history. But now, Islam also belongs in Germany”. In Canada, Calgary’s Mayor Naheed Nenshi, the first Muslim mayor of a major North American city, has used his position to speak out against racism and discrimination, and to encourage a pluralist image of Canada where one can be both a devout Muslim and a “committed Canadian”.²⁸

But many more such examples are needed. We strongly recommend that


Public figures, and people with a significant presence online, should challenge stereotypes and misleading generalisations about any group.


Lesson Nine: Politics

One important test of successful integration is the participation of minorities in the political process, starting with their exercise of the right to vote. Figures 29 and 30 show that, as of 2010, a smaller percentage of foreign-born than of native-born men and women reported themselves as having voted in the most recent national election in all five of our case-study countries – the difference being highest among women in Germany and lowest among both men and women in Canada. We do not have corresponding figures for native-born members of minorities.

It is important that minorities should be, and feel, empowered, but this is not achieved by recognising self-appointed minority leaderships, or by ascribing to people identities which they do not themselves choose. We alluded in the Introduction to the search of states for *interlocuteurs valables* through whom they can deal with minorities, and the fact that this has sometimes led states to promote and empower self-appointed “community leaders”, some of them with dubious credentials.

Figures 29 and 30: Self-reported voter participation





Source: OECD International Migration Database.
Note: Voting participation is measured by asking whether an individual cast a ballot in the most recent national election. Note that self-reported participation rates are generally much higher than the actual participation rates recorded by election authorities.

Here are examples of attempts made to engage the Muslim communities in our three European case-study countries:

- The French Council of the Muslim Faith was set up in 2003, ostensibly as a non-governmental organization but with strong support from Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior. His idea was to bring together the rival currents in French Islam and give an official voice to the country’s second largest faith. From the start, however, the Council was racked by rivalry between Muslim leaders of Algerian and Moroccan origin, supported by their respective governments, while both feared the influence within it of the more radical Union of Islamic Organisations in France. By 2008 it was almost universally seen as at best ineffective and at worst dangerous. Its track record, according to the well known French specialist on Islam, Olivier Roy, was “zero – on the training of imams, nothing; on appointing chaplains, nothing; on contributing to public debates, nothing.”²⁹
- The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), an umbrella body of Muslim organizations set up in 1997, was less directly government-sponsored but has also been cultivated by public authorities in search of a channel of communication with a partly imaginary “Muslim community”. Its representativeness has been widely questioned. In the words of a sympathetic

journalist, Madeleine Bunting,³⁰ “to the extent that the government over-relied on the MCB, it was due to the laziness of the government wanting only to hear one voice – the colonial model of ‘bring me your headman.’” She added that the MCB was “not democratic, it is not representative and it can be divisive”. None the less, it was “the biggest Muslim organization in this country and the one that has achieved the greatest degree of non-factionalism and non-sectarianism”, and therefore, in her view, it should not be excluded from the government’s engagement with “a wide range of Muslim organizations”.

- The German Islam Conference was convened by Wolfgang Schäuble in 2006, when he was Germany’s federal Minister of the Interior, and has met annually since then. Its object is to provide an institutionalised forum for dialogue between government (at federal, state and local levels) and Germany’s growing Muslim population. At the 2007 conference, a new body was launched: the Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany, a kind of “umbrella of umbrellas”, bringing together the four largest Muslim umbrella organizations in Germany – the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, the Islamic Council of Germany, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and the Association of Islamic Culture Centres. However, while Schäuble’s successors continue to express satisfaction with the Islam Conference, and Muslim organizations believe it is important to continue the dialogue, some have also called the talks in their present form “pointless”. An opposition parliamentary leader has charged that the present minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, “is only interested in security and terrorism” and has led the Conference to a “dead end”.³¹ It has also been noted that many Muslim organizations, including some of those that belong to the Islam Conference and the Coordinating Council, remain under long-term observation by the intelligence services. (See Lesson Ten below.)³²

In all three cases the intentions may have been commendable; yet the desire of state agencies to interact with one body representing all Muslims (even while dealing separately with a wide range of Christian groups) has almost always been too obviously driven by the security agenda and a sense of distrust towards Muslim organizations. In principle, therefore, it is preferable if members of minorities can express themselves through regular democratic institutions, rather than *ad hoc* bodies created or promoted by the state. Where there are already relatively well-organized and representative bodies (as for instance in Germany), the state should interact with them in the same way as it does with the main Christian denominations.

Clearly, in a democracy, members of minorities must be free not only to vote, but also to organize themselves, as they see fit – including, if they so wish, in separate parties formed to advance their specific interests. If they are denied this freedom there is a danger that they will feel the system is excluding or discriminating against them, and either relapse into apathy or contest the system through undemocratic means.

It is, however, even more desirable, indeed essential, that migrants, postmigrants and members of minorities should participate in mainstream parties, based on shared interests, values and policies, and make their voices heard in and through them. The question of how one secures such representation in the high places of a free country – not just in political parties but also in the law courts, the police, the civil service and so on – is a famously difficult one. Affirmative action, particularly in the form of quotas, risks the accusation that one is undermining foundational principles of equal opportunity and selection by merit. ‘So now you are discriminating against us!’ cry the members of a disgruntled majority (sometimes, as in the case of the white English working class, themselves underprivileged and educationally deprived). It further risks undermining the credibility of those of minority background who are promoted to senior positions (‘she’s only there because she’s...’).

None the less, such visible representation is enormously important, in politics as in the media, and can have a positive impact much wider than the relatively small number of people involved. There is no simple or absolutely fair way of achieving this. One curious – and inimitable – example comes from the upper house of the oldest democracy among our five countries. Since members of the British House of Lords are not elected, the government has simply appointed prominent members of the Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, Jewish, Asian British and other communities to be peers of the realm. Their ennoblement sends a powerful message of recognition and opportunity to all members of the communities from which they come: ‘you, too, could be a Lord or a Lady!’

This expedient is not, however, available to most democratic countries, and is in any case no substitute for the work of parties competing in a genuinely democratic process. In order to achieve this, parties must make efforts to ensure that people from minorities can achieve positions of real power (and not just token prominence) within their own ranks. The Greens in Germany have shown that this is possible by electing Cem Özdemir, the son of a Turkish-Circassian guest-worker, as their co-chairperson.

The Social Democrats have a long history of participation by immigrants and postmigrants, not least thanks to close relations with trade unions. The Free Democrats have also been keen on incorporating postmigrant members (and MPs), but the Christian Democrats have been much slower in opening up to such people, particularly those of Muslim and/or Turkish heritage. That said, there is a growing number of Christian Democrat politicians with a Turkish/Muslim heritage on the local level (particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia), who are slowly rising through the ranks, and there is a German-Turkish Forum, which seeks to strengthen Turkish representation within the party.

Of Canada's three major parties, the New Democratic Party is the most active and explicit in recruiting visible minorities. It has adopted an affirmative action policy which requires riding (constituency) associations actively to seek candidates from visible minorities and provides such candidates with financial assistance once they are selected. Neither the Conservative nor the Liberal Party has such an explicit affirmative action policy. In the 2004 election it was the Conservative Party that fielded the largest number of minority candidates, many of them in winnable ridings, but in 2006 the party ran significantly fewer, and most of them where it had little chance of winning. Historically, the Liberals have had more visible minority candidates than the other major parties, but this has shifted in recent years. In the 2008 election, they were the least likely to nominate candidates from visible minorities, and placed only 7% of new minority candidates in winnable ridings, in contrast to 30% of new white candidates.³³

In Britain, the Labour party made a choice to cultivate minority representation, with minority groups tending to be most numerous in what had traditionally been Labour constituencies, and concentrated also at the lower end of the socio-economic scale where leftwing policies generally have greatest appeal. This enabled relatively large numbers of candidates from minority backgrounds to win parliamentary seats as well as positions of power in local government. For some years now, television coverage of the British House of Commons has shown a striking contrast between the multi-coloured ranks of the Labour party, visibly diverse in background (and gender), and the still largely white, male ranks of the Conservatives. More recently the Conservative Party has begun to diversify its visible representation quite rapidly. This has a political logic for the party, since many of Britain's main minority groups incline to be both entrepreneurial and socially conservative. It may also have a wider positive impact, since the existing voter base of conservative parties is often the least sympathetic to

migrants and to diversity. It will be interesting to see if the Republican Party in the United States, which lost the 2012 election largely thanks to minority, and particularly Hispanic, votes for President Obama, follows a similar path.

Our conclusion is that

Active steps need to be taken, notably by political parties, to ensure that minorities and their members are fully represented through established democratic institutions.

Lesson Ten: How attitudes are changed

We should distinguish clearly between what must be required by law in a free country and what is desirable for living together in a free country in mutual enrichment. The first category includes basic rights and freedoms, while the second includes such things as “mutual respect” – which is clearly important but cannot be compelled: it needs to exist in people’s hearts and minds. It goes without saying that respect should also be reflected in outward behaviour, but it is not practicable, and is generally counterproductive, to treat it as a right which can be claimed by law. People should show respect for each other, but failure to do so is a subjective matter, except when it goes so far as to infringe clearly defined rights, violations of which can be objectively determined. The burden of proof should always be on those who seek to extend legal restrictions and create new punishable offences, thereby imposing new limits on the rights and freedoms of others.

We believe that a better common life in today’s diverse societies ultimately depends less on legal compulsion, and more on enabling people of different cultures and persuasions to *feel* that they actually need to live together, and can do so without feeling threatened, because they are all members of the same society and nation. Such feelings will depend, in large part, on the “signals” that different parts of society are receiving from each other, whether or not these signals are consciously and deliberately emitted. At this point one needs to stretch the notion of “public policy” to its furthest extent. We are all members of the public, and in the last resort it is the personal responsibility of every one of us who lives in a diverse society to pay attention to the signals we are sending to our neighbours in our everyday interactions with them. Those actions – at school, at work, on the street, in the local shop or café – will affect the attitudes of migrants and postmigrants at least as much as any high policy. As one of us (Timothy Garton Ash) writes in an essay which expands on this theme: “Small slights alienate, small courtesies integrate.”³⁴

Some signals are, however, picked up more widely than others, and they can be negative as well as positive. Some very powerful ones were received by Muslims in Germany from the reception of Thilo Sarrazin's book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* ("Germany abolishes itself"), published in 2010, which argued that Germany is in imminent danger of being taken over by Muslims, and that genetic and religious reasons explain the underperformance of Muslim immigrants, particularly of Turks.³⁵ The issue here was not the author's right to publish his views, nor even primarily the reaction of the political and cultural elite, which did by and large distance itself from those views. More important was the reaction of a significant part of the popular press and general public, which behaved as if Sarrazin's statements had unmasked an elite conspiracy to deny or conceal what everyone knew to be true. The book led the best-seller lists for a year, selling more than 1.5 million copies. According to a Bertelsmann poll in 2013,³⁶ more than 50% of Germans regarded Islam as more a threat than an enrichment. (36% of West Germans said they felt the same about atheism and 19% of all Germans about Judaism.)

A recent research project, *Signals from the majority*,³⁷ looked specifically at the impact on immigrant and minority communities in Germany of two contemporary issues: the public debate about male circumcision in 2012, and the long-term surveillance of certain Muslim organizations by the *Verfassungsschutz* (Agency for the Protection of the Constitution). The circumcision debate began in May 2012, when a Cologne court effectively outlawed male circumcision in Germany, and ended, at least formally, when the Bundestag passed a law re-legalising it seven months later. In between these two events a wide range of actors came out against circumcision, often in an aggressive and vehement way. This shocked many Jews, particularly because of some of the images used, depicting them as bad parents, child molesters, and members of a pre-rational religious community which needed to assimilate to German values. Many Jews found the debate intrusive and disrespectful, and some voiced serious concerns about the future of Jewish life in Germany.

The second case study explored the surveillance of non-violent Islamist movements deemed to be "not in conformity" with the German constitution. Many of their members could not understand why their group was subjected to surveillance, since they explicitly rejected violence and radical views while seeking to participate in German society as Muslims.

In a sense, both these debates can be said to have had positive outcomes: circumcision has been legally secured, and racist explanations of socio-economic differences between ethnic and religious groups have been publicly rejected by most official and mainstream independent commentators. Yet the “signals” received by both Jews and Muslims left many of them wondering whether they will ever be accepted in Germany as equal citizens.

Even in Canada, which scores so well in our Indicators, civic organizations sometimes emit negative signals. For instance, the Quebec Soccer Federation imposed a ban on the wearing of turbans and other religious headwear during soccer matches. The organization only lifted it (in June 2013) after being suspended by the Canadian Soccer Association and after FIFA had issued a directive confirming the legality of such headwear.³⁸

It is vital that there should be positive signals to counterbalance the effect of such negative ones. The ability and willingness of members of minorities to feel that they belong to a nation, and for majorities to accept them as part of it, will depend in large part on such signals over time – on the way a nation or society presents or depicts itself, and the way minorities are depicted or represented, not only in political and social discourse but also in cultural products such as soap operas, feature films, popular novels, museums, sporting events and so on. The American TV sitcom *The Cosby Show*, which portrayed the life of an upper middle class African-American family living in Brooklyn in the late 1980s and early 90s, is widely recognised as a breakthrough moment in the way that community has been seen and has seen itself within wider society. There is now a vigorous debate about whether sitcoms that highlight recognizable Hispanic actors working in English-language television such as ABC’s *Modern Family* – which Republican Presidential nominee Mitt Romney proclaimed his favourite TV show in 2012 – can do the same for the Hispanic community. So far, most Hispanic viewers have preferred the Spanish-language telenovela *La Que No Podía Amar*, which airs during the same weekly time slot as *Modern Family*. In Canada, *Little Mosque on the Prairie*, the comedy series aired on CBC from 2007 to 2012 which depicted the lives of Muslim and Christian characters in a prairie town in Saskatchewan, was well received by both Muslim and non-Muslim Canadians.

Another interesting example is the widely watched opening ceremony of the 2012 London Olympics. This was a long, exuberant and partly ironic self-portrait of the British nation, which mixed several strands: a traditional narrative (cricket, green fields, Shakespeare), multicultural diversity, pop music, and widely treasured public goods such as the National Health Service. Many members of minorities, as well as of the white British majority, responded warmly to this very high-profile and quasi-official event, in which the Queen herself made an unexpected cameo appearance, alongside James Bond.

People's picture or understanding of their own society, and of their place in it, derives in no small degree from the way it is presented in such cultural, sporting and social contexts, as well as from their direct experience of everyday interactions. We believe more attention needs to be paid to understanding this apparently "soft" yet actually crucial dimension of combining diversity and freedom. This lesson is not easy to encapsulate in a single sentence, but we can say that

For everyone in a diverse society, the feeling of belonging together depends crucially on the social and cultural signals sent and received every day.

Notes

¹ Toronto, “Backgrounder”, 29 May 2013.

² Council of Europe, *Living Together: Combining Diversity and Freedom in 21st Century Europe* (Strasbourg, 2011), p.10.

³ <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/freedomanddiversity.html>.

⁴ Council of Europe, *Living Together (op. cit.)*, pp. 37-51.

⁵ Robert Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century”, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2007), pp. 137-174.

⁶ OECD & European Commission, *Naturalisation: a Passport for the Better Integration of Immigrants?* (Brussels, 2011).

⁷ Jan Niessen, “The Participation of Immigrants in Political Processes and Institutions”, in Kristen Jeffers (ed.), *Inclusive Democracy in Europe* (Florence: European University Institute, 2012).

⁸ See Elena Jurado, *Citizenship: Tool or Reward? The Role of Citizenship Policy in the Process of Integration* (London: Policy Network, 2008).

⁹ See Gerhard Casper, “Forswearing Allegiance”, Maurice and Muriel Fulton Lecture in Legal History, University of Chicago Law School, 1 May 2008.

¹⁰ http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_320/nn_6906/DE/presse/pm/2013/178-2013.html?__nnn=true.

¹¹ Not all authorities agree on this point. In 2009, concerned that the public school system was failing its Afro-Caribbean students, the Toronto District School Board decided to create a new “Africentric” school, in which “the sources and knowledge and experiences of peoples of African descent” are taken as “an integral feature of the teaching and learning environment.” Several similar schools exist in the United States, and results from other such schools have indicated that “Black students at Africentric schools perform better on tests, skip class less often, show greater respect for authority and elders, report feeling a greater sense of belonging in their schools, and have a greater commitment to social responsibility and community welfare.” But the experiment has provoked fierce controversy in Canada. Whether it should be considered a triumph or failure of diversity remains a moot point.

¹² Prudence Carter, “Schools’ cultural practices key to true integration”, *Gender News*, 17 June 2013.

¹³ Council of Europe, *Living Together (op. cit.)*, p. 38.

¹⁴ Martin Ruhs, *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 8. See also Philip Martin, “Migrant workers’ vs. ‘international service providers’: Labour markets and the liberalization of trade in services”, in Christiane Kuptsch (ed.), *The Internationalization of Labour Markets: The Social Dimension of Globalization* (Geneva: ILO, 2010), pp. 197-229.

¹⁵ Claire Adida (University of California, San Diego), interviewed in *Discover*, 22 November 2010.

¹⁶ Council of Europe, *Living Together (op. cit.)*, p. 21.

¹⁷ Open Society Foundations, *At Home in Europe: Living Together* (New York, 2011).

¹⁸ Oral communication from Professor Gilles Kepel.

¹⁹ Open Society Foundations, *At Home in Europe (op. cit.)*, pp. 129-145.

²⁰ Alissa J. Rubin, “A French Town Bridges the Gap Between Muslims and Non-Muslims”, *New York Times*, 6 August 2013.

²¹ Open Society Foundations, *At Home in Europe (op. cit.)*, p. 98.

²² Naika Foroutan, *Identity and (Muslim) Integration in Germany* (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), pp. 4-5.

²³ Daniel Dale, “Council asks Maclean’s for ‘Too Asian?’ apology”, *The Star*, 20 December 2010.

²⁴ European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia & European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, *Racism and Cultural Diversity in the Mass Media. An overview of research and examples of good practice in the EU Member States, 1995-2000* (Vienna: EUMC, 2002).

²⁵ Also, in the Netherlands, the murder of the film-maker Theo Van Gogh, and death threats to his collaborator Ayan Hirsi Ali, an immigrant of Somali origin who renounced, and campaigned against, Islam.

²⁶ Corey Brettschneider, *When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012)

²⁷ Hannah Taylor, *Social Media for Social Change: Using the Internet to Tackle Intolerance* (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012).

²⁸ See for example his John Galbraith Memorial Lecture in St. John’s Newfoundland, in which he celebrated plurality and diversity at the municipal level.

- ²⁹ AFP, "Islam in Europe: Power wars spell dead-end for French Muslim council", 8 May 2008.
- ³⁰ Madeleine Bunting, "A dialogue of the deaf", *Guardian*, 12 July 2007.
- ³¹ Deutsche Welle, "German Islam Conference struggles to redefine its role", 7 May 2013.
- ³² Kerem Öktem, *Signale aus der Mehrheitsgesellschaft: Auswirkungen der Beschneidungsdebatte und staatlicher Überwachung Islamischer Organisation auf Identitätsbildung und Integration in Deutschland* (Oxford: European Studies Centre, 2013).
- ³³ Jerome H. Black, "Visible Minority Candidates and MPs: An Update Based on the 2008 Federal Election", *Canadian Parliamentary Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2011), pp. 30-34; Myer Siemiatycki, "The Diversity Gap: The Electoral Under-Representation of Visible Minorities", (DiverseCity: The Greater Toronto Leadership Project, 2011).
- ³⁴ See Timothy Garton Ash, "Freedom & Diversity: A Liberal Pentagram for Living Together", *New York Review of Books*, 22 November 2012.
- ³⁵ See Timothy Garton Ash's review essay on Sarrazin's book and its reception in German: "Germans, More or Less", *New York Review of Books*, 24 February 2011.
- ³⁶ Detlef Pollack & Olaf Müller, *Religionsmonitor - verstehen was verbindet. Religiosität und Zusammenhalt in Deutschland* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013), p.39.
- ³⁷ Kerem Öktem, *Signale aus der Mehrheitsgesellschaft* (*op. cit.*).
- ³⁸ Bertrand Marotte, "Sikhs celebrate reversal of Quebec's soccer turban ban", *The Globe and Mail*, 16 June 2013.

Acknowledgements

This report is the result of a process of academic research and intellectual debate that has involved a large number of experts, students, institutions and funding bodies. Without their commitment and dedication, this project would not have been possible.

A Steering Committee provided the academic backbone of the endeavour. In addition to the chair, Timothy Garton Ash, the principal investigator, Kerem Öktem, and the lead author of this report, Edward Mortimer, the Committee consisted of Oxford academics and other leading experts. We would like to thank Michael Keith (COMPAS), Amir Eshel (Stanford University), Kalypso Nicolaidis (Department of Politics and International Relations), Halbert Jones (North American Studies Programme, St Antony's College), Carolina Kobelinsky and Paola Mattei (both European Studies Centre), as well as Nazia Hussain (Open Society Foundations/At Home in Europe), Catherine Fieschi (Counterpoint), and Sasha Havlicek and Vidhya Ramalingam (both Institute for Strategic Dialogue).

A team consisting of students at the University of Oxford carried out the background research for this project together with the principal investigator. We would like to thank in particular Bassam Gergi for his great skill and commitment to the overall realization of the research; Katherine Bruce-Lockhart for her most valuable work on multiculturalism and citizenship in Canada; Tamasz Szigeti for his astute observations on citizenship and hate speech regulations; Aerica Banks for her contribution on education and discourse analysis; and Fagan Harris for his input in the initial fact-finding phase.

Dominic Burbidge has been an invaluable and scrupulous editor, and thoughtful commentator, as the report has moved to completion.

The research, the conference and the production of the pamphlet were made possible by the committed support of our administrative staff. Judith Bruhn, the Administrator of the Dahrendorf Programme for the Study of Freedom, was an indispensable member of the team and facilitator of the entire process. And so was Jelena Mayerhofer, the Administrator of the European Studies Centre. Their organizational skills ensured a smooth running of the committee meetings as well as the colloquium itself.

The Dahrendorf Colloquium in May 2013 was a true festival of ideas, thanks to the lively and insightful contributions of all the participants. Sasha Havlicek and Leo Lucassen (Leiden University) set the scene by framing the context and the larger questions at stake. Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago) circumscribed the contours of a principled liberal stance towards religious diversity in her keynote lecture *The Challenge of Religious Difference*. Bridget Anderson (COMPAS, Oxford University), Adrian Favell (Sciences Po, Paris) and Gary Gerstle (Harmsworth Visiting Professor of American History, Oxford University) explored the crucial theme of immigration, citizenship and inclusion, while Rob Reich (Stanford University), Patrick Weil (CNRS-Université de Paris I) and Susan Croft (Oxford Spires Academy) discussed the centrality of education in managing diversity. The importance of labour markets for integration and inclusion was at the centre of the presentations by Martin Ruhs (COMPAS, Oxford University), Philip Martin (UC Davis) and Felicitas Hillmann (Free University, Berlin). Another crucial theme, freedom of expression and the media, was analysed by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (The Independent), Leslie Green (Balliol College, Oxford and Queen's University, Canada) and Ali Aslan (Deutsche Welle). Politics in the local, national and global sphere was the theme of the panel bringing together Rushanara Ali (Labour Party MP, UK), Christopher Hill (Cambridge University) and Honey Deihimi (Federal Chancellery, Berlin). Michael Keith, Katrin Bennhold (International Herald Tribune) and Kerem Öktem concluded the colloquium with a synopsis of the debates and a look into the future. Margaret Macmillan (Warden of St Antony's College), Jeremy Waldron and John Lloyd accepted our request to join the debate as session chairs. We are indebted to all of them.

Finally, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to the participating institutions and funders of this project, for their generous support – intellectual, financial and logistical. We thank the European Studies Centre, the Welfare State research project and the North American Studies Programme, all at St Antony's College, the Centre for International Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, the Maison Française d'Oxford and COMPAS, all at Oxford University; the Europe Center at Stanford University; the OxPo collaboration between the Maison Française d'Oxford and Sciences Po, Paris; the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in London; the Zeit Foundation, the Aurea Foundation and the Open Society Foundations.



OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS



ZEIT-Stiftung
Ebelin und Gerd
Bucerius

Western societies are becoming ever more diverse, particularly because of large-scale migration over more than half a century. This is often seen as a threat to old-established freedoms but, properly managed, the reality of growing diversity should complement and enhance freedom. This report is dedicated to suggesting ways in which it can.

The product of a research project at Oxford University, it brings together data and analysis on five major Western democracies and draws ten lessons for public policy. Public policy is here understood to mean not just the work of governments and local authorities, but also the activities of civil society and the wider public. It is hoped that these lessons will stimulate useful debate, and not only in the five countries here compared.

Timothy Garton Ash is Professor of European Studies in the University of Oxford, Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow at St Antony's College, Oxford, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He directs the Dahrendorf Programme for the Study of Freedom at Oxford, which organised the project upon which this report draws.

Edward Mortimer is a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and Senior Programme Adviser to the Salzburg Global Seminar. He was formerly Foreign Affairs Editor of the Financial Times, Director of Communications to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and Rapporteur for the Council of Europe group on Living together: Combining diversity and freedom in 21st-century Europe.

Kerem Öktem is a Research Fellow at St Antony's College and Associate Faculty Member of the Oriental Institute, University of Oxford. He also holds a Mercator Fellowship at Istanbul's Sabanci University. He works on Islamic networks, exclusion and integration in Europe and the Balkans, Turkish politics and international relations, and social movements in Southeast Europe and the Middle East.

“One of the main challenges facing liberal democracies in the 21st century is to ensure that greater diversity means more freedom, not less. We have a good chance of achieving that if we learn the ten lessons in this report, and act on them.”

Joschka Fischer, Former German Foreign Minister and Chair of the Council of Europe group on Living together: Combining diversity and freedom in 21st-century Europe

“This is a bold, exhilarating, and utterly welcome contribution to public debate. Written with appealing vividness and simplicity, the report is at the same time conceptually subtle and empirically responsible. I happen to agree with almost all the recommendations, but the more important point is that the report makes excellent arguments that invite reasoned public discussion.”

Martha C. Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago

ISBN 978-0-9926819-0-6



9 780992 681906